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Chapter 1
General Introduction
People evaluate their environments. For example, people may have positive or negative 
responses towards ringing alarm clocks in the early morning, a child carrying a teddy­
bear, peanut butter, scientific journals, cockroaches, Greenpeace, abortion, snakes, 
strawberries, minority groups, modern art, Macintosh computers, fast-food restaurants, 
the death penalty, banana-flavored ice-cream, the euro, UPC, our parents-in-law, 
Christmas, chocolate, coffee, carnival etc. The evaluative responses towards stimuli like 
these are called attitudes.
Attitudes are functional in multiple ways. In short, attitudes may help us to 
understand and to respond to our environment, they may ease decision-making processes, 
they may express our personal identity, and they may help to create bonds with others 
(Katz, 1968; Maio & Olson, 2000; Smith et al.,1956). The functionality of attitudes 
should also become evident when considering their possible consequences. There is 
abundant support for the idea that attitudes influence behavior and information 
processing. For example, it has been shown that attitudes may influence behavior and 
decision making in the domain of voting (e.g. Krosnick, 1988b, Shuman & Johnson, 
1976; Verplanken & Holland, 2002, Study 6), prejudice (e.g. Fazio, Jackson, Dunton & 
Williams, 1995), puzzles (e.g. Fazio & Zanna, 1978), dating partners (Wilson, Dunn, 
Bybee, Hyman & Rotondo, 1984), donations to charity (Holland, Verplanken & van 
Knippenberg, 2002), consumer decisions (Sanbonmatsu & Fazio, 1990; Wilson & Dunn, 
1986), blood and organ donation (e.g. Jaccard, King & Pomazal, 1977), and many other 
behaviors and decisions (for reviews, see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Kraus, 1995). In 
addition, attitudes have also been found to influence interpersonal attraction (e.g. Byrne,
1971), selective attention (e.g. Roskos-Ewoldsen & Fazio, 1992) selective processing 
(e.g. Lord, Ross & Lepper, 1979) and selective perception (Fazio, 2000). Furthermore, 
some attitudes are quite stable over time and difficult to change (e.g. Hovland, 1959; 
Sears, 1983).
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Despite this abundant evidence illustrating the impact and persistence of attitudes, 
other studies have shown anything but powerful and stable attitudes. For example, Wicker 
(1969) suggested that we should get rid of the attitude concept, because attitudes were 
only very weakly related to behavior. Most evidently, the influence of persuasive 
communication on attitude change is one of the best-documented phenomena in social 
psychology (for reviews, see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), suggesting that at least some 
attitudes are easily changed. Furthermore, attitude change has also been documented as a 
function of mood (Schwarz & Clore, 1983), processes of dissonance and self-affirmation 
(Carlsmith & Festinger, 1959; Holland, Meertens & van Vugt, 2002; Steele & Liu, 1983), 
ease-of-retrieval experiences (Haddock, Rothman, Reber, & Schwarz, 1999), goals 
(Brendl, 2001), behavioral information (Salincik & Conway, 1975), analyzing reasons for 
one’ s attitude (Wilson, Kraft & Dunn, 1989), context effects in surveys (Schuman & 
Presser, 1981; Krosnick & Schuman, 1988) and others (see for reviews Schwarz & 
Bohner, 2001; Wilson & Hodges, 1992). Such flexibility in attitudes led Converse (1970) 
to conclude that many people have “non-attitudes” on key issues (cf. Rosenberg’s (1968) 
notions on “vacuous” attitudes).
Apparently, attitudes differ in the degree to which they are consequential. This 
feature of attitudes has been described in terms of strength. Krosnick and Petty (1995) 
argued that attitudes should be considered to be strong when they have impact on 
behavior and information processing and when they are stable over time and resistant to 
change. However, classifying attitudes as ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ on the basis of their 
consequences (e.g. behavioral outcomes) does not make clear why one attitude is more 
consequential than another. In order to be able to explain what causes one attitude to be 
more persistent and more strongly related to behavior, we need to analyze the structural 
features and process variables associated with these attitudes. In doing so, we may come 
to know why and how strong attitudes are more consequential than weak ones.
Reviewing the attitude objects listed in the first paragraph of this chapter, you 
may have noticed differences in the nature of attitudes that are related to strength. First, 
some attitudes may be held with great confidence (cockroaches), whereas towards other 
objects one may have ambiguous feelings (fast-food restaurants). Second, you may attach 
personal significance to some of these attitudes and such attitudes may be related to core 
aspects of your self-concept (scientific journals), whereas other attitudes may be 
considered less important and self-relevant (peanut butter). These two aspects of attitude 
strength reflect two dimensions that are central to the present dissertation. The first 
dimension refers to the certainty, conviction or certitude of the attitude. Within the 
literature on attitude strength, this dimension is often called commitment (Pomerantz,
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Chaiken & Tordesillas, 1995; Lastovica & Gardner, 1979; Lavine, Huff, Wagner, & 
Sweeney, 1998), gauging a person’s commitment to his or her attitudinal position on the 
issue1. The second dimension of attitude strength relates to the centrality or importance of 
the attitude to the self-concept and personal values. Although, many labels have been 
used to refer to this aspect of strength, centrality seems most appropriate because this 
term used by several other researchers (Bem, 1970; Budd & Spencer, 1984; Judd & 
Krosnick, 1982; Katz, 1960).
Although several factor-analytic studies have suggested that commitment and 
centrality should be viewed as distinct dimensions of strength (Lastovica & Gardner, 
1979; Pomerantz et al., 1995), little is known about the nature of these strength 
dimensions. The present book aims to contribute to the understanding of attitude strength, 
by examining commitment and centrality with respect to (1) structural features of 
attitudes that are associated with these dimensions, (2) mental processes underlying the 
psychological experiences of these dimensions and (3) consequences that are connected 
to these strength dimensions. Before elaborating on attitude strength, we will provide a 
more formal definition of attitude and describe properties of the attitudinal structure.
Attitude
In this book we will use the definition proposed by Eagly and Chaiken (1993). They 
defined an attitude as “the psychological tendency to evaluate a particular entity with 
some degree o f  favor or d isfavor” (p. 1.). That is, attitudes differ along an evaluative 
dimension, ranging from very positive to very negative. Attitudes are always evaluations 
of an entity. This entity may be an object, a person, an idea, a pattern of behavior or an 
organization, etc. Like many other constructs in social psychology, attitudes are 
hypothetical constructs. Attitudes are latent variables that are not directly observable 
(although neuro-scientific approaches seem to be making progress in exploring the 
hardware of attitudes). Nevertheless, many psychologists would agree that such latent 
processes do really exist somewhere in the minds of people.
Attitude structure
Psychologists have often ascribed structural features to attitudes. One way in which 
attitude structure has been investigated is by studying the structural features of the
1 In order to avoid misunderstandings concerning the meaning of this strength dimension, it should be 
emphasized that this strength dimension should not be confused with Kiesler’s (1971) notions of 
commitment as “the pledging or binding of the individual with behavioral acts” (p. 30).
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attitude itself and the classes of responses that directly underlie attitudes, i.e. the 
cognitive, affective or behavioral antecedents of evaluations. These features directly 
pertain to the internal structure of attitude. Therefore, this part of attitude structure is 
called the intra-attitudinal structure (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Illustrations of research 
investigating the intra-attitudinal structure are abundant. For example, investigators have 
studied the relation between an attitude and underlying beliefs (e.g. Anderson, 1971, 
1981; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1980), affect (e.g. Zajonc, 1980, Staats & Staats, 1958; 
Krosnick, Betz, Jussim and Lynn, 1992) and behavioral experiences (e.g. Bem, 1972, Wu 
& Shaffer, 1986); the consistency within and between beliefs, affect and behavioral 
experiences (see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; 1995); the bipolar structure of attitudes (e.g. 
Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergal, 1964); the independence of negativity and positivity in 
evaluations (e.g. Cacciopo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997; Kaplan, 1972); and the 
associative strength between an object and its summary evaluation (e.g. Fazio, 1995; 
Powell & Fazio, 1984). All these variables may be considered features of the internal 
structure of attitudes.
However, attitudes are not isolated psychological entities. Therefore, the structure 
of attitudes also implies external links of attitudes with other attitudes, values, personality 
traits, goals etc. These external links of attitudes with other elements in a cognitive 
structure is often referred to as the inter-attitudinal structure (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). 
Although the inter-attitudinal properties of attitudes are less intensively studied than intra- 
attitudinal properties, some researchers have focused on the relations between an attitude 
and other attitudes (e.g. Judd, Drake, Downing & Krosnick, 1991); personal values (e.g. 
Feather, 1995; Katz, 1968; Rokeach, 1968); the self (e.g. Greenwald, 1989); interpersonal 
attraction (e.g. Byrne, 1971; Heider, 1946); and personality traits (e.g. Petty, Wheeler, & 
Bizer, 2000). Perhaps Heider’s (1946) ideas on the dynamic relations between attitudes 
and personal attraction, as expressed in his balance theory, are probably the best-studied 
phenomena within literature on the inter-attitudinal structure (“George likes pizzas. 
George notices that Mary likes pizzas as well. Therefore, George likes Mary”). In 
addition, the relation between personal values and attitudes also received considerable 
attention. Many psychologists have pointed out that attitudes may be derived from more 
abstract desired end-states, i.e. personal values, such that people are positive towards 
attitude objects that are congruent, and negative towards objects that are incongruent with 
values (Feather, 1995; Feather, Norman, & Worsley, 1998; Rokeach, 1973; Stern, Dietz, 
Kalot & Guagnona, 1995).
Properties of the intra and inter-attitudinal structure may help to understand 
aspects of attitude strength (cf. Eagly & Chaiken, 1995). We will argue that intra- versus
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inter-attitudinal properties of strength may also elucidate differences in centrality and 
commitment dimensions of attitude strength. We will discuss the relation between attitude 
structure and attitude strength after we have summarized the state of affairs in attitude 
strength literature.
When attitudes become powerful: the psychology of strong attitudes
As we have described above, attitude strength has been defined in terms of attitudinal 
consequences (Krosnick & Petty, 1995). In investigating attitude strength, researchers 
have studied all kinds of attitudinal attributes that have to do with strength. For example, 
researchers have examined attributes such as the importance of the attitude (Krosnick, 
1988a; Boninger, Krosnick, & Berent, 1995), the certainty with which an attitude is held 
(Gross, Holtz & Miller, 1995), the extremity of an attitude (Abelson, 1995), the extent to 
which an attitude contains both positive and negative elements in memory, i.e. 
ambivalence (Thompson, Zanna & Griffin, 1995), the perceived likelihood than an 
attitude will change (Pomerantz et al., 1995), the accessibility of an attitude in memory 
(Fazio, 1995), the amount of knowledge associated with an attitude object (Wood, 1995) 
and the perceived centrality of attitude in relation to the self and personal values 
(Pomerantz et al., 1995).
In support of the notion that these attributes relate to attitude strength, there is 
ample evidence that such attributes affect the degree to which the attitudes involved have 
consequences such as behavior, information processing, stability and resistance to change 
(for reviews, see Krosnick, Boninger, Chuang, Berent, & Carnot, 1993; Petty & Krosnick, 
1995). The total number of variables that have been distinguished as strength related 
attributes is big. Therefore, it became unclear which aspect does really assess an attitude’s 
strength. Some researchers aimed to reduce this complexity by focusing on the way 
strength is measured. Others have focused on different dimensions of strength.
Meta-attitudinal versus operative measures of strength
Strength-related attributes differ in the way they are measured. Some of these attributes 
refer to psychological experiences of strength, such as attitude importance and certainty. 
Such subjective reflections with regard to the strength of a person’s attitude are called 
meta-attitudinal strength measures (Bassili, 1996). In fact, most strength-related attributes 
that have been described and examined fit this category of strength measures.
Other strength-related attributes refer to underlying mental structures or 
psychological processes. An illustration of such an attribute is attitude accessibility.
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Accessibility is usually measured by the response latency of an attitudinal inquiry (Fazio, 
Sanbonmatsu, Powell & Kardes, 1986; Fazio, 1995), and is said to reveal the strength of 
the link between an attitude object and its summary evaluation. If the strength of this link 
increases, an attitude becomes more easily activated when confronted with the object, 
which should lead to reduced response latencies. Measures like accessibility that tap 
mental representations or underlying psychological processes are called operative 
measures of attitude strength (Bassili, 1996).
Meta-attitudinal and operative measures of strength analyze attitude strength on 
different levels of processing. Operative measures of attitude strength provide a more 
direct peak into the processes and structural features underlying attitudes, whereas meta- 
attitudinal measures may be the result of these processes. Therefore, some authors have 
favored operative measures above meta-attitudinal measures (Bassili, 1996). However, 
sometimes the psychological experience of attitude strength is crucial for understanding 
effects. For example, Chaiken and colleagues (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989) has 
suggested in her heuristic systematic model of persuasion that the confidence felt towards 
an attitude is an important determinant of the level of information processing. Also, the 
conscious experience of attitude importance may motivate people in their actions. 
Therefore, it seems that both types of measures have their value. Operative measures may 
reveal structural properties that underlie an attitude’s strength and help to understand 
more implicit behaviors. Meta-attitudinal strength measures may reveal the psychological 
experiences of strength, and may help to understand more deliberative consequences.
Dimensionality of Attitude Strength
Bassili’s (1996) distinction between operative and meta-attitudinal measures suggested 
that all strength measures pertain to one underlying construct, although there are two 
general different ways to assess this construct. However, other researchers have tried to 
reveal strength dimensions that differ in content rather than method of measurement. This 
relates to a more controversial issue within the literature on attitude strength. Should all 
strength-related attributes be viewed as indicators of one single underlying construct, or 
can we discern multiple meaningful dimensions of strength?
The question with regard to the dimensionality of attitude strength has received a 
lot of empirical attention. Most of these studies have used factor analysis to explore the 
structure of attitude strength (Raden, 1985; Krosnick et al., 1993). By now, most 
researchers agree that attitude strength is best considered as a multi-dimensional construct 
(e.g. Abelson, 1988; Krosnick et al., 1993; Pomerantz, et al., 1995; Raden, 1985). 
However, the debate concerning the nature of a multi-dimensional structure continues.
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The search for reliable, higher order dimensions of strength has yielded mixed results. On 
the one hand, studies have shown differences in the number of strength dimensions, some 
studies revealing two factors (Bassili, 1996; Pomerantz et al., 1995), three factors 
(Abelson, 1988), and others even four (Prislin, 1996). These differences may be explained 
as resulting from the number and diversity of strength measures that were included in the 
studies. Usually, those studies that included many strength measures yielded many 
strength factors. In addition to differences in the number of factors, some studies also 
revealed differences in content of factors across study (Krosnick et al., 1993). For 
example, knowledge was found to load on a factor together with importance in some 
studies (e.g. Pomerantz et al., 1995) and on a different factor in others (Abelson, 1988; 
Krosnick et al., studies 2 and 3).
However, consistencies were also obtained across studies. For example, using 
meta-attitudinal measures of strength, Pomerantz et al. (1995) found clear factor 
structures across several attitude objects. One factor was determined by certainty, 
perceived likelihood of change and extremity, while a second factor was determined by 
importance, perceived centrality to the self and perceived centrality to personal values. In 
fact, several authors have suggested that attitude certainty, decidedness and/or 
accessibility on the one hand should be differentiated from measures pertaining to 
importance, relation to moral beliefs and self-relevance on the other hand (Abelson, 1988; 
Bassili, 1996; Erber, Hodges & Wilson, 1995; Lastovica & Gardner, 1979; Pomerantz et 
al., 1995). As we have briefly described above, the former dimension is referred to as 
commitment, whereas the latter is referred to as centrality.
Although an exclusive use of factor-analytic designs is unlikely to provide 
conclusive evidence for the structure of attitude strength (cf. Bizer & Krosnick, 2001), the 
convergence of results across studies and objects warrants more attention to centrality and 
commitment. In order to draw firm conclusions with regard to the nature of these two 
strength dimensions, a systematic approach is needed, in which the structural attitudinal 
features and psychological processes that are associated with these strength dimensions 
are studied, along with their consequences. Such a systematic approach is still lacking.
Two pillars of attitude strength: Centrality and commitment
The centrality and commitment dimensions were almost exclusively studied by meta- 
attitudinal strength measures. Then, what do these two factors represent in terms of 
psychological experience? Centrality relates to the psychological experience of the degree 
to which an attitude is personally important and perceived as central to the self or
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personal values. A person holding a high centrality attitude may express phrases on the 
attitude object like ‘this is important to me’. This is akin to the concept of ego- 
involvement. Sherif and Cantril (1947) described ego-involved attitudes as attitudes that 
are psychologically experienced as “belonging to me, as being part of me”.
Commitment relates to psychological experiences of certainty versus uncertainty, 
decidedness versus undecidedness, and people’s feelings that they will never change their 
minds or that they are open to change. Gross, Holtz & Miller (1995) defined attitude 
certainty as the subjective sense of conviction or validity about one’s attitude. Confidence 
would be a useful label for this strength dimension. However, whereas certainty or 
confidence is used to refer to specific attributes, researchers have used the term 
commitment to refer to the higher order strength dimension determined by several 
attributes, such as certainty, decidedness, and perceived likelihood of change (e.g. 
Lastovica & Gardner, 1979; Pomerantz et al., 1995).
Although centrality and commitment may be moderately correlated, it seems 
theoretically important to consider these dimensions as conceptually distinct dimensions. 
High levels of commitment do not automatically entail high levels of centrality. For 
example, a person may be very convinced that cockroaches are filthy insects, without any 
feeling of importance or self-relevance. Likewise, high levels of centrality do not have to 
imply high levels of commitment. For example, people may find the issue of nuclear 
power very important, but may be uncertain whether they are pro or contra.
Such examples suggest that it makes sense to distinguish these two dimensions. 
Still, it is not clear what underlies these two strength dimensions. Here we will contend 
that we may enhance our understanding of these two strength dimensions by focusing on 
the structural attitudinal features that underlie these dimensions. We will argue in the 
present dissertation that the distinction between the strength dimensions makes sense 
because centrality is associated with aspects of the inter-attitudinal structure, whereas 
commitment is associated with aspects of the intra-attitudinal structure.
Structural features that underlie commitment and centrality
Eagly and Chaiken (1995) endeavored to explain differences in attitude strength in terms 
of structural attitudinal features. They argued that the consequences related to strong 
attitudes may be better understandable if we comprehend the ‘particular structural 
configuration that underlies an attitude’s strength’ (p. 413). In harmony with this view, 
we suggest that differences in centrality and commitment can be explained by structural 
attitudinal features. However, because previous factor-analytic studies supporting these
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dimensions were largely based on meta-attitudinal strength measures. Thus far, the 
structural bases of centrality and commitment are largely unexplored.
We argue that the structural attitude features associated with centrality have to do 
with the external or inter-attitudinal structure. More precisely, attitude centrality has to do 
with the strength of the link between an attitude and important/core constituents of the 
self-concept (Katz, 1960). If an attitude becomes more strongly embedded in a cognitive 
structure of personal goals, values and/or other aspects of the self, centrality increases. 
Several researchers have underlined the functional relation between attitudes and aspects 
of the self-concept, such as values (e.g. Johnson & Eagly, 1989; Ostrom & Brock, 1968; 
Sherif and Cantril, 1947), self-schemas (Petty, Weeler and Bizer, 2000), and personality 
traits (Petty et al., 2000; Prentice & Carlsmith, 2000). However, no attempts have been 
made yet to empirically validate this assumed link between attitudes and the self. In order 
to provide strong evidence for the structural properties associated with centrality, research 
should investigate self-attitudes associations more directly by using measures that tap the 
differences in mental representation of central versus more peripheral attitudes. Or, in 
terms of Bassili’s (1996) notions, by introducing a operative measure for centrality.
Whereas centrality may be derived from features of the inter-attitudinal structural 
features, we argue that commitment relates to features of the intra-attitudinal structure. 
This argument seems to be grounded in several studies. For example, Pomerantz et al., 
(1995) reported that commitment was found to be associated with accessibility. This 
intra-attitudinal property denotes the strength of the link between an attitude-object and 
its summary evaluation (Fazio, 1995). Other studies have also obtained a relation between 
meta-attitudinal indicators of commitment and accessibility (e.g. Bassili, 1993, 1996). 
These findings suggest that the strength of the link between an attitude-object and its 
evaluation in memory may be an important feature determining attitudinal commitment. 
For example, it is possible that attitude accessibility may signal the psychological 
experience of commitment such as the certainty with which an attitude is held (cf. Kelly 
& Lindsay, 1993). In other words, meta-attitudinal indicators of commitment may be 
inferred from the ease of attitude retrieval.
The strength of the object-evaluation association may also be determined by the 
structural consistency of the attributes underlying an attitude. Ambivalence refers to the 
degree of co-existence of both positive and negative elements in the basis of an attitude 
(Cacioppo et al., 1997; Thompson et al., 1995; Jonas, Broemer & Diehl, 2000). If an 
attitude object is associated with both negative and positive elements in memory, the 
attitude is said to be ambivalent. Providing some support for the idea that ambivalence 
may weaken the strength of the object-evaluation association, ambivalence is associated
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with lower accessibility of attitudes (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; van 
Harreveld, van de Pligt, de Vries, Wenneker & Verhue, 2002; Fazio, 1995). Also, 
ambivalence has been found to correlate with certainty (Bassili, 1996; Jonas, et al., 1997). 
Of particular interest, Jonas et al. (1997) manipulated ambivalence and showed that high 
ambivalence participants held their attitudes with less confidence than low ambivalence 
participants. Together, these observations provide preliminary evidence for the idea that 
commitment is associated with features of the intra-attitudinal structure. In other words, if 
the intra-attitudinal structure becomes more coherent and the summary evaluation of the 
object is more accessible, commitment is expected to increase.
Consequences of centrality and commitment
Examining the underlying structure of commitment and centrality is one way to enhance 
our understanding of the nature of centrality and commitment. A second way is to look at 
differential consequences of the two strength dimensions. If commitment and centrality 
were related to unique attitudinal outcomes, it would strengthen our confidence that these 
dimensions indeed reflect different psychological constructs. Some preliminary evidence 
for this idea has been provided by the studies of Pomerantz et al (1995). They showed 
that centrality was related to a higher interest in information, whereas commitment was 
associated with biased processing with regard to attitude relevant information.
The assumed structural attitudinal properties related to both strength dimensions 
may generate hypotheses with regard to the consequences associated with centrality and 
commitment. Because central attitudes are strongly linked with core aspects of the self, 
these attitudes are imbued with a strong motivation. Central attitudes may energize 
behavior, because they foster personally important goals and values of the self. High 
centrality attitudes may constitute crucial links in self-determined action -- actions that 
are performed to reach personal values, goals and needs. Such behavior may be socially 
prompted, like being asked to donate money for charity, or may be spontaneously pursued 
out of sheer interest, like gathering information on the attitude object.
High centrality attitudes may also have consequences for self-esteem. Because 
central attitudes are associated with core aspects of the self-concept, expressing a central 
attitude may affirm the self and increase self-esteem (Tesser, Crepaz, Collins, Cornell, & 
Beach., 2000; Steele, 1988). Such ideas have been formulated in relation to the value- 
expressive function of attitudes. For example, Katz (1960) stressed that the expression of 
attitudes may be satisfactory. Acting on central attitudes may result in positive self­
evaluations, because it may help us to achieve important goals in our life.
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The aforementioned assumed consequences of centrality are all motivational in 
nature. Yet the cognitive interpretation of centrality, as the strength of the link between an 
attitude and values and other elements of the self, may also be associated with 
consequences. One consequence of such broad connections with other elements in 
memory may be resistance to change. Psychologists have theorized that if an attitude is 
strongly embedded in an extensive network of cognitions, attitude change would imply a 
chain reaction of interrelated changes in the cognitive structure. According to the domino 
principle, the latter would result in cognitive disruption. In order to prevent the disruptive 
effects of cognitive restructuring, people tend to resist change. Empirical evidence for 
these ideas has been put forward by Ostrom & Brock (1968). They showed that if the link 
between an attitude and personal values was strengthened, individuals were less 
influenced by a counter-attitudinal message (see also Johnson & Eagly, 1989).
A consequence of the cognitive properties of central attitudes that has received 
less attention relates to the bandwidth of predictions. As values are abstract goals, they 
may be related to a wide range of different attitudes. If an attitude is related to values, it is 
also indirectly related to a number of other attitudes that are linked to the same values. 
For example, the general value ’preserving life’ may be linked to both attitudes towards 
abortion and euthanasia. Therefore, if a person has a central attitude towards abortion 
because it is linked to this value, the attitude may also predict attitudes or behavior with 
respect to euthanasia. As a result, central attitudes may have a wide bandwidth of 
predictions.
What kinds of consequences are associated with commitment? Commitment 
refers to the degree that an individual is able to retrieve a clear and decided attitude. 
Therefore, we expect that commitment is associated with outcomes that depend on this 
retrieval process. For example, commitment may ease decision-making processes. For 
example, in the domain of consumer decision-making, Fazio, Powell & Williams (1989) 
showed that high accessibility attitudes more strongly influenced product choices than 
low accessibility attitudes. Also, high commitment lessens the need to think about the 
pros and the cons of an object, because the global evaluation is easily retrieved. 
Therefore, it may be expected that commitment may be especially important in the 
domain of context effects on attitudes. Context effects more likely influence attitudes that 
are constructed on the spot. We expect that whereas low commitment attitudes are 
constructed on the spot, high commitment attitudes are retrieved from memory. Indeed, 
aspects of commitment such as accessibility and certainty have been found to reduce 
context effects (Fazio et al., 1989; Bassili, 1996).
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In the present dissertation, we will focus on a special case of context effects, i.e. 
processes of self-perception. When do people infer their attitudes from their overt 
behavior? We suggest that such processes of self-perception are moderated by 
commitment. If an attitude is held with confidence and if it is highly accessible, there is 
no need to infer that attitude from behavior. In such a case, the attitude is simply retrieved 
from memory.
Overview of the present Book
In this dissertation we systematically examine the strength dimensions centrality and 
commitment. We aim to investigate the nature of these two strength dimensions by 
examining the structural attitudinal properties, psychological experiences and the 
consequences to which they are related. In doing so, we aim to enhance our understanding 
of these dimensions and provide validity for the distinction between a centrality and a 
commitment dimension of attitude strength. The general purpose of this dissertation can 
be divided in two steps.
In Part 1, which consists of two empirical chapters, we will describe a series of 
studies aimed at revealing the mental representations and psychological processes 
associated with centrality and commitment. In particular, we aim to demonstrate that 
centrality relates to parts of the inter-attitudinal structure, whereas commitment is 
associated with features of the intra-attitudinal structure of attitudes.
In Part 2, the consequences of centrality and commitment will be examined in two 
empirical chapters. In particular, we will focus on the influence of centrality and 
commitment on value-expressive behavior and the presence or absence of self-perception 
effects.
Finally, In Chapter 6, we will discuss the empirical findings and draw 
conclusions. We will evaluate whether the studies have provided evidence for the nature 
of centrality and commitment. We will also suggest possibilities for future research and 
address the relation between the two strength dimensions and the possible functions that 
they serve.
Below I sketch an overview of the empirical chapters. All the empirical chapters 
can be read independently from the rest of the dissertation. At the same time, this implies 
that parts of the introductions of the empirical chapters may have some overlap.
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Part 1: On the structure of attitude strength
Me, myself and I
In chapter 2, we will attempt to provide evidence for structural features related to attitude 
centrality as the strength of the link between an attitude and the self-concept. Hypotheses 
tested in this chapter are based on the idea of spreading activation. For example, if an 
attitude is linked to the self, activating the self should result in an increase in the 
accessibility of that attitude. In Studies 2.1 and 2.2, we tested the hypothesis that highly 
central attitudes become more accessible in memory when the self-concept has been 
activated, whereas such self-activation should not affect the accessibility of more 
peripheral attitudes. In Study 2.3, we used a reversed procedure to examine the structural 
features related to centrality. In that study, it is predicted that the self will be more 
strongly activated after thinking about a high centrality attitude, compared to thinking 
about a low centrality attitude.
From Repetition to Conviction
In Chapter 3, we will focus on the structural attitudinal properties related to commitment. 
Study 3.1 tests the hypothesis that psychological experiences related to commitment such 
as certainty may be inferred from the ease of attitude retrieval. Fazio and colleagues 
(Fazio, 1995) have convincingly shown in their research on attitude accessibility that the 
ease of attitude retrieval can be enhanced by repeatedly expressing an attitude, because it 
is supposed to strengthen the link between an attitude-object and its evaluation. Because 
we assume that the object-evaluation association is an important determinant of 
commitment, it is hypothesized that changes in attitude accessibility affect meta- 
attitudinal indicators of commitment such as certainty and perceived likelihood of change. 
Additionally, because we do not anticipate that strength of the object-evaluation link 
underlies centrality, it is predicted that the manipulation of accessibility only affects 
indicators of commitment, but not those of centrality.
Part 2: On the consequences of attitude strength
After having discussed and described studies related to the structural features that are 
associated with attitude strength, a series of studies are reported that were designed to 
study the consequences related to centrality and commitment.
20 Chapter 1
Express your Self
In Chapter 4 we specifically focus on several consequences of attitude centrality. Based 
on the assumed link between high centrality attitudes and important aspects of the self­
concept such as values, it is predicted that high centrality attitudes are imbued with 
considerable motivation. This motivational strength is of crucial importance in our 
striving to live up to our most important personal values. Studies 4.1 and 4.2 test the role 
of centrality and commitment in their relation to value-expressive behavior. It is 
hypothesized that attitude centrality mediates the relationship between values and 
behavior. In Study 4.3, the consequences of the cognitive properties of attitude centrality 
are put to the test. The hypothesis is tested that high centrality attitudes are not only 
expected to predict behavior towards the same attitude object, but also behavior towards 
other attitude objects within the same value-domain. That is, high centrality attitudes are 
predicted to have a wide range of predictions compared to low centrality attitudes. Finally 
in Study 4.4, we focus on the effects of attitude expression on self-esteem as a function of 
centrality. It is predicted that the expression of a central attitude may affect self-esteem 
such that attitude congruent acts may result in positive self-evaluations, whereas attitude 
incongruent acts may decrease a person’s self-evaluation. In all studies within this 
chapter, the effects of commitment on these outcomes are also tested. However, since 
commitment does not pertain to the strength of the link between an attitude and important 
values, no effects of commitment are expected in Studies 4.1 to 4.4.
Perceiving or Retrieving
In Chapter 5, the differential consequences of centrality and commitment are tested in the 
domain of self-perception effects. People may infer their attitudes from their behavior. 
Previous studies have provided preliminary evidence that self-perception effects are more 
likely obtained for weak than for strong attitudes (Chaiken & Baldwin, 1981; Holland, et 
al., 2002; Wood, 1982). It is predicted that commitment will be the pivotal factor with 
regard to the onset of self-perception effects. If a person is confident of his or her attitude, 
there is no need to infer this attitude from his/her behavior. These ideas are put to the test 
in two studies. In Study 5.1, participants could infer their attitudes from their overt 
behavior. That is, we created conditions conducive of self-perception effects. Because 
centrality does not relate to the ability to retrieve a clear and decided attitude, no effects 
of centrality are expected with regard to self-perception. However, it is predicted that 
commitment moderates self-perception effects. In Study 5.2, commitment was 
manipulated by a repeated expression manipulation before we elicited self-perception 
effects.
Part 1
On the Structure of 
Attitude Strength

Chapter 2
Me, Myself and I: 
On the Cognitive Link between 
Attitudes and the Self*
After 89 minutes o f  p lay in M arseilles on July 4, Argentina and The 
Netherlands had scored one goal each. Then, Dennis Bergkamp latched 
on to a long ball, evaded the Argentine defense and drove the ball past 
goalkeeper Carlos Roa. A  stunned silence descended on a small room in 
Aloor, Thrissur in Kerala where a group o f  youngsters was watching the 
match. P.P.B., a dejected Argentine supporter, walked out o f  the room 
after the fina l whistle. He hanged him self from  a tree.
(Adapted from "Screams and suicide", 1998)
The degree to which a person is personally involved in favoring or disfavoring a 
particular entity, i.e. attitude object, can vary dramatically. The dreadful case described 
above, published in the Indian Express of July 1998, provides an extreme example of a 
person whose identity was strongly attached to favoring Argentina in the soccer world 
cup tournament. The supporter’s attitude towards the team of Argentina and the person’s 
self-concept were so strongly linked, that, upon loosing the game life was not worth 
living anymore. Although the example is extreme and exceptional, it suggests that the 
strength of the link between an attitude and the self-concept may be an important one. 
Attitudes that are strongly linked to the self may affect behavior and information 
processing in different ways than attitudes that are not.
* This chapter is based on Holland, Verplanken, Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg (2001)
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The strength of the relation between an attitude and important characteristics of a 
person is usually referred to as attitude centrality (Eagly & Chaiken, 1995; Judd & 
Krosnick, 1982; Katz, 1960; Rokeach, 1968). Attitude centrality varies across individuals 
and objects. For example, an attitude towards a sports team may be closely linked to the 
self for some individuals, while other individuals may have the same evaluation of the 
team, without a link to the self-concept. The former might acquire a bad mood after a lost 
game, the latter probably won't. Also, attitudes towards some topics are more likely to 
become central (e.g. abortion, soccer, environment, top journals in psychology) than 
others (e.g. washing detergent, coffee, toothbrushes, pizza). It has been shown in several 
studies that high centrality attitudes have stronger effects on information processing and 
behavior than more peripheral attitudes (Greenwald, 1989; Kretch & Krutchfield, 1948). 
For example, it has been suggested that attitudes that are related to core values are more 
resistant to change, (Eagly & Chaiken, 1995; Ostrom & Brock, 1968; Rokeach, 1968), are 
more likely bolstered when they are threatened (Sherman & Gorkin, 1982), and have 
more impact on behavior (Charng, Piliavin, & Callero, 1983; Holland, Verplanken, 
Smeets, & Van Knippenberg, 2003). Because of these consequences, attitude centrality is 
considered as an indicator of attitude strength (Petty & Krosnick, 1995; Thomsen, 
Borgida & Lavine, 1995).
Some researchers have explained the differences in outcomes of central versus 
more peripheral attitudes in terms of differences in the mental representation of these 
attitudes (Eagly & Chaiken, 1995). High centrality attitudes are assumed to have a 
stronger mental link with the self and with core values than low centrality ones. However, 
although several researchers have discussed the possibility of relation between attitudes 
and the self (Greenwald, 1989; Katz, 1968; Kretch & Crutchfield, 1948; Sherif and 
Cantril, 1947), we are not aware of research that actually demonstrates the cognitive link 
between attitudes and the self. In order to get a better understanding of the underlying 
processes through which centrality may influence information processing and behavior, 
we need to attain a more comprehensive understanding of the structural features that are 
associated with attitude centrality. In the present research, we examined the differences of 
the structural attitudinal features of high centrality attitudes versus low centrality ones. 
Specifically, we aim to demonstrate that attitude centrality reflects the associative 
strength between an attitude and the self.
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Psychologists have frequently ascribed structural properties to attitudes. Eagly and 
Chaiken (1993; 1995; 1998) made the important and clarifying distinction between the 
intra and inter-attitudinal structure. The intra-attitudinal structure refers to the attitude’s 
internal structure and encompasses possible affective, cognitive and behavioral reactions 
elicited by the attitude object, which therefore became associated with it. For example a 
person may have an attitude towards flying, based on affect (‘I am scared to fly’), 
cognition (‘flying implies the risk of going down’) and behavior (‘Whenever it is possible 
I try not to fly’). Various qualities of an attitude that are related to the intra-attitudinal 
structure are strength indicators, such as affective-cognitive consistency (e.g. Chaiken & 
Yates, 1985), the amount of knowledge (Wood, Rhodes and Biek, 1995), ambivalence 
(Thompson, Zanna & Griffin, 1995) and attitude accessibility (Fazio, 1995).
In the present article, we focus on a second aspect of attitude structure, that is, the 
inter-attitudinal structure. This refers to the external structure of attitudes, such as an 
attitude’s connections with other attitudes, personal values or goals and/or the self­
concept. Across and within individuals, attitudes may differ in the breadth of the 
connections with other mental representations. The degree to which attitudes are linked 
with other cognitive elements in memory is often called embeddedness (Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1998; Pomerantz, Chaiken & Tordesillas, 1995; Lavine, Huff, Wagner & 
Sweeney, 1998).
To our view, attitude centrality relates to a subset of the external structure of 
attitudes, namely the strength of the link between an attitude and core elements of the 
self. Several authors have used this conceptualization of centrality. For example, Katz 
(1960) stated: “the centrality of an attitude refers to its role as part of a value system 
which is closely related to the individual’s self-concept" (p. 169; see also Abelson and 
Prentice, 1989; Bem, 1970; Judd & Krosnick, 1982; Kretch & Crutchfield, 1948). For 
example, consider a person who strongly endorsed the value that all humans should be 
treated equally. This person may have central attitudes towards political or human rights 
organizations such as Amnesty International, because these attitudes are strongly 
associated with the equality value.
The idea that attitudes may be functionally related to the self-concept can be 
traced to classic attitude research. The relation between attitudes and the self was 
prominent in the work of Sherif and Cantril (1947) on ego-involvement. However, their 
measures of ego-involvement did not directly assess links between an attitude and the 
self. Attitude centrality has also been assessed by self-reported measures (e.g. Pomerantz
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et al., 1995), using items such as ‘my attitude towards X represents my personal values’, 
or 'my attitude towards X provides a good description of myself'. Although such self­
reports have their value, they also do not provide unequivocal evidence that some 
attitudes are linked to the self. Experimental manipulation of cognitive activation might 
provide a much more powerful way to demonstrate this link.
In the last decade, however, many studies in social psychology have provided 
evidence for linkages between two mental representations using a priming method (e.g. 
Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). Typically, one mental construct is primed and the accessibility 
of the other construct is measured. For example, studies have provided evidence for 
stereotypes by priming a social category (e.g. skinhead) and measure the activation of a 
trait that is linked to the category (e.g. aggressive). Although such priming techniques are 
used throughout the field of social cognition, attitude researchers have rarely used them to 
examine the inter-attitudinal structure (for an exception, see Judd, Drake, Downing & 
Krosnick, 1991). If central attitudes are linked to the self, priming the self-concept should 
subsequently increase the accessibility of central attitudes.
Self Activation
Although the discussion on the nature of the diversity of the self continues, most 
researchers would agree that the self-concept can be considered as a collection of bits of 
self-knowledge, or self-schemas, such as traits, social roles and values (Baumeister, 1998; 
Markus, 1977). Several researchers have used associative network models, to describe 
self-knowledge as knowledge that is independently linked to a central self-node (Higgins, 
van Hook & Dorfman, 1988; Kihlstrom & Klein, 1994; Klein & Loftus, 1993; Klein, 
Loftus & Burton, 1989). Activating such a central self-node, or core self, may 
subsequently activate all kinds of knowledge that is linked to the self. Activation of the 
self may emanate from seeing oneself in the mirror, primes such as ones own name, or 
words that designate the self, like me or I.
Such methods of self-activation have been used in research on self-focus. For 
instance, self-focus has been induced by placing participants behind a mirror (e.g. Carver, 
1975; Dijksterhuis & Van Knippenberg, 2000; Macrae, Bodenhausen & Milne, 1998), by 
presenting the participant’s surname (Macrae, et al., 1998), or by priming participants 
with words, like me or I  (Dijksterhuis, et al., 1998; Stapel & Tesser, 2001). Some studies 
have provided some preliminary evidence that self-activation may result in the activation 
of important aspects of the self. A well-established finding is that after self-activation, a 
person's behavior is more likely to be brought in line with internalized personal standards
and norms (Carver, 1975; Macrae, et al., 1998, Gibbons, 1978; Froming, Nasby, & 
McManus, 1998). For example, Macrae and colleagues (1998) argued that, generally 
speaking, people find it inappropriate to judge another person on the basis of a stereotype. 
This personal standard more likely influenced behavior for participants in the high self­
focus condition than in the low self-focus conditions, as reflected in less stereotypical 
descriptions in the former condition. Further underlining the influence of self-activation 
in the use of personal standards, for participants who endorsed prejudice stereotypical 
descriptions increased in the self-focus condition. Although these studies did not assess 
the activation of personal standards directly, they suggest that self-knowledge may be 
activated upon self-activation. In line with these findings, we suggest that activating the 
self may automatically activate central attitudes. In contrast to these earlier studies, we 
did investigate activation directly by measuring attitude accessibility.
The Present Research
The present research examines the structural attitudinal features that are associated with 
attitude centrality. We hypothesize that attitude centrality reflects the strength of the link 
between an attitude and the self. Based on the idea that high centrality attitudes are 
closely linked to the self, whereas low centrality attitudes are not, we predict that 
activation of the self-concept increases the accessibility of high centrality attitudes but not 
the accessibility of low centrality attitudes. A reverse link is also predicted. Compared to 
activating a peripheral attitude, activating a central attitude is expected to result in higher 
self-activation.
These ideas are put to the test in three experiments. In Studies 2.1 and 2.2, the 
influence of self-activation on attitude accessibility is studied as a function of attitude 
centrality. In accordance with a method that was proposed by Fazio (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, 
Powell, & Kardes, 1986, Fazio, 1995), we measure attitude accessibility in a task in 
which participants report their dichotomous evaluation of a word as quickly and 
accurately as possible. The response latencies are used as indicators of attitude 
accessibility. If the self is activated, we expect the response latencies of high centrality 
attitudes are facilitated compared to a no self-activation control condition. For low 
centrality attitudes, no effects of self-activation were expected. In Study 2.1, the 
correlation between attitude centrality and attitude accessibility is compared between a 
self-activation and a no activation control condition. A higher centrality-accessibility 
correlation is expected in the self-prime condition than in the control condition. In Study 
2.2 we aim to replicate and extend Study 2.1 by looking directly at the actual level of
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attitude-accessibility in a 2 X 2 attitude centrality and self-activation two-factor design. 
Moreover, we aim to show that the link between central attitudes and the self is 
automatic, by activating the self subliminally. In Study 2.3, we focus on the reversed link 
between high centrality attitudes and the self. The degree of self-activation is measured 
after priming participants with either a high centrality or a low centrality attitude. We 
predict that self-activation is higher after thinking about a central attitude than after 
thinking about a peripheral attitude.
Study 2.1 
Method
Overview
The experiment consisted of two sessions with a one-week interval. In a preliminary 
session, attitude centrality was assessed for 30 attitude objects. During the second session, 
attitude accessibility was measured for the same objects. Self-activation was manipulated 
within the attitude accessibility task. For participants in the self-prime condition, the 
appearance of an attitude object on the computer screen was preceded by words that 
designate the self (I or me). In the control condition, no prime preceded the target words. 
For each experimental condition, we calculated the correlations between attitude 
centrality on session 1 and attitude accessibility on session 2. It was predicted that these 
correlations would be higher in the self-prime condition than in the control condition.
Participants and design
Fifty-two students at Nijmegen University were randomly assigned to one of the 
experimental conditions. The design had a single factor (Prime: self-prime versus control) 
between subjects design. In exchange for their collaboration, participants received 10 
Dutch guilders (about US $ 4).
Procedure
Participants came to the laboratory individually, were greeted by the experimenter, and 
seated behind a computer. They were told that they were participating in an study on 
attitudes and that all instructions would be presented by means of a computer program. 
Within a computerized questionnaire, participants responded to attitude questions about 
30 different objects (e.g. racism, vegetarian food, a soap series, soccer, death penalty).
First, they indicated their attitude towards the object on a one-item semantic differential 
(1 = negative - 11 = positive). Attitude centrality was assessed by two items that were 
taken from Pomerantz et al. (1995), "My attitude towards X provides a good description 
the person I am " (1 = strongly disagree to 11 = strongly agree), and "My attitude towards 
X is strongly related to my personal values" (1 = strongly disagree to 11 = strongly 
agree). A score for attitude centrality for each individual object was computed by the 
mean of these two items (mean Cronbach's alpha = .79). Upon completing the 
questionnaire the first session was finished and participants left.
Approximately one week later participants returned for the experimental session. 
They were seated in individual cubicles behind a computer with a button-box. They were 
told that all instructions would be presented by means of a computer program. The 
experimenter started the program and left.
It was explained to participants that a series of attitude objects would be presented 
on the computer screen and it was their task to evaluate these objects as quickly and 
accurately as possible (Fazio et al., 1986). The participant was instructed to use a button­
box with two buttons. The left button was labeled "negative", and the right button was 
labeled "positive". Participants were told that they had to evaluate words that were 
presented on the screen as quickly and accurately as possible by pushing either the 
"positive" or the "negative" button, and to keep their hands near the buttons throughout 
the task. Altogether, participants responded to 30 trials, which were the same attitude 
objects as in the preliminary session. Objects were presented in a randomized order. After 
a participant’s response, there was a three seconds interval before the next trial started.
Self-activation was manipulated within this attitude accessibility task. Control 
participants followed the procedures as described above. The procedure for participants in 
the self-prime condition was slightly different. These participants were told that first a 
string of XXXs would be presented on the screen, followed by a short word to which they 
should not respond. Subsequently, once more a string of XXXs appeared, which was 
followed by the target word. More specifically, a trial in the self-prime condition was 
built up as follows. First, a row of XXXs was presented on the screen for 1.5 seconds. 
Then the self-prime "I" or "me" appeared on the screen for 200 milliseconds. The prime 
was immediately followed by another string of XXXs for 100 milliseconds. Then the 
target word was presented until the participant responded.
By priming participants with words that designate the self we tried to activate the 
self immediately before the attitude object was presented. The response latencies were 
recorded from the moment the target appeared on the screen, and served as indicators of 
attitude accessibility. When the participants were completed the task, they were paid,
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debriefed, and thanked for participation. None of the participants guessed the true purpose 
of the experiment.
Results
First, all response latencies were transformed by a 1/X transformation2 (Fazio, 1990a). 
Moreover, we excluded inconsistent response latencies, i.e. responses that did not share 
the same valence of the session 1 attitude measure (5% of the total responses). 
Subsequently, we calculated within each experimental condition the correlation between 
attitude centrality and response latency for each of the 30 attitude objects. After a Fisher- 
z-transformation, these correlations were used as dependent variables in an independent 
two-sample t-test (self-prime versus no prime). This analysis confirmed our prediction. 
The centrality-accessibility correlation was stronger in the self-prime condition than in 
the control condition, (Ms = -.27 vs. -.11), ¿(58) = 3.05, p  < .01.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 provide suggestive evidence for the idea that the strength of 
the relation between attitude centrality and attitude accessibility is contingent on the level 
of self-activation. The fact that we obtained a higher correlation in the self-prime than in 
the control condition supports the notion that central attitudes may have a strong mental 
link to the self-concept, while such a link of peripheral attitudes is weak or absent. 
Central attitudes apparently became more accessible in the self-prime condition, whereas 
peripheral attitudes less so, which resulted in a higher correlation in this condition.
The results of Study 1 are limited in two ways. First, although the difference in 
correlations may indicate facilitation of responses towards central attitude objects, it 
might also indicate inhibition of peripheral attitudes. With respect to the latter, one could 
argue for example, that less important aspects of the self might be inhibited when the self 
is activated, so that focus of attention might be more effectively directed to important 
aspects. The exclusive focus on differences in correlations, thus, does not allow us to 
discern between a facilitation of central attitudes, inhibition of peripheral attitudes, or 
both. Second, Study 1 is limited because participants in the control condition did not 
receive a prime. Therefore, the trials in the control condition in which we measured 
attitude accessibility were slightly different from those in the self-prime condition.
2
Same results were obtained if used a cut-off criterion of three times the standard deviation above the 
mean.
In order to be able to determine which process is underlying the observed 
difference in correlations, we conducted a second experiment in which we selected 
peripheral and central attitudes for each participant individually. That is, we directly 
compared response latencies of peripheral and central attitudes in high and low self­
activation conditions. Moreover, in Study 2.2 the trials to assess attitude accessibility 
were now similar except for the prime. Study 2.2 extended our first experiment in another 
way. By using a subliminal self-prime, we now also attempted to show that the effect of 
self-activation on attitude accessibility operates on an automatic level.
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Study 2.2 
Method
Overview
In a preliminary session, 12 high centrality attitudes and 12 low centrality attitudes were 
pre-selected for each individual participant. One week later, participants came back to the 
lab and were asked to quickly evaluate attitude objects that appeared on a computer 
screen. For participants in the self-prime condition, attitude objects were preceded by a 
subliminal prime of words that designate the self-concept (I and me), and for participants 
in the control condition the attitude objects were preceded by a subliminal neutral prime 
(xx). It was predicted that participants in the self-prime condition would be faster in 
responding to high centrality attitudes than participants in the control condition. No 
differences between the two experimental conditions were expected in response times for 
low centrality attitudes.
Participants and design
Twenty-nine students at Nijmegen University were randomly assigned to the self-prime 
or control condition. The design was a mixed-model of 2 (Prime: self-prime versus 
control) X 2 (Attitude Centrality: high centrality versus low centrality) mixed design, the 
latter factor being a within subjects factor. In exchange for their collaboration, 
participants received Dutch 10 guilders (about US $ 5).
Procedure
The experiment consisted of two sessions with a one-week interval. Participants came to 
the laboratory individually, were greeted by the experimenter, and seated behind a
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computer. They were told that they were participating in a study on attitudes and that all 
instructions would be presented by means of a computer program. Participants responded 
to attitude questions about 85 different objects, which were presented in a random order. 
First, they indicated their attitude towards the object on a one-item semantic differential 
(1 = extremely negative - 7 = extremely positive). The items for attitude centrality were 
identical to those in Experiment 1, except that we added one extra item; "To what extent 
does your attitude express yourself" (1 = very little to 7 very much). For each object the 
three items were aggregated in a scale for attitude centrality (mean Cronbach's alpha = 
.80).
Based on the responses on the attitude and centrality items, we selected 48 
attitude objects for each individual participant. Thus, a different set of attitude objects 
was created for each participant. First, we distinguished the participants' positive attitude 
objects from their negative attitude objects. Within the participants’ subset of positive 
attitudes, we selected the 12 attitude objects with the highest centrality scores and 12 
attitude objects with the lowest centrality scores. We will refer to the first subset as the 
high centrality positive attitudes and the latter as the low centrality positive attitudes. 
Also, within the participants’ subset of negative attitudes we selected the attitude objects 
with the 12 highest and 12 lowest scores on attitude centrality, creating participants’ 
subsets for high centrality negative attitudes and low centrality negative attitudes.
One week later participants returned for the experimental session and were seated 
in individual cubicles behind a computer with a button-box. They were told that they 
were participating in an experiment on attitudes and that all instructions would be 
presented by means of a computer program. The experimenter started the program and 
left.
Participants were told that a series of attitude objects would be presented on the 
computer screen and it was their task to evaluate these attitude objects as quickly and 
accurately as possible (Fazio et al., 1986). More specifically, participants were told that 
an object would be presented on the screen each time after a string of XXXs had appeared. 
Participants were asked to decide as quickly as possible if they had a positive or a 
negative attitude towards the object. Participants responded by pushing either a "positive" 
or a "negative" button and were asked to keep their hands near the buttons throughout the 
task.
The attitude accessibility task consisted of 24 trials. The computer randomly 
selected 24 of the 48 pre-selected attitude objects such that the objects of all the four 
categories, i.e. central positive attitudes, peripheral positive attitudes, central negative 
attitudes and peripheral negative attitudes, were represented with 6 trials. The 24 trials
were presented in random order. Before these target trials the participants responded to 5 
practice trials. Self-activation was manipulated within the accessibility task. In the self­
prime condition the target words were preceded by a subliminal prime of 32 ms, 
containing "I" or "me". In the neutral prime condition participants were subliminally 
primed with 'xx'.
The trials were built up as follows. First we presented a row of XXXs on the center 
of the screen for 1,600 ms. Subsequently, the prime appeared on the screen for 32 ms. 
The prime was followed by the string of XXXs again for 120 ms, which in turn was 
followed by the target word. This word appeared on the screen until participants 
responded. The computer recorded the time it took participants to respond. After 
participants responded, the screen remained blank for 1.5 s after which the next trial 
appeared. Following the attitude accessibility task, participants were thanked, paid, 
probed for suspicion, and debriefed. In support of our assertion that our self-prime was 
unconscious, none of the participants indicated to have seen anything between the 
presentations of the rows of XXX-s. Moreover, none of the participants was able to 
indicate the goal of the experiment.
Results
A 2 (self-prime vs. neutral prime) X 2 (high centrality vs. low centrality) X 2 (positive vs. 
negative) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the last two factors revealed a main 
effect for centrality, F (1, 25) = 15.15, p  < .01, and valence, F(1,25) = 13.16, p  < .01, 
indicating that central attitudes were reported faster than peripheral attitudes, and positive 
attitudes were reported faster than negative attitudes. More importantly, the two-way 
interaction of attitude centrality X self-focus was also significant, F(1, 25) = 8.55, p  < .05. 
Simple effects analysis confirmed our prediction that the effect of self-prime was 
significant for central attitudes, F(1, 25) = 5.33, p  < .05, but not for peripheral attitudes, 
F(1, 25) = .69, ns. As is depicted in Figure 2.1, participants in the self-prime condition 
responded faster to highly central attitudes than participants in the neutral-prime 
condition. On the other hand, the response times of low centrality attitudes were 
approximately equal in both experimental conditions.
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Figure 2.1. Means of Response Latencies (in Milliseconds) for high and low 
Centrality Attitudes as a function of self prime (Study 2.2)
Finally, our analysis revealed a significant Valence X Prime interaction, F(1, 25) 
= 6.78, p  < .02. Participants in the self-prime condition responded faster to positive 
attitudes (both central and peripheral attitudes) than control participants [Ms = 743 vs. 
889]. The latter finding is in line with findings that people more easily associate words 
like I or me with positivity rather than negativity (Farnham, Greenwald, & Banaji, 1999). 
Importantly, the three-way interaction of prime X attitude centrality X valence was non­
significant, F  (1, 25) = .02, indicating that the interaction between attitude centrality and 
self-prime was not qualified by valence.
Discussion
The results showed, in line with our predictions, that activating the self-concept may 
activate high centrality attitudes, but not low centrality ones. Study 2.2 extends the 
findings of Study 2.1 in two important ways. Firstly, it was shown that self-activation 
only influenced the accessibility of high centrality attitudes. The accessibility of 
peripheral attitudes was not affected by the self-prime. These results suggest that the 
differences in correlations in Study 2.1 are due to facilitation of high centrality attitudes 
rather than inhibition of low centrality attitudes. Secondly, by using a subliminal self­
prime, we aimed to show that conscious awareness is not needed to activate the link
between an attitude and the self. These results suggest that the link between the self­
concept and central attitudes is automatic.
Taken together, both Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 provide a clear demonstration for 
the mental link between central attitudes and the self. So far we focused on the link 
between attitudes and the self, by activating the self and measure the accessibility of 
attitudes. Conversely, one might argue that if high centrality attitudes are linked to the 
self-concept, then the activation of a central attitude may also result in a higher self­
activation. This hypothesis was tested in our third experiment.
Study 2.3
The goal of our third experiment is to provide additional evidence for the cognitive link 
between central attitudes and the self by employing a reversed procedure of that in the 
first two experiments. We have participants think about either a central attitude or a 
peripheral attitude and measured, subsequently, the participant’s level of self-activation. 
Thinking about a high centrality attitude may activate the self to a greater extent than 
thinking about a low centrality attitude, because high centrality attitudes may activate the 
self by means of spreading activation.
Thus, in Study 2.3 self-activation is used as a dependent rather than an 
independent variable. We use a personal pronouns task (Dijksterhuis & Van 
Knippenberg, 2000), which is based on the finding, that people use more self-referential 
personal pronouns (me, mine and I) when attention is directed to the self (Davis & Brock, 
1975; Macrae, et al., 1998; Wegner & Giuliano, 1980). For example, Macrae and 
colleagues (1998) showed that participants used more self-referential pronouns in the 
description of another person when they were placed behind a mirror or when they were 
subliminally primed with their own surname. The explanation for these findings is, that 
after the self becomes more activated, e.g. by looking in the mirror, words that designate 
the self, like me, mine and I, become more accessible in memory and therefore will more 
likely be used. Accordingly, self-activation may be revealed by the frequency of the use 
of these self-referential words.
In the personal pronouns task participants are asked, allegedly in a study on 
language, to translate several personal pronouns in a text of a language that is unfamiliar 
to them (in fact it was fictitious). They are instructed to guess the translation of these 
pronouns. As a measure of self-activation, we will count the frequency of personal 
pronouns that are translated with I, me or mine. It is hypothesized that participants who
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are led to think about a high centrality attitude object use more self-referential pronouns, 
than participants who are led to think about a low centrality attitude object.
Method
Participants and design
Sixty students at Nijmegen University participated in the experiment for 5 Dutch guilders 
(about 2.5 US Dollar). Participants completed their tasks on paper and pencil and on a 
LCIII Macintosh Computer in individual cubicles. Three participants were omitted from 
the analysis, because they did not complete the personal pronouns task. The study had a 
single factor (Type of Prime: high centrality attitude vs. low centrality attitude) between- 
subjects design.
Procedure
Upon arrival participants were seated behind the computer in separated cubicles. The 
participants were told that they would participate in three unrelated pilot experiments. 
The first task was on attitudes and opinions and the participants were told that we were 
interested in their feelings about a number of topics. On a computerized questionnaire, 
participants reported their attitudes and attitude centrality towards 16 topics (e.g. death 
penalty, smoking, soccer, coffee, politics etc.). The attitude itself was measured by one 
item 11-point scale (-5 = very negative - 5 = very positive). Attitude centrality was 
measured, employing the same three items as in Study 2.2, also on 11-point scales. The 
reliability of the attitude centrality scale for the 16 attitude objects was satisfactory (mean 
Cronbach's alpha = .80).
Upon completing the questionnaire, participants went on to the priming task. It 
was explained to the participants that we were also interested in their associations on the 
topics, and, therefore, they were asked to write down associations on one of the 16 topics. 
Participants were told that this topic would be randomly chosen by the computer. In fact 
the computer selected the object with the highest or the lowest centrality score from these 
ratings, depending on the experimental condition. The topic was presented on the 
computer screen for two minutes. During these two minutes, participants were asked to 
write down all the associations they had about the topic on a blank sheet of paper. Thus, 
participants in the high centrality-attitude condition were asked to provide associations 
concerning their most central attitude topic, while participants in the low centrality- 
attitude condition were asked to provide associations about their least central attitude 
topic.
Upon completing the association task, participants were asked to participate in a 
study on language, which was introduced as an independent study. Instructions were 
provided on paper. This final task, taken from Dijksterhuis & Van Knippenberg (2000), 
consisted of the personal pronouns task and served as a measure for self-activation. In the 
instruction of the language task, participants were told that sometimes people are able to 
guess the meaning of words of a foreign language without understanding the language. 
The participants would be presented a short story in "Weswe", a language allegedly 
spoken in New-Guinea. In the text 20 words were underlined. The participants were told 
that these underlined words were personal pronouns and it was their task to guess the 
Dutch translation of these words and list the translation under the story. It was their task 
to translate 20 personal pronouns by using their intuition. In fact, the language was 
fictitious. We used the number of underlined words that were translated with I, me or 
mine, as a measure of self-activation.
After this personal pronouns task participants were probed for suspicion, paid, 
thanked for their participation and dismissed. No participant suspected any connection 
between the first two tasks and the final one.
Results
First, it was checked whether the centrality of the attitudes towards the objects differed 
between the two conditions. An independent samples t-test showed that the scores for 
attitude centrality were indeed higher for participants in the centrality prime condition 
than those in the peripheral prime condition (Ms = 9.59 vs. 2.52), t(55) = 20.55, p  < .001. 
Subsequently, we subjected the number of self-referential pronouns to an independent t- 
test (central prime versus peripheral prime). These analyses revealed the predicted effects. 
Participants in the central prime condition listed more self-referential pronouns than 
participants in the peripheral prime condition (Ms = 5.24 vs. 4.07), t(55) = 2.68, p  < .02.
Discussion
These findings, again, support our contention that central attitudes have a stronger mental 
link to the self-concept than more peripheral attitudes. The number of self-referential 
pronouns used in the language translation task was higher in the group of participants 
who were led to think about an attitude object that was highly central to them, compared 
to a group of participants who were led to think about a peripheral attitude.
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General D iscussion
The major purpose of the present research was to establish evidence for the cognitive link 
between central attitudes and the self-concept. Using a priming method, we tried to 
illuminate our understanding of the structural attitudinal features associated with attitude 
centrality. The present three experiments provided clear evidence for the idea that 
centrality reflects the strength of the link between an attitude and the self. In particular, 
the results of Study 2.1 revealed that the correlation between attitude centrality and 
attitude accessibility was more pronounced when the self was activated. In Study 2.2, we 
more directly showed that high centrality attitudes were responded faster after self­
activation compared to a control group, whereas no effects of self-activation were found 
for low centrality attitudes. These results suggest that, consistent with our assumptions, 
high centrality attitudes can be framed as attitudes with strong links to the self while this 
link is absent for low centrality attitudes. Furthermore, by using a subliminal priming 
procedure, we showed that the link between an attitude and the self can be completely 
automatic. Whereas Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 provided support for our notions by priming 
the self and measure attitude accessibility, the results of Study 2.3 provided further 
evidence by reversing the procedure. It was found that thinking about a high centrality 
attitude results in higher self-activation than thinking about a low centrality attitude.
Our findings are in line with a structural view on attitude strength (Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1995). According to this view, the strength of an attitude can be described by 
structural attitudinal properties that are assigned to attitudes. These structural properties 
may involve intra-attitudinal aspects, such as the number of beliefs and affective 
reactions, and inter-attitudinal aspects, such as relations between attitudes and attitude- 
value relations. Attitude centrality fits within this inter-attitudinal structure. Attitudes that 
have strong links with core aspects of the self may be more consequential than attitudes 
that lack these links. Such consequences have been documented in several studies, like 
the moderating role of attitude centrality in the resistance to change (Eagly & Chaiken, 
1995; Ostrom & Brock, 1968; Rokeach, 1970), and in its impact on behavior (Holland, et 
al., 2003). By examining the structural attitudinal features of attitude centrality, the 
present research may help to clarify these findings. For example, a person may more 
likely give money to charity, when the attitude towards charity is related to the self. For 
such individuals, donating money can be a form of self or value-expression.
In research on self-awareness, it has been demonstrated that behavior is more 
consistent with attitudes and personal norms when attention is directed to the self (Carver,
1975; Pryor, Gibbons, Wicklund, Fazio & Hood, 1977). For example, Pryor and 
colleagues showed that the attitude-behavior consistency was higher when attitudes were 
measured under high self-awareness (i.e. behind a mirror). The present findings suggest 
that the effect of self-focus may not apply to all attitudes. Self-focus may increase the 
accessibility of an attitude, but only when that attitude is linked to the self. Spreading 
activation of the self to attitudes affects attitudes that are linked to the self, but not to 
those that are peripheral to the self. Accordingly, it can be expected that self-focus does 
not affect attitude-behavior relations for low centrality attitudes. Clearly, in Study 2.2 it 
was shown that the accessibility of peripheral attitudes was not affected by our self-prime 
manipulation. Therefore, a moderating role of self-activation with regard to the attitude- 
behavior consistency is predominantly expected, for high centrality attitudes.
Are low centrality attitudes weak attitudes? Is it possible that attitudes with no 
strong connection to the self (still) have impact on durability and behavior? We assume 
that a link to the self is not a necessary precondition for an attitude to have impact on 
behavior. This is easier to understand when attitude strength is considered as a multi­
dimensional construct (Krosnick, Boninger, Chuang, Berent & Carnot, 1993; Petty & 
Krosnick, 1995: Pomerantz et al., 1995). Attitude centrality is best considered as one 
important dimension of attitude strength. For example, using factor analysis on several 
indicators of attitude strength, like centrality, importance, accessibility, and certainty, 
Pomerantz et al. (1995) found two relatively independent factors of attitude strength. The 
first, embeddedness, was determined by attitude centrality and importance. A second 
factor, commitment, was determined by attitude certainty and accessibility. Such a two­
dimensional structure of attitude strength was replicated in our own laboratory (Holland 
et al., 2003, Holland, Verplanken, van Knippenberg & Karremans, 2003) and is also 
supported by prior research (e.g. Lastovica & Gardner, 1979). In line with these findings, 
Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 revealed only a weak correlation between attitude centrality and 
attitude accessibility (related to Commitment) within the control conditions. Thus, despite 
low centrality, an attitude may be highly accessible. One form in which attitudes may 
become more accessible, for instance, is rehearsal of one’s attitude (Fazio, 1995). Such a 
procedure may result in powerful and accessible attitudes, which may be helpful tools in 
decision-making, especially under circumstances of time pressure and/or low motivation 
(Fazio, 1990b; 1999). However, such attitudes may not be associated with core elements 
of the self.
Attitude centrality is usually measured by asking people to rate the extent to 
which an attitude is descriptive of their self-image. In a way, the validity of these self­
reported centrality measures is supported by the results of the present research. Explicit
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measures, asking participants how central their attitude is to their self-concept, were 
found to be related to the implicit link between the self and the attitude in memory. The 
present research provides an implicit measure for attitude centrality (or operative 
measure, see Basilli, 1996). Calculating the difference between the accessibility of an 
attitude under high self-focus and its accessibility under low self-focus measures the 
strength of the link of an attitude towards an object. Such a measure may be especially 
advantageous when the attitude object is sensitive for social desirability (like 
environmental concern, racial prejudice), and explicit measures may be less suitable.
We have investigated attitude centrality as the strength of the link between an 
attitude and the self. Although the results of our experiments corroborated this line of 
reasoning, one could think of variables that may mediate these effects. For example, 
values may serve this role. Values are considered as broad desired end-states, which make 
part of the self (Rokeach, 1968; Schwartz, 1992; Verplanken & Holland, 2002). Specific 
attitudes as we used in our experiments may be linked to more abstract values. For 
instance, a person’s attitude towards swimming may be related to the more general value 
of ‘leading a healthy life’, which may be a core element of this person’s self-concept. 
Then, these values may mediate the relation between the self and more specific attitudes. 
This is up to future research.
The present research contributed to our understanding of the structural attitudinal 
properties associated with attitude centrality. By gaining insight in these structural 
properties, we may be able to better understand the effects of centrality on behavior or 
information processing. For example, we may be able to understand why the mood of a 
fanatic supporter of a sports team is based on the results of the weekend’s matches.
Chapter 3
From Repetition to Conviction: 
Attitude Accessibility as a Determinant of 
Attitude Certainty*
Consider John who invites several friends to come over for a game of Trivial 
Pursuit. Awaiting his friends, he watches an item on television about the Vietnamese city 
of Saigon. Later that evening, he and his friends play Trivial Pursuit. After a couple of 
rounds, John is asked the question: “What is the capital city of Vietnam?” Feeling quite 
confident, John promptly answers: “Saigon!”.
John may have been very confident of his faulty answer, because Saigon 
happened to be highly accessible in his memory. Indeed, a series of experiments by Kelly 
and Lindsay (1993) suggests that confidence with regard to answers to knowledge 
questions may be inferred from the ease with which the answer comes to mind (see also 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). The present research aimed to elaborate further on the 
causal relation between accessibility and certainty in a quite different area, viz. the 
domain of attitudes. Both the certainty with which attitudes are held and the accessibility 
of attitudes in memory are important variables in the attitude literature, because they are 
assumed to reflect the strength of an attitude (see for reviews Fazio, 1995; Gross, Holtz & 
Miller, 1995). Several studies have illustrated that attitude certainty is correlated with 
attitude accessibility (e.g. Bassili, 1993, 1996; Gross et al., 1995; Pomerantz, Chaiken & 
Tordesillas, 1995). However, these studies do not specify any causal relation between 
accessibility and certainty. We argue that the confidence with which an attitude is held 
may be inferred from the ease with which the attitude comes to mind (see also Bem,
1972), in very much the same way as accessibility affects confidence in answering
* This chapter is based on Holland, Verplanken & van Knippenberg (in press)
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knowledge questions. To put it succinctly, on a meta-cognitive level, attitude accessibility 
may signal attitude certainty. One goal of the present experiment was to provide evidence 
for this causal relation between attitude accessibility and certainty.
Attitude strength is usually defined in terms of its consequences: strong attitudes 
are persistent over time, resistant to change, and influence information processing and 
action (Krosnick & Petty, 1995). In investigating these outcomes of attitudes, researchers 
have focused on several attributes of attitudes that indicate the strength of an attitude. In 
addition to attitude certainty and attitude accessibility, other attributes have been studied 
such as personal importance of the attitude (Boninger, Krosnick, Berent & Fabrigar, 
1995), centrality of the attitude to the self-concept (Holland, Verplanken, van 
Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 2001), perceived likelihood of change (Pomerantz, Chaiken 
& Tordesillas, 1995), the degree to which an attitude encompasses both positive and 
negative elements (Thompson, Zanna & Griffin, 1995) and several others (see for a 
comprehensive overview Petty & Krosnick, 1995). Supporting the role of these attributes 
with regard to attitude strength, it has been demonstrated that these attributes affect the 
impact of attitudes on behavior, stability, resistance to change and information processing 
(see for a review Kraus, 1995; Krosnick & Abelson, 1992; Petty & Krosnick, 1995).
To some extent, the great number of strength-related attributes that have been 
proposed in the literature is confusing and unclear. Researchers have tried to clarify the 
nature of attitude strength in several ways. Bassili (1996) introduced the insightful 
distinction between meta-attitudinal and operative strength measures. Meta-attitudinal 
strength measures are based on “respondents’ impressions of their own attitudes” (p. 5). 
For example, attitude certainty can be considered as a meta-attitudinal strength measure: 
it is based on the impression of the confidence with which an attitude is held. Conversely, 
Bassili refers to strength measures that are based on processes related to the judgment of 
the attitude as operative strength measures. Many of these operative strength measures 
reflect structural aspects of an attitude. For example, attitude accessibility is usually 
measured by the response time with which an attitude is indicated and is assumed to 
reflect the strength of the association between an object and its evaluation (Fazio, 1995). 
In general, the psychological processes and/or the structural components underlying 
operative strength are transparent and theoretically embedded. The underlying 
psychological processes of meta-cognitive judgments of strength however, are far less 
well understood. Questions that need to be addressed are: How do people form meta­
cognitions with regard to strength? And, are all meta-attitudinal strength measures 
influenced by the same psychological processes?
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The latter question pertains to another way by which researchers aimed to 
elucidate the concept of attitude strength: the dimensionality of attitude strength. 
Although attitude strength is generally considered to be a multi-dimensional construct 
(e.g. Abelson, 1988; Krosnick, Boninger, Chuang, Berent & Carnot, 1993; Pomerantz, et 
al., 1995; Raden, 1985), the exact nature of its multi-dimensional structure remains 
controversial. Factor-analytic studies, which predominantly investigated meta-attitudinal 
strength measures, have yielded mixed results (e.g. Abelson, 1988; Pomerantz, Chaiken 
& Tordesillas, 1995; Prislin, 1996). Researchers have revealed slightly different factor 
structures in terms of content or number of strength factors (Abelson, 1988; Bassili, 1996; 
Erber, Hodges, & Wilson, 1995; Krosnick et al., 1993; Prislin, 1996). Still, two 
dimensions have received a considerable amount of support across several studies 
(Holland, Verplanken, Smeets & van Knippenberg, 2003, Holland, Verplanken, van 
Knippenberg & Karremans; 2003; Lastovica and Gardner, 1979; Pomerantz, et al., 1995). 
One factor that emerged in these studies consists of meta-attitudinal strength measures 
such as certainty and perceived likelihood of change. This factor is often called 
commitment (Holland, Verplanken, Smeets et al., 2003; Holland, Verplanken, van 
Knippenberg et al., 2003; Lastovica & Gardner, 1979; Pomerantz, et al., 1995). A second 
factor pertains to attributes such as meta-attitudinal strength measures related to 
importance, self-relevance and value-relevance. We refer to this factor as centrality (cf. 
Bem, 1970; Judd & Krosnick, 1982; Katz, 1960). Thus, it seems that at least two 
dimensions may be distinguished in the domain of meta-attitudinal strength measures.
Although factor analytic studies may provide insight in the degree to which 
strength-related attributes are associated, they do not shed light on the origins and the 
sources of these attributes. In order to attain a better understanding of the nature of 
strength dimensions and their attributes, an experimental approach is warranted (cf. Bizer 
& Krosnick, 2001). Demonstrating that centrality and commitment-related attributes of 
attitude strength are differentially related to sources of strength, would further increase 
our understanding of the multi-dimensional structure of attitude strength.
In this paper, we will investigate attitude accessibility as a possible determinant of 
several strength-related attributes, including meta-attitudinal strength measures related to 
commitment such as certainty, perceived likelihood of change, and meta-attitudinal 
strength measures related to centrality, such as importance and self-relevance. We argue 
that meta-cognitive judgments related to commitment are partly based on the strength of 
the link between an object and its evaluation (Fazio, 1995). If the strength of the object­
evaluation link increases, attitudes become more accessible in memory. We expect that 
the ease of attitude retrieval is used to infer the subjective commitment. Therefore, any
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manipulation of the strength of the object-evaluation link and thereby attitude 
accessibility is expected to influence commitment-related attributes of strength.
On the other hand, attitude accessibility is not expected to be a determinant of 
meta-cognitive judgments of centrality. Although centrality-related attributes like attitude 
importance have been found to be moderately associated with accessibility (e.g. Krosnick, 
1989), recent studies by Bizer and Krosnick (2001) suggest that whereas importance may 
be a source of accessibility, accessibility does not have a causal impact on importance. 
Nevertheless, a study of Roese and Olson (1994) has shown the opposite: their results 
indicated that repeatedly expressing an attitude enhanced attitude accessibility as well as 
attitude importance. In spite of this, Bizer and Krosnick showed in three studies that 
accessibility did not influence attitude importance. More specifically, in two experiments 
they failed to replicate the Roese and Olson findings, using the same repeated expression 
paradigm. At any rate, the impact of attitude accessibility on importance seems not a very 
robust phenomenon.
The dissociation between accessibility and importance may also become more 
easily understood if one considers cases in which likes or dislikes readily come to mind 
without any feeling of personal significance. For example, a person may quickly indicate 
his positive attitude towards banana-flavored ice cream or his dislikes of cockroaches 
without being personally involved to these issues. Therefore, importance may have 
different origins than accessibility. Indeed, Boninger, Krosnick & Berent (1995) argued 
that the bases of importance may relate to value-relevance, self-interest and/or strong 
identification with possible reference groups or reference individuals. In general, these 
findings suggest that if an attitude becomes more strongly linked to the self in one way or 
the other, this attitude becomes more important. Such links with the self are not signaled 
when people merely experience that their attitude is easily retrieved from memory. 
Therefore, we expect that centrality-related attributes of strength are not affected by 
accessibility manipulations.
In the present experiment attitude accessibility was manipulated by a repeated 
expression manipulation (e.g. Powell & Fazio, 1984). We investigated the effects of 
accessibility on meta-attitudinal attributes of commitment, i.e. certainty and subjective 
likelihood of change, and on meta-attitudinal attributes of centrality, i.e. importance, 
perceived centrality to values and the self. Several predictions were made. First, it is 
predicted that repeated attitude expression affects attitude accessibility (e.g. Bizer & 
Krosnick, 2001; Powel & Fazio, 1984). Second, it was predicted that the commitment 
related attributes certainty and the perceived likelihood of change are enhanced after 
repeatedly expressing an attitude compared to expressing an attitude only once. Third, it
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was hypothesized that repeated expression affects subjective commitment through its 
effect on attitude accessibility. In other words, the effects of repeated expression on 
meta-attitudinal attributes of commitment were expected to be mediated by accessibility. 
Finally, it was predicted that meta-attitudinal attributes pertaining to centrality remained 
unaffected by the accessibility manipulation.
Method
Participants and design
One hundred and fourteen undergraduate students from the University of Nijmegen 
participated in the experiment. These participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
cells of a 2 (Issue: Willem Alexander versus European Unification) X 2 (Repetition 
Condition: Willem Alexander repeated vs. European Unification repeated) X 2 (Strength 
measure: commitment vs. centrality). The first factor was varied within participants, 
while the latter two factors were varied between-participants. Participants received DFL. 
5,- (about 2 US Dollar) for participation.
Procedure
Participants were seated in individual cubicles behind a computer and a button box. They 
read on the computer screen that they participated in a study on attitudes. It was their task 
to evaluate target words as quickly and accurately as possible. The target words were 
presented one by one. Underneath the target word, one single semantic differential scale 
(e.g. bad -  good, unfavorable- favorable, negative - positive) was presented on the screen 
as well. Participants were asked to evaluate the target word with the use of this semantic 
differential. They could indicate their evaluation by a button box with two keys (left = 
negative, right = positive). After receiving three practice trials, the task consisted of 35 
trials, which were randomly presented.
Within this task we manipulated the number of times participants had to evaluate 
the two target objects “Willem Alexander” (the Dutch crown prince) and “European 
Unification”. Half of the participants responded six times towards Willem Alexander 
(favorable - unfavorable, good  - bad, pleasant unpleasant, support - oppose, desirable -  
undesirable, positive-negative) and 1 time towards “European Unification” (positive­
negative). The other group of participants responded six times towards the European 
Unification and one time towards Willem Alexander. The attitude objects and the 
semantic differentials were randomly presented, with the exception that the final 
evaluation of the two target objects was always presented with the semantic differential
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“positive -  negative”. The response latencies to these items served as an indicator of 
attitude accessibility towards both attitude objects.
M easures o f  comm itment and centrality. After the manipulation of repeated 
expression, participants responded to questions regarding meta-attitudinal judgments of 
attitude strength. Half of the participants responded to questions that pertained to 
commitment, whereas the other half responded to questions that pertained to centrality. 
Studying these effects between participants is important, because Bizer and Krosnick 
(2001) showed that responding to questions about attitude strength might also increase the 
accessibility of attitudes. That is, measurements of self-reported attitude strength may 
interfere with our manipulation of accessibility. Thus, for an adequate test of our ideas, 
we should measure commitment and centrality directly after the accessibility 
manipulation. Accordingly, we used a between-participants design.
For participants in the commitment condition, two items were included, (1) 
certainty “I am very certain about my attitude towards X” (1 = very uncertain, 7 = very 
certain) (2) likelihood of change: “How likely is it that you will change your attitude 
towards X in the near future” (1 = very unlikely, 7 = very likely). Responses to the latter 
item were recoded such that higher numbers represented stronger commitment. The 
scores of the two items were aggregated in order to construct indices of commitment 
towards both targets (alpha’s = .73 and .78 for Willem Alexander and European 
Unification, respectively).
The other half of the participants answered questions pertaining to centrality. 
Three items were included (1) importance: “To what extent is the issue of X important to 
you?” (1 = very unimportant, 7 = very important), (2) centrality: “To what extent is your 
attitude towards X related to your self-concept” (1= not at all, 7 = very much), (3) relation 
to values: “To what extent is your attitude towards X related to your important values?”. 
These items were also aggregated (alpha’s = .61 and .76, for Willem Alexander and 
European Unification, respectively). All items were taken from Pomerantz et al. (1995).
After they completed the computerized questionnaire, participants were debriefed, 
paid, thanked and dismissed.
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Results
Attitude accessibility
First, all response latencies were transformed by a 1/X transformation3 (c.f. Fazio, 1990). 
The transformed response latencies of the two target objects were subjected to a 2 (Issue) 
X 2 (Repetition condition) X 2 (Strength measure) MANOVA. This analysis revealed a 
main effect for issue, F (1, 106) = 8.72, p_< .01, indicating that attitudes towards Willem 
Alexander were expressed somewhat faster than attitudes towards European Unification. 
Moreover, the issue X repetition condition interaction was significant, F (1, 106) = 
128.65, p < .001. Participants who repeatedly expressed Willem Alexander attitudes, 
reported their attitudes towards Willem Alexander more quickly than their attitudes 
towards European Unification, (M = 715 vs. M = 1304). Conversely, the participants who 
repeatedly expressed European Unification attitudes, reported their attitudes towards 
European Unification more quickly than their attitudes towards Willem Alexander (M = 
721 vs. M = 1126). Thus, across issues and repetition conditions, repeatedly expressed 
attitudes were reported more quickly (M = 718 ms) than were non-repeated attitudes (M = 
1205 ms.).
Attitude strength as a function of repeated expression
In order to analyze the effects of repeated expression on meta-attitudinal attributes of 
attitude strength, we subjected the measures of attitude strength (either commitment or 
centrality, depending on the strength measure condition) to a 2 X 2 X 2 (Issue X 
Repetition condition X Strength measure) analysis of variance. This analyses revealed a 
main effect for strength measure, F (1, 110) = 39.90, p < .001, indicating that 
commitment scores were generally higher than centrality scores. Additionally, a main 
effect was obtained for issue, F (1, 110) = 35.20, p < .001, indicating that attitudes 
towards European Unification were generally stronger than attitudes towards Willem 
Alexander. However, these main effects were qualified by several higher order 
interactions. The strength Measure X Issue interaction was significant, F (1, 110) = 36.91, 
p < .001. Importantly however, the Issue X Repetition condition X Strength measure 
interaction was significant, F (1, 110) = 7.32, p < .01. In order to elucidate the nature of 
this three-way interaction, we conducted specific analyses for the commitment and 
centrality groups separately.
3 Similar results were obtained for raw scores.
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Commitment-related attributes of strength
Within the group of participants in which commitment was assessed, a 2 X 2 (Issue X 
Repetition condition) analysis of variance was conducted on the composite measure of 
commitment. The Issue X Repetition condition interaction was significant, F(1, 64) = 
11.02, p < .001. No main effects were obtained. The interaction effect was in line with 
our hypothesis. For the group of participants who repeatedly expressed Willem Alexander 
attitudes, commitment to the Willem Alexander attitude was greater than commitment to 
the European Unification attitude, (M = 5.1 vs. M = 4.5). A reversed pattern was found 
for the group of participants who repeatedly expressed European Unification attitudes, (M 
= 4.4 vs. M = 5.2), for commitment to the Willem Alexander and European Unification 
attitudes respectively. Thus, in line with the predictions, repeatedly expressed attitude 
were associated with higher levels of commitment (M = 5.1), compared to attitudes that 
were expressed only once (M = 4.5).
Analyses concerning the separate items for certainty and likelihood of change 
showed similar results. A significant issue X repetition condition interaction effect was 
obtained for both measures, F(1, 64) = 10.81, p < .01, and F (1, 64)= 7.75, p < .01, for 
certainty and likelihood of change respectively.
Centrality-related attributes of strength
In the same way, a 2 X 2 (issue X repetition condition) analysis of variance was 
conducted within the group of participants who responded to questions concerning 
centrality. This analysis revealed a main effect of issue, F (1, 46) = 73.16, p < .001, 
indicating that centrality was stronger for the issue of European Unification (4.2) than 
Willem Alexander (M = 2.6). No other effects were obtained. The issue X repetition 
condition interaction was not significant for participants in the centrality condition, F < 1, 
ns. Also, separate analyses for each of the three items did not reveal any effects of 
repeated expression, Fs(1, 46) = .67, 1.30 and .42, ns., for importance, relation to the self, 
and relation to personal values respectively. Thus, also corroborating the hypotheses, 
results indicated that repeated attitude expression did not affect attitude centrality.
Mediation analyses
Next, in order to investigate the underlying process of the effects of repeated expression 
on commitment, we tested whether the effects of repeated expression on commitment 
were mediated by attitude accessibility. For mediation to occur, three conditions must be 
satisfied (Baron & Kenny, 1986). First, the independent variable should be reliably 
associated with the dependent variable. Second, the independent variable should be
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reliably associated with the mediating variable. Third, in a regression of the dependent 
variable on both the independent variable and the mediator, the independent variable 
should be significantly reduced, whereas the mediator should have a significant effect.
For these analyses, we followed procedures recommended by Judd, Kenny and 
McClelland (2001) for mediation and moderation analysis in within-subjects designs4. 
Therefore, difference scores for accessibility were created by subtracting the transformed 
reaction times for Willem Alexander from the transformed reaction times for European 
Unification. Similarly, difference scores for subjective commitment were created by 
subtracting the Willem Alexander commitment scores from the European Unification 
commitment scores. Repetition condition was coded as a dummy variable (1 for rehearsal 
of the attitude towards Willem Alexander and 2 for rehearsal of the attitude towards 
European Unification).
Satisfying the first two criteria for mediation, repetition condition was 
significantly related to the difference scores of accessibility and commitment. The higher 
the frequency of attitude expression the higher the subjective commitment beta = .39, t 
(64) = 3.37, p < .01, and the higher the accessibility, beta = .77, t (64) = 9.80, p < .01. 
Moreover, the accessibility difference scores significantly correlated with the difference 
scores of commitment, indicating that higher levels of accessibility was associated with 
higher levels of commitment, beta = .47, t (64) = 8.67, p < .01. Finally, when we 
controlled for the effects of attitude accessibility on the relation between repetition 
condition and commitment, the effect was reduced and became non-significant, beta = 
.11, t (63) < 1, ns., while the effect of accessibility on commitment remained significant, 
beta = .42, t (63) = 2.39, p < .05. This reduction was significant, Z = 2.32, p < .03. These 
latter analyses satisfied the third and final criterion for mediation to occur. The mediation 
analysis is depicted in Figure 3.1.
4
Following Judd et al. (2001), we also computed the sum scores of issues (across repetition 
conditions), for accessibility and commitment. Subsequent regression analysis showed no effects of the 
accessibility sum scores on the difference scores of commitment, indicating that the relationship 
between accessibility and commitment is homogeneous for both repetition conditions. Following 
recommendations of Judd et al, the sum scores were left out in the subsequent analyses, in which 
difference scores were analyzed only.
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Figure 3.1 .Path analyses illustrating the mediating role of attitude accessibility on the 
relation between repeated expression and subjective commitment. The 
numbers represent standardized betas between repetition condition (dummy 
coded) and difference scores of accessibility and commitment of repeated and 
non-repeated attitudes. The parenthetic numbers represent the relation between 
repeated expression and commitment before controlling for accessibility. 
Higher scores represent higher strength.
Analyzing mediation for certainty and likelihood of change separately revealed 
parallel effects. Mediation was found to be significant for certainty, Z = 2.01, p < .05, and 
for subjective likelihood of change, Z = 2.12, p < .05. Together these findings show that 
the effects of repeated expression on subjective commitment are mediated by attitude 
accessibility. It corroborates our hypothesis that commitment-related attributes of strength 
might be inferred from the ease with which an attitude comes to mind.
Discussion
The present experiment contributes to the literature because it sheds light on the causal 
relation between attitude accessibility and the meta-attitudinal strength measures certainty 
and perceived likelihood of change, which have previously been studied as indicators of a 
strength dimension called commitment (e.g. Pomerantz et al., 1995). Our study provides 
the first empirical demonstration that attitude accessibility is a determinant of meta­
cognitive judgments of commitment. Results showed that attitude certainty and perceived 
likelihood of change is enhanced after repeated attitude expression compared to single 
attitude expression. Moreover, our mediation analysis showed the effect of repeated
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attitude expression on meta-cognitive judgments of commitment was mediated by its 
effect on attitude accessibility. These findings provide support for the proposition that the 
confidence with which an attitude is held may be inferred from the ease of attitude 
retrieval.
Second, the present experiment contributes to our knowledge with respect to the 
multi-dimensional structure of attitude strength. Whereas the results provide support for 
the idea that accessibility is a determinant of commitment-related attributes, the absence 
of effects for meta-cognitive judgments of centrality, such as importance and centrality to 
the self, suggest that these attributes have different origins. The latter finding largely 
replicates Bizer and Krosnick’s (2001) findings. In line with our results, they also failed 
to find effects of attitude accessibility on attitude importance. In addition to importance, 
we showed that other centrality-related attributes also remained unaffected by repeated 
expression.
The absence of effects of repeated expression on centrality measures is considered 
here (and in the study of Bizer and Krosnick, 2001) to be a meaningful finding, indicating 
that meta-attitudinal strength measures related to centrality have different origins than 
meta-attitudinal strength measures related to commitment (e.g. Boninger et al., 1995). 
Alternatively, one might argue that this absence of effects may be due to the unreliability 
of our centrality measures. However, centrality measures that were used in the present 
research have shown their reliability and validity in several past studies. For example, it 
has been demonstrated that these centrality-related attributes significantly influence 
information processing (Pomerantz et al., 1995), the attitude-behavior relationship 
(Krosnick, 1988a; Holland, Verplanken, Smeets et al., 2003), self-esteem (Holland, 
Verplanken, Smeets et al., 2003), stability over time (Krosnick, 1988b) and many others 
(see for an overview Boninger et al., 1995). These findings counter unreliability as an 
alternative explanation of the null-findings.
In the introduction we mentioned a study by Roese and Olson (1994) that is 
seemingly inconsistent with the present findings. They showed that repeatedly expressing 
an attitude increased importance. The results of Bizer and Krosnick (2001) and the 
present findings suggest that the relation between repeated expression and centrality may 
not be very widespread. Nevertheless, the Roese and Olson study hints that at least on 
special occasions a relation between centrality related attributes and repeated expression 
might exist. What process might underlie this relation? As Bizer and Krosnick discussed 
this contradiction, repeated expression may elicit “different sorts of thoughts” (p. 581). In 
specific cases or circumstances in which these thoughts pertain to origins of importance
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such as values, self-interest or social identification (Boninger et al., 1995), it is 
theoretically quite conceivable that repeated expressions also strengthen the connection 
between aspects of self and the expressed attitude and, thereby, also enhance the 
centrality of that attitude. Note that the assumed process is quite different from inferring 
importance from the ease of attitude retrieval. Future studies, in which the self-relevance 
of the thoughts is manipulated within the repeated expression paradigm, e.g. by priming 
with important values (Verplanken & Holland, 2002) might provide more conclusive 
evidence concerning the processes through which repeated expression may affect 
centrality.
We have stated that people may use the ease of attitude retrieval to infer the 
subjective feeling of attitude certainty. Still, it seems unlikely that these inference 
processes require effortful, deliberative information processing. Instead, the processes 
underlying the affects of attitude accessibility on attitude certainty may be based on 
intuitive heuristic processing. In line with researchers who have shown that high 
accessibility of knowledge may induce a 'feeling of knowing' (Kelly & Lindsay, 1993; 
Koriat, 1993; Schwarz & Clore, 1996), attitude accessibility may quite automatically 
signal a ‘feeling of confidence’. Notwithstanding the present emphasis on intuitive 
processes related to feelings of certainty, attitude certainty can also be the result of 
analytic information processing. As Koriat and Levy-Sadot (1999) suggested, meta­
cognition, including feelings of confidence, may be both influenced by intuitive and 
analytic processes. A recent study of Haddock and colleagues (Haddock, Rothman, Reber 
and Schwarz, 1999) can be considered as a case in which confidence is influenced by 
subjective experiences of analytic rather than intuitive processing. More specifically, they 
showed that attitude certainty and other strength-related attributes were influenced by the 
subjective ease or difficulty to retrieve arguments underlying an attitude. In sum, it seems 
that subjective experiences of analytic processing, e.g. searching memory for pertinent 
beliefs, as well as those of intuitive processing, e.g. the quick retrieval of a global 
summary evaluation, may influence meta-cognitive judgments of certainty. In future 
research, the relative contribution of intuitive versus analytic processes to feelings of 
certainty and other attributes of strength should be addressed.
Our findings concerning the impact of accessibility on certainty have implications 
for understanding the relation between these variables and strength-related consequences 
such as attitudinal effects on behavior and information processing and the stability of 
attitudes. The effects of certainty, reported in some studies (see for an overview, Gross et 
al., 1995) may in fact have been caused by differences in attitude accessibility. In these 
cases, certainty can be considered as an indirect measure of accessibility. Supporting this
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view, Bassili (1993) showed that although both attitude certainty and accessibility 
predicted voting behavior separately, after entering both these strength measures 
simultaneously in a regression it appeared that accessibility was the only significant 
predictor. Results like these suggest that certainty does not have consequences other than 
those caused by its interrelation with accessibility. However, in several theoretical 
perspectives meta-cognitive judgments of confidence are ascribed unique consequences. 
For example, judgments of confidence are considered to be a pivotal factor in relation to 
the depth of information processing (Chaiken, 1989), learning and performance (Bandura, 
1997; Ellis & Kruglanski, 1992), and the impact of persuasive messages (Petty, Brunol & 
Tormola, 2002). Thus, although accessibility may determine certainty, the meta-cognitive 
feeling of certainty can be a more proximal determinant of these consequences. Future 
research should investigate the circumstances under which meta-cognitions of certainty or 
attitude accessibility are more proximal determinants of behavior, resistance and attitude 
stability.
In conclusion, the present experiment aimed to investigate the largely unexplored 
area of the psychological processes and structural features underlying meta-attitudinal 
judgments of attitude strength. It was shown that meta-cognitive attributes pertaining to 
commitment, such as certainty and perceived likelihood of change may be signaled by 
attitude accessibility. The data suggest that, if we express an attitude over and over again, 
our attitude becomes increasingly accessible in memory. Consequently, we may hold this 
attitude with such great confidence that we are absolutely sure that we will never ever 
change our mind.

Part 2
On the Consequences of 
Attitude Strength

Chapter 4
Express your Self: 
The role of Attitude Centrality in the Prediction 
and Consequences of 
Value-Expressive Behavior*
Some time ago, it turned out that Mrs. N., an 87-year-old great-grandmother now 
pottering around in her garden, had been spying for the KGB for more than 40 years. She 
had passed secrets about developments in Britain's nuclear atom technology to the KGB. 
Why? “I did what I did not to make money”, Mrs. N. said. She claimed that she wanted to 
help the communist system to survive because it brought food, a proper education and 
health service for ordinary people. In fact, spying for the KGB was of great significance 
to her, because it served her most cherished personal values.
Values have motivational properties, because they are considered to be core 
aspects of the self (Schwartz, 1996; Verplanken & Holland, 2002). Such motivational 
properties of values were illustrated in a study by Verplanken and Holland (2002, study 
4). They showed that when individuals violate their core values through actions, they are 
motivated to compensate for these actions in subsequent opportunities. If values have 
motivational properties, constructs that are closely linked to values may also be furnished 
with a great motivational strength. In the present article we will focus on the strength of 
the link between attitudes and values and the self-concept, which we refer to as attitude 
centrality (Bem, 1970; Katz, 1960; Judd & Krosnick, 1982). We aim to show that a 
central attitude may have various consequences through its link with values and the self­
concept. More specifically, we will demonstrate that central attitudes play a crucial role in
* This chapter is based on Holland, Verplanken, Smeets & van Knippenberg (2003)
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the prediction of value-expressive behavior, have a wide bandwidth of predictions. We 
also aim to show that the expression of central attitudes may influence an individual’s 
self-esteem.
Values, Attitudes and Attitude Centrality
It is widely acknowledged that attitudes may depend on values, express values or 
serve as a function of values. Still, the nature of the relation between values and attitudes 
is poorly understood. A couple of studies have shown that values may influence attitudes, 
such that people are positive towards attitude objects that are congruent, and negative 
towards objects that are incongruent with values (Feather, 1995; Feather, Norman, & 
Worsley, 1998; Rokeach, 1973; Stern, Dietz, Kalot & Guagnona, 1995). For example, 
Feather (1995) showed that the attractiveness of a variety of choice options systematically 
correlates with related values.
However, such differences in evaluation do not seem to fully cover the 
motivational impact of values on attitudes. Mrs. N. did not gather intelligence information 
for the KGB because she was just very positive towards spying for the KGB. Spying was 
of crucial importance to her; she was highly motivated, because it served her core values 
that made part of her self-concept. Therefore, values may not only influence the attitude 
itself (i.e., the extent to which it is positive or negative), but also aspects of an attitudes' 
structure and strength. We argue that if an attitude becomes more strongly linked to 
values and the self-concept, the centrality of an attitude increases.
The relation between values and attitude strength has been acknowledged in the 
literature on value-relevant involvement or ego-involvement (Johnson & Eagly, 1989; 
Ostrom & Brock, 1968; C. W. Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergall, 1965). For example, Ostrom 
and Brock discussed the motivational properties of attitudes that are related to values:
“...the basic feature o f  an ego-involved attitude is its relation to the 
manner in which an individual defines himself. The individual defines 
him self prim arily in terms o f  that “distinct constellation o f  social and 
personal values” he has acquired. The closer the relation between his 
attitude and these values and the more central these related values are, 
the higher the degree o f  attitudinal involvem ent.” (Ostrom & Brock, p.
375).
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Attitudes that are strongly embedded in a cognitive network of central and 
ingrained values, may have important consequences for two reasons. First, because values 
are considered to be core parts of the self-concept, attitudes that are related to values may 
have a great motivational strength (Pratkanis & Turner, 1994). Similarly to the 
transference of motivation from higher order goals to lower order cognitions (as 
documented in the literature on goal-pursuit, cf. Carver & Scheier, 1981; Kruglanski, 
Shah, Fishbach, Friedman, Chun, & Sleeth-Keppler, 2002), values may transfer 
motivation  to attitudes. Indeed, Boninger and colleagues (1995) have provided evidence 
that individuals who consider their attitudes relevant to values attach greater importance 
to their attitudes. These findings may be considered as preliminary evidence that links 
with values may influence the motivational strength of attitudes.
Second, in addition to motivational properties, central attitudes may be 
consequential because they are embedded in a larger cognitive structure. That is, highly 
central attitudes may have a strong inter-attitudinal structure (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). 
Several psychologists have argued that values affect a broad range of human information 
processing and behavior. For example, Rokeach (1973) argued that: "Values are 
determinants of virtually all kind of behavior that could be called social behavior - of 
social action, attitudes, ideology, evaluations, moral judgements...." (p. 24). In a similar 
vein, Allport (1955) suggested that values were the “dominating force in life”, directing 
all person’s activities towards the realization of values. From a cognitive perspective, this 
suggests that if an attitude is linked to personal values, these attitudes are, indirectly, 
related to a broad range of other attitudes.
Consequences of Attitude Centrality
Central attitudes are 'strong' attitudes. Strong attitudes are resistant to change and 
stable over time, and have impact on information processing and behavior (Petty & 
Krosnick, 1995). As a result of the motivational and cognitive properties as we described 
above, central attitudes may thus have such consequences. Surprisingly however, the 
consequences of attitude centrality have hardly been studied. An exception is research on 
the influence of attitude centrality on resistance processes to persuasive communication. 
Several studies have shown that attitudes with strong links to personal values are more 
resistant to change compared to attitudes that lack such links (Eagly & Chaiken, 1995; 
Johnson & Eagly, 1989; Ostrom & Brock, 1968; Rokeach, 1970).
However, in addition to resistance, centrality may have several other important 
consequences that have not been studied yet. In particular, the role of attitude centrality
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with regard to the impact attitudes have on behavior, needs to be addressed in more detail. 
Centrality may play an important role in the influence and the prediction of behavior, as 
well in the consequences of behavior for self-esteem. Below, we will clarify these 
consequences in some detail.
Value-expressive behavior
One important consequence of centrality relates to the influence of attitudes on our 
actions. Several studies have shown that values may affect behavior (Schwartz, 1992; 
Verplanken & Holland, 2002; Maio & Olson, 1994, 1995; Feather, 1992). Centrality may 
play an important role in the relation between values and behavior. The motivational 
strength of attitudes is expected to increase as the link with values becomes stronger 
(Boninger et al., 1995). Such an increase in motivational strength reinforces the influence 
of the attitude involved on behavior, especially when actions require personal costs, such 
as effort, money or other personal costs. This would suggest that attitude centrality 
mediates the value-behavior relationship. Two studies have investigated the relation 
between values, behavior and attitudes (Maio & Olson, 1995; Verplanken & Holland, 
2002, Study 6). The methods of these studies allowed for testing the possible mediating 
role of the attitude itself. However, no mediation was found. Results of both studies 
indicated that value importance and attitudes were both unique predictors of behavior 
(intention). Indeed, the attitude itself (i.e. the degree to which an attitude is positive or 
negative) may not tap the motivational properties of an attitude that are derived from 
values. That is, the degree of favor or disfavor connected to an object does not indicate 
the degree of involvement and motivation connected to the attitude. However, the 
centrality of an attitude to a person's self-concept and his or her personal values may tap 
these motivational properties. Therefore, we expect attitude centrality to mediate the 
relation between values and behavior, whereas attitudes do not. These ideas are tested in 
Studies 1 and 2.
The bandwidth of predictions
A second possible consequence of centrality that is investigated in the present research 
relates to the bandwidth of predictions. Through their link with values, central attitudes 
are embedded in a larger cognitive network of attitudes and values. Values can thus be 
seen as central nodes to which a set of specific attitudes are linked. Consequentially, if 
attitudes are linked to values, these attitudes may also be linked indirectly to one another. 
Following this line of reasoning, attitudes toward X (e.g. buying organically grown 
potatoes) may predict the attitude towards Y (e.g. Greenpeace), or even behavior towards
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Y (e.g. donating money to Greenpeace), if both objects X and Y are embedded in the 
same cognitive structure of values (e.g. protecting the environment).
Such predictions may seem inconsistent with ‘correspondence’ or compatibility 
principles with regard to the relation between attitudes and behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 
1977; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). This correspondence principle states that attitude- 
behavior relationships are most likely obtained when attitudes and behavior are 
compatible with respect to target, action, context and time (see for reviews: Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993; Kraus, 1995). We do not argue here against the general idea that high 
correspondence between attitudes and behavior results in stronger attitude-behavior 
relations. However, we do suggest that if an attitude is strongly linked to personal values, 
it may predict behavior despite a low correspondence between attitude and behavior. 
Therefore, as the centrality of an attitude increases, the bandwidth of predictions is 
increased as well. This idea is tested in Study 3.
Self-esteem regulation
As we noted, centrality may play an important role in an attitude’s impact on behavior. 
However, the expression of a central attitude through behavior may also have important 
consequences on its own. Through its relation with values and the self, the expression of a 
central attitude may affect an individual's self-esteem. Several psychologists have argued 
that value-expression is an important tool for regulating self-esteem (Greenwald, 1989; 
Steele, 1988; Tesser, 2001; Tesser, Crepaz, Collins, Cornell, Beach, 2000; Katz, 1960). 
Congruent to this idea, Steele (1988) argued in his self-affirmation theory that expressing 
significant parts of the self can neutralize a threat to a person’s self-integrity. Because 
values are considered to be core aspects of the self-concept, the expression of personal 
values may be especially suited to affirm one's self-integrity. Indeed, it has been 
repeatedly shown that thinking about important personal values may re-establish an 
individuals’ feeling of self-worth (Koole, Smeets, van Knippenberg & Dijksterhuis, 1999; 
Steele & Liu, 1983; Tesser & Cornell, 1991; Tesser et al., 2000).
Through its link between attitudes and values, the expression of central attitudes 
should also have self-affirming potential. Therefore, acting upon a highly central attitude 
in a consistent way, may be satisfying and increase self-esteem. On the other hand, failing 
to act consistently with a central attitude may even decrease self-esteem. For attitudes that 
are low in centrality, a relation between attitude expression through action and self­
esteem is not expected, because these attitudes are not functionally related to a person’s 
self-concept. The moderating role of centrality on the impact of attitude expression on 
self-esteem is tested in the Study 4.
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Multidimensional Structure of Attitude Strength
We have posited attitude centrality as a component of attitude strength. In line 
with such an attitude strength perspective, it is expected that central attitudes have several 
consequences. However, in addition to centrality-related attributes, several other features 
of attitude strength have been studied, such as attitude accessibility, ambivalence and 
certainty. Recent studies suggest that attitude strength may be considered as a multi­
dimensional construct (Bizer & Krosnick, 2001; Krosnick, Boninger, Chuang, Berent & 
Carnot, 1993; Petty & Krosnick, 1995; Pomerantz, Chaiken & Tordesillas, 1995). And, 
attitude centrality is proposed to constitute one of the dimensions of attitude strength.
In the present research we will contrast centrality with another strength 
dimension, which is labeled commitment. The term commitment is often used to refer to a 
strength dimension that consists of attributes like certainty and subjective likelihood of 
change (Lastovica & Gardner, 1979; Pomerantz et al., 1995). Whereas centrality seems to 
depend on the strength of the link between an attitude and values and the self-concept, 
commitment seems to depend on the clarity and accessibility of the attitude itself. Indeed, 
Holland Verplanken and van Knippenberg (in press) showed that rehearsal of the global 
evaluation strengthened commitment-related attributes such as accessibility, certainty and 
subjective likelihood of attitude change, but did not affect centrality-related attributes (see 
also Jonas, Biel & Bromer, 1997).
Because commitment pertains to features of the intra-attitudinal structure, rather 
than the relation between attitudes and personal values, no effects of commitment were 
expected with respect to the prediction and the consequences of value-expressive 
behavior. Thus, in studying the prediction and consequences of value-expressive 
behavior, we only expect effects of attitude centrality.
Overview of the Present Research
We present four studies in which we examine the role of attitude centrality in relation to 
the influence and the consequences of value-expressive behavior. In Studies 1 and 2 we 
investigate the influence of attitude centrality on value-expressive behavior, and its 
possible mediating role in the relation between values and behavior. In Study 3, we 
examine the bandwidth of prediction of central versus peripheral attitudes. It is 
hypothesized that centrality of an attitude towards one specific object (e.g. buying 
organically grown potatoes) predicts behavior towards another specific object (e.g. 
donating money to Greenpeace). In Study 4, we explore the relation between attitude
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centrality and self-esteem. It is hypothesized that the successful expression of a central 
attitude may affirm one’s self-esteem, whereas failing to express a central attitude may 
even result in more negative self-evaluations. In all studies the effects of centrality 
dimension will be compared with commitment dimension of attitude strength. Based on 
the ideas described earlier, no effects of commitment are expected.
Study 4.1
Method
Overview
We measured attitudes and attitude strength towards Greenpeace, including measures for 
centrality and commitment. In addition the importance of environmental values was 
measured as well. In a later stage of the study, participants were provided with the 
possibility to donate money to Greenpeace in a collecting box. It was hypothesized that 
centrality would predict donation behavior, whereas commitment would not. Moreover, 
we hypothesized that the value-behavior relationship was mediated by attitude centrality.
Participants
Participants were 103 undergraduates at the University of Nijmegen. Members of 
Greenpeace who did not donate money (n = 3), were excluded from the analysis, because 
these participants had a clear reason not to donate money as they already paid 
membership fees. Participants received 7 Dutch guilders for taking part in the experiment 
(3 US Dollar).
Procedure
Participants came to the laboratory and were seated in separate cubicles. They responded 
to a computerized questionnaire.
Attitude. The attitude towards Greenpeace was measured using an 11 item 
semantic differential on 7-point scale (e.g. positive-negative, necessary-unnecessary, 
good-bad: alpha = .90).
Attitude strength. Attitude strength was assessed on 7-point Likert-scales (1 = 
strongly agree, 7 = strongly disagree). The questionnaire consisted of four items for 
attitude centrality , including two items for importance (1) “The organization of 
Greenpeace is very important to me”, and (2) “My attitude towards Greenpeace is very
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important to me”, and two items for centrality to the self-concept “Greenpeace is an 
organization that personally affects me” and “I feel closely connected to Greenpeace”.
Furthermore, four items for commitment, including a measure of certainty (1) “I 
am very certain about my attitude towards Greenpeace”; likelihood change (2): “It is 
unlikely that my attitude towards Greenpeace will change in the near future”; conviction 
(3): “I am convinced about my attitudes towards Greenpeace” and (un)decidedness (4): “I 
do not know how to evaluate Greenpeace”. The latter item was recoded so that higher 
scores represented greater strength.
Values. Participants were asked to rank order 22 values with respect to their 
importance (e.g. freedom, equality, enjoying life). These values were taken from 
Schwartz’s (1992) Value Inventory. Two of these values were related to environmental 
values: "respect for nature” and “protecting the environment”. The rank orders of the two 
items were aggregated and the mean was used for further analyses.
Behavior. When participants had completed the questionnaire they reported to the 
experimenter to get their money. They were paid seven separate Dutch guilders. Directly 
after paying, the experimenter told the participants that they could donate some money to 
Greenpeace in a collecting money-box if they wanted. When the experimenter was sure 
that the participant noticed the collecting box, he asked if he or she would fill in a small 
questionnaire. This questionnaire contained an item in which the participants were asked 
to write down the amount of money they had put in the collecting box. It also contained 
an item in which participants were asked whether they were member of Greenpeace. 
Afterwards, we compared the total amount of the money that was present in the collecting 
box with the total of the self-reported amount of money across all participants. These data 
matched, indicating that participants were honest in their responses.
Results
Factor analysis
Principal component analyses5 with varimax-rotation on the various strength measures, 
using the eigenvalue > 1 criterion, revealed a two-factor structure (total explained 
variance = 72 %). The factor loadings for each strength measure are shown in Table 4.1. 
Replicating previous studies (e.g. Pomerantz et al., 1995), a Centrality dimension, 
determined by strength measures referring to the centrality and importance of the attitude,
5 In the present paper we report prinicipal component analyses. However, for each of the four studies 
that are reported in this Chapter we also conducted factor analyses using maximum likelihood 
estimates. These analyses showed simialr factor solutions and resulted in the same outcomes as the 
present principal component analyses.
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and a C om m itm ent dimension, determined by certainty, decidedness and likelihood 
change emerged from the analysis. Factor scores after varimax rotation were used in 
further analyses.
Table 4.1 Factor Loadings o f  Strength Measures on Commitment and Centrality, 
Study 4.1: Greenpeace.
Strength measures
Strength Factors
Centrality Commitment
Importance of attitude .90 .01
Centrality to self .84 .21
Importance of Greenpeace .79 .05
Strength of personal bond .78 .43
Conviction .21 .90
Certainty .16 .90
Likelihood change .15 .70
Decidedness .24 .63
Explained percent variance 53 17
Note. Higher scores represent higher strength
Correlations
To evaluate our predictions, we first calculated the correlations between attitudes towards 
Greenpeace, importance of environmental values, centrality, commitment and the amount 
of money that was donated to Greenpeace. These correlations are given in Table 4.2. 
Interestingly, value importance, attitude and centrality were all significantly related to 
donation behavior, r (100) = .32, .39, and .48, respectively, all p  < .01. Moreover, a 
significant relation between values and centrality was obtained, r(100) = .49, p < .001, but 
not between values and commitment, r(100) = .10, p < .30. The latter correlations support 
the idea that centrality, but not commitment, is related to the strength of the link between 
an attitude and personal values.
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Table 4.2: Hierarchical Regression o f  Behavior on Values, Attitude, Centrality and 
Commitment: Study 4.1: Greenpeace.
Step Variable Entered Simple r 
with behavior
Multiple regression results 
b DR2 F
1 . Values 32** 32** . 1 0 ** 1 1 .2 1 **
2 . Values 32** .2 1 * .08** 10.80**
Attitude .38** .30*
3. Values 32** . 1 1 .08** 8.31**
Attitude .38** .13
Centrality 4 9 ** .35**
Commitment -.06 -.07
* p  < .05 ** p<  .01
Mediation analyses
A three-step hierarchical regression analyses was conducted on the amount of money 
donated to Greenpeace; value importance was entered on the first step, attitude was 
entered on the second step, followed by centrality and commitment on the final step. The 
results of these analyses revealed a significant relation between value importance and 
behavior, (AR2 = .10, AF = 11.21, p  <.01). The addition of attitude towards Greenpeace at 
the second step was associated with a significant improvement of the model (AR2 = .08, 
AF = 9.70, p  < .01). Interestingly, both the beta of value importance (b = .21) and the beta 
of attitude (b = .30) were significant on the second step. This finding replicates previous 
research on the role of values and attitudes in the prediction of behavior (Maio & Olson, 
1995; Verplanken & Holland, 2002). Nevertheless, when Centrality and Commitment 
were entered on the third step, there was a significant increase in the variance (AR2 = .08, 
AF = 4.96, p  < .01). As shown in Table 4.2, Centrality was the only significant predictor 
in the final equation, b = .40, p  <.001 .6
6 Many studies on the moderating role of attitude strength on behavior report interactions between an 
attitude X strength measures. In this study, and the following studies, no significant strength X attitude 
interactions were found, and therefore only main effects are reported. The absence of significant 
interactions is due to the fact that nearly all participants in our studies had positive attitudes towards 
Greenpeace and Amnesty International. Because, we only focused on positive evaluations, interactions 
between attitude and strength are less likely obtained. Thus, although theoretically speaking we argue 
that in our studies the effects of attitudes are moderated by centrality, this moderation is manifested in 
main effects rather than interactions.
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Figure 4.1. Path analyses depicting the mediating role of centrality on the value- 
behavior relationship: Study 1: Greenpeace.
The results described above, suggest that centrality mediates the value-behavior 
relationship. Figure 4.1 illustrates this mediation more clearly. To corroborate that 
centrality mediates the value-behavior relationship, three important conditions were 
satisfied (Baron & Kenny, 1986). First, value-importance was found to be significantly 
associated with behavior. Second, value-importance was significantly related to attitude 
centrality. Third, when the value-behavior relationship was controlled for the variance in 
attitude centrality, the effect of centrality remained significant, while the impact of values 
on behavior was reduced and became non-significant. This reduction was significant, Z= 
3.39, p  < .001.
Discussion
The results of Study 4.1 provide some first evidence for the role of centrality in predicting 
behavior. The motivational properties of centrality were supported; as centrality 
increased, the amount of money that was donated increased as well. Furthermore, 
mediation analyses suggested that values may affect behavior via their influence on 
attitude centrality, suggesting that central attitudes are more proximal causes of behavior.
There is a possible shortcoming however, in the procedure of Study 4.1. 
Participants were asked to donate money to Greenpeace directly after they had completed 
their questionnaire. This procedure might have induced consistency motives. That is, 
participants may have been motivated to bring their behavior in line with their attitude 
and centrality scores in the questionnaire. One argument that counters such an 
explanation is the fact that we used actual behavior, while consistency motives have been 
predominantly obtained for self-reported behavior (e.g. Kraus, 1995). Still, we cannot 
completely rule out this possibility. Therefore, we conducted a second study in which we 
used a one-week interval between attitude measures and behavior.
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Another way in which Study 4.2 aimed to extend Study 4.1 is by focusing on a 
different attitudinal object. In our second study the attitude object was the human rights 
organization Amnesty International. Thereby, we could test our ideas concerning 
centrality in a different attitudinal and value domain and show that the findings of Study 
4.1 are not confined to the domain of environmental issues.
Study 4.2
Method
Overview
In Study 4.2 measures for attitude, values, centrality and commitment concerning 
Amnesty International were assessed in a preliminary session. One week later, 
participants returned to the laboratory and were provided with the possibility to donate 
money to Amnesty International. By separating the assessment of attitudes and attitude 
strength from the behavior, we aimed to eliminate consistency effects. As in Study 4.1, it 
was expected that centrality of the attitude towards Amnesty International would predict 
the amount of money that would be donated to the organization, whereas no such a 
relation was predicted for commitment. Furthermore, we hypothesized that centrality 
would mediate the value-behavior relationship.
Participants
Participants were 51 undergraduates at the University of Nijmegen. They received 7,50 
Dutch guilders (3 US Dollar) for their participation.
Procedure
Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were placed in separate cubicles equipped 
with a computer. The experimenter started the computer program and told the participants 
that all instructions would be provided through the program.
In the first part of the study, participants responded to the Schwartz’s Value 
Inventory (1992). Next, participants responded to a filler task. Subsequently, participants 
completed a computerized questionnaire on social issues. Items about Amnesty 
International were embedded in this questionnaire together with questions about three 
different social issues. The latter was done to disguise Amnesty International as the target 
object. Participants then completed a series of other studies that were unrelated to the 
present research. Finally, participants made an appointment to return the next week.
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One week later, participants returned for an unrelated study, which took about 10 
minutes. Subsequently, they were paid for the whole experiment and received 5 separate 
guilders and a coin of two-and-a-half Dutch guilders for their participation. Next they 
were given the opportunity to donate money to Amnesty International, following the 
same procedure as in Study 4.1. The amount of money that was put in the collecting box 
was counted and this constituted our measure of value-expressive behavior.
Measures
Attitude. The global attitude towards Amnesty International was measured 
through two semantic differentials (positive - negative and good - bad, alpha = .94).
Attitude strength. Attitude centrality was measured by three items, including 
importance: “How important is Amnesty International to you?' (1 = not at all important - 
11 very important); centrality to the self-concept: “My attitude towards Amnesty 
International provides a good description of the person I am” (1 = strongly disagree - 11 
strongly agree); and relation with values: “My attitude towards Amnesty International is 
strongly related to my personal values” (1 = strongly disagree - 11 = strongly agree). 
These items were taken from Pomerantz et al., 1995. The items for commitment were 
identical to those used in Study 4.1.
Values. Results of a pilot study showed that the value ‘equality’ was highly 
relevant for the attitude object Amnesty International. This is not surprising since the 
organization fights for equal rights for all human beings. The importance of the value 
‘equality’ was measured in an adapted version of the Schwartz Value Survey (Schwartz, 
1992), such that the value was embedded in a series of others. Importance of the values 
was assessed by the use of 11-point response scale, anchored with ‘this does not belong to 
me at all’ and ‘this very much belongs to me’ (Verplanken & Holland, 2002). Following 
Maio and Olson (1995) and Schwartz (1992) we statistically controlled for response 
tendencies by correcting for the mean score of the other values included in the survey.
Results
Factor analysis
Principal component analyses on the various strength measures, using the eigenvalue > 1 
criterion, revealed two strength dimensions (total explained variance 81 %). Again, a 
centrality factor and a commitment factor emerged. Factor loadings for each of the 
strength measures are shown in Table 3. As in Study 1, standardized factor scores after 
varimax rotation were used in subsequent analyses.
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Table 4.3: Factor Loadings o f Strength Measures on Commitment and Centrality, 
Study 4.2: Amnesty International.
Strength measures
Strength Factors
Centrality Commitment
Centrality to self .91 .06
Represents personal values .79 .41
Importance .75 .28
Conviction .29 .89
Certainty .34 . 8 8
Likelihood change .31 .90
Decidedness -.06 .85
Explained percent variance 53 17
Note. Higher scores represent higher strength
Table 4.4: Hierarchical Regression o f Behavior on Values, Attitude, Centrality and 
Commitment: Study 2: Amnesty International.
Step Variable Entered Simple r 
with behavior
Multiple regression results 
b DR2 F
1 . Values .28* .28* .08* 4.24*
2 . Values .28** . 2 1 .04 2.69
Attitude .23b .15
3. Values .28* . 1 1 . 1 0 * 2.93*
Attitude .23 .13
Centrality 3 9 ** .39**
Commitment . 2 0 .26
* p  < .05 ** p<  .01
Correlations
Table 4 depicts the correlations of the various predictor variables with behavior. The table 
shows that value importance (equality) was significantly related to the amount of money 
donated to Amnesty International, r(53) = .28, p  < .05, as was centrality, r(53) = .39, p  < 
.01. The correlation between attitudes and behavior was marginally significant, r(53) =
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.23, p  = .08. Replicating the results of Study 1, it was found that centrality was 
significantly related to value importance, r(53) = .50, p  < .001, while no such relation was 
found for commitment, r(53) = .21, p  = .13. These findings underscore the idea that 
central attitudes are linked to personal values.
Mediation analyses
A three-step hierarchical regression was conducted; value importance was entered 
on the first step, attitude was entered on the second step, followed by centrality and 
commitment on the final step. The results of these analyses revealed a significant relation 
between value importance and behavior, (AR2 = .08, AF = 4.02, p  <.05). At the second 
step attitude towards Amnesty International was added to the model, which did not result 
in a significant improvement of the model (AR2 = .04, AF = 2.18, p  < .15). Both the beta 
of value importance (b = .21, p  = .08, one-tailed), and attitude were no longer significant 
(b = .15, ns). More important, entering centrality and commitment in the equation on the 
third step yielded a significant increase in the variance (AR2 = .08, AF = 4.96, p  < .05). 
Centrality was the only significant predictor in the final equation, b = .39, p  < .01.
Again, the results indicate that attitude centrality mediates the value-behavior 
relationship. This mediation is depicted in Figure 4.2. Value importance significantly 
predicted money donation. Furthermore, the importance of the value 'equality' was 
positively associated with the centrality of the attitude towards Amnesty International. 
Finally, when the relation between value importance and money donation was controlled 
for the variance in attitude centrality, centrality remained a significant predictor of 
behavior, while the effect of value on behavior was reduced and became non-significant. 
This reduction was significant, Z= 1.94, p  = .05
Figure 4.2. Path analyses depicting the mediating role of centrality on the value- 
behavior relationship: Study 4.2: Amnesty International.
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Discussion
In Studies 4.1 and 4.2 we showed, across different attitudinal objects and value domains, 
that attitude centrality is associated with (1) value importance and (2) donation behavior. 
Also, results indicated consistently that attitude centrality mediated the relationship 
between value-importance and behavior. Results of Study 4.2 showed that these findings 
were also obtained, even if we used a one-week interval between the measurement of 
centrality and the assessment of behavior. The latter procedure makes a consistency 
explanation of the results of the first study less plausible.
The results thus far underline our notions that central attitudes are important in 
living up to our personal values. Also, stressing the significance of a multi-dimensional 
view of attitude strength, both Study 4.1 and 4.2 indicated that only centrality was 
associated with value-expressive behavior, whereas commitment was not. Because 
commitment more strongly refers to structural aspects of the attitude itself rather than 
external links of an attitude with personal values, no effects of commitment were 
expected. However, by repeatedly showing effects of centrality and no effects of 
commitment, we might have, inadvertently, depicted commitment as an unreliable and 
inconsequential dimension of attitude strength. It should be emphasized, however, that 
this absence of effects is due to the fact that centrality and commitment are related to 
different processes and outcomes. In line with this argument, several studies using the 
same measures have shown that commitment affects several outcomes such as 
information processing (Pomerantz et al., 1995), self-perception effects (Holland et al., 
2003) and behavior (Sample & Warland, 1973; see for an overview Gross, Holtz & 
Miller, 1995). These results suggest that our measures for commitment were valid and 
reliable.
However, the validity of our measures of commitment was further corroborated 
by linking these measures to a measure of attitude accessibility. Several studies have 
shown that commitment relates to the ease of attitude retrieval (Bassili, 1993; 1996; 
Holland, Verplanken & van Knippenberg, in press; Pomerantz et al., 1995). Attitude 
accessibility is assessed by measuring the time it takes a person to indicate his or her 
evaluation. If we were able to show that the measures for commitment that are employed 
in the present study are related to the speed in which evaluations are indicated, we would 
have a more profound basis for its validity. Therefore, we measured centrality and 
commitment with respect to Amnesty International in similar ways as in Study 2. 
Beforehand, we measured attitude accessibility as the speed with which the attitude 
towards Amnesty International was given in a separate dichotomic evaluation task (Fazio,
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1995). Results indicated that commitment was related to accessibility, r(84) = -.33, p  < 
.03, such that highly committed attitudes had lower response latencies. Centrality was not 
related to accessibility, r(84) = .10, ns. These data corroborate the idea that the measures 
for commitment employed in the present investigation are reliable and valid.
Study 4.3
Thus far, the results support our notion that centrality is important in explaining the 
relation between values and behavior. The results suggest that highly central attitudes 
have a great motivational strength that results in larger amounts of money being donated. 
Studies 4.1 and 4.2 focused on the motivational properties of central attitudes. In Study 
4.3 we examine the consequences of cognitive properties of centrality; and the bandwidth 
of predictions as a function the centrality and commitment.
Method
Overview
In a preliminary stage of Study 4.3 we measured participants’ attitudes and attitude 
strength towards ‘buying organically grown potatoes’. At the end of the experiment 
participants were provided with the possibility to donate money to Greenpeace. We 
deliberately selected two attitude objects (buying organically grown potatoes and 
Greenpeace) within the same value-domain that neither corresponded with respect to 
action, context, time, nor target. This gap between attitude and behavior, allowed us to 
examine the bandwidth of prediction of attitude centrality. It was predicted that centrality 
of the attitude towards buying organically grown potatoes would predict the amount of 
money that was donated to Greenpeace. As commitment does not pertain to the strength 
of the link between an attitude and personal values, no effects were expected for 
commitment.
Participants
Participants were 105 undergraduates at the University of Nijmegen (M = 21.8 years). 
Members of Greenpeace, who did not donate money, were excluded from the analysis (n 
= 7). Because of missing data another three participants were excluded. Participants were 
given 5 Dutch guilders (2 US dollar) for taking part in the study.
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Procedure
Participants came to the laboratory, were placed in individual cubicles, and filled in a 
questionnaire booklet on the issue of 'buying organically grown potatoes'. After they 
completed the questionnaire participants were paid. Subsequently, participants were 
asked to donate money to Greenpeace. Finally, participants were debriefed, thanked and 
dismissed.
Measures
Attitude. The attitude towards buying organically grown potatoes was measured 
by 10 items on 7-point semantic differentials (e.g. positive-negative, necessary- 
unnecessary, good-bad: Cronbach's alpha = .90).
Attitude strength. This was assessed on 7-point Likert-scales (1 = strictly agree, 7 
= strictly not agree). The booklet consisted of three items for commitment: certainty, 
likelihood change and conviction and three items for centrality, including two items for 
attitudinal importance: “The buying of organically grown potatoes is important to me”, 
“The buying of organically grown potatoes is of great importance, despite the fact that 
these potatoes are somewhat more expensive”7, and centrality to the self-concept: “issues 
like the buying of organically grown potatoes, are issues that personally affect me”.
B ehavior. When participants completed the questionnaire, they received 5 
separate guilders for participating. Subsequently, the experimenter told the participants 
that he was also conducting a study for Greenpeace. Then, participants were provided 
with the possibility to donate money to Greenpeace in a collecting box, following the 
same procedure as in Studies 1 and 2.
Results
Factor-analyses
Principal component analysis, using the eigenvalue > 1 criterion, on the strength measures 
revealed a two-dimensional structure of attitude strength (total explained variance = 
76%). As in Studies 4.1 and 4.2, a centrality and a commitment factor were obtained. The
7 In hindsight we are not too happy with the formulation of the second importance item, because of its 
addition “despite the fact that these potatoes are somewhat more expensive”. Such additions make 
items unclear and less usefull for investigating other issues. Importantly, leaving out this item from the 
analyses, that is if we used two in stead of three items for centrality, did not change the pattern of 
results.
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factor loadings for each strength measure are shown in Table 4.5. Again, factor scores 
after varimax rotation were used in further analyses.
Table 4.5: Factor Loadings o f Strength Measures on Commitment and Centrality, 
Study 3: Buying Organically grown Potatoes.
Strength measures
Strength Factors
Centrality Commitment
Importance .90 . 0 1
Importance despite the price . 8 6 .19
Centrality to self .84 . 2 1
Certainty . 2 0 .85
Decidedness .34 .82
Likelihood change . 0 0 .81
Explained percent variance 53 23
Note. Higher scores represent higher strength
Regression analyses
The amount of money donated to Greenpeace was regressed on attitude and both factors 
of attitude strength. The correlations and regression coefficients are shown in Table 4.6. 
While no reliable correlation was obtained for attitude, r (93) = .16, p  < .11, centrality 
turned out to be a significant predictor of behavior r (93) = .26, p  < .01. Regression 
analyses with all three predictor variables showed a significant fit of the model, F(3, 89) 
= 2.66, p  = .05. Centrality was the only significant predictor of behavior, p = .26, p  < .04.
Table 4.6: Correlations and Regression coefficients o f  Attitude, Centrality and 
Commitment on the amount o f money donated to Greenpeace: Study 4.3: 
Buying o f organically grown potatoes
Predictor variable Simple r 
with behavior
Multiple regression results 
b R2 df F
Attitude .16 . 0 0 .08 87 2.66
Centrality .26** .26*
Commitment . 1 1 . 1 1
* p  < .05 ** p< .01
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Discussion
Whereas Studies 4.1 and 4.2 focused on consequences of centrality that were due to 
motivational properties, the results of Study 4.3 demonstrated some effects of the 
cognitive properties of centrality. The centrality of attitudes towards buying organically 
grown potatoes predicted donation behavior to Greenpeace. Despite the gap between the 
target of the predictor and the behavior, a reliable relation was obtained. As specific 
attitudes become more strongly embedded in a constellation of personal values, these 
attitudes may, despite their specificity, predict behaviors towards other specific attitudes 
that are also connected to these values. The present case is most easily explained through 
the role of environmental values. Both attitude objects can be considered as relevant to 
environmental values. If preserving the environment is a core value to a person, then both 
buying organically grown potatoes and Greenpeace might become central attitudes. 
Therefore, centrality with regard to potatoes might predict money donation to 
Greenpeace. In sum, Study 4.3 showed that central attitudes may predict a wide variety of 
attitudes and behaviors because of its structural links with personal values.
Study 4.4
Whereas Studies 4.1 to 4.3 investigated the prediction of value-expressive behavior, 
Study 4.4 investigates the consequences rather than the prediction of value-expressive 
behavior. In our final study we test our ideas concerning the effects of the attitude 
expression on self-esteem. The hypothesis is tested that the self-esteem of high centrality 
attitude individuals is influenced by attitude expression whereas no self-esteem effects are 
expected among low centrality attitude individuals.
Self-esteem is measured by the name letter effect (Nuttin, 1985). Nuttin showed 
that generally speaking people prefer their own name letters to letters that do not make 
part of their name. Several studies have found evidence for the validity of the idea that 
this overpreference for one's own name letters effect is an indicator of implicit self­
esteem (Hoorens, 1993; Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997; Koole et al., 1999, 2001; Nuttin,
1985). For example, Koole and colleagues (1999) established evidence that the bias to 
favor name letters is reduced upon receiving failure feedback. Research has shown that 
the name letter effect has a good test-retest reliability (Koole, Dijksterhuis, & van
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Knippenberg, 2001) and cannot be explained by mere exposure (Nuttin, 1987)8 . The 
name letter effect can be viewed as an implicit measure of self-esteem. Therefore, this 
measure bypasses biases such as the social or personal desirability to hold positive self­
views, which are often found in explicit measures of self-esteem.
Method
Overview
Study 4.4 consisted of two sessions. In a preliminary session we measured centrality and 
commitment with respect to Amnesty International and we included a pre-measure of the 
name letter effect. Our main goal was to examine whether attitude expression through 
money donation to Amnesty International could re-affirm self-esteem. Therefore, in the 
second session, participants first received failure feedback on an alleged IQ test, through 
which we tried to lower self-esteem to begin with. Subsequently, participants were forced 
to make a choice whether or not to donate money to Amnesty International. Within the 
group of low centrality attitude participants, no effects on self-esteem were expected from 
their decision to donate money, because low centrality attitudes have no or only weak 
links with core values and the self-concept. On the other hand, within the group of high 
centrality attitude participants, we expected that donation behavior would affect self­
esteem. More specifically, as we lowered self-esteem to begin with through our failure 
feedback manipulation, it was expected that central attitude participants who chose to 
donate money would affirm their selves and thereby restore their self-esteem to their 
normal level. A different effect is expected for central attitude participants who decided 
not to donate money. Their failure to express a central attitude may result in an additional 
threat to the self, over and above the failure feedback received earlier in the session. 
Therefore it was hypothesized that these participants would exhibit an even stronger 
decline in self-esteem. Low centrality attitude participants would not be able to affirm 
their self-esteem and should therefore show a decline in implicit self-esteem. Again, no 
such moderating role was expected for commitment.
8 Effects of mere exposure tend to level off as the number of presentations increases. The number of 
times that we are confronted with letters of the alphabet is enormous, therefore a mere exposure 
explanation for the name letter effect is theoretically unlikely.
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Participants
Participants were 53 undergraduates at the University of Nijmegen. They received 7,50 
guilders (3 US Dollar) for their participation. As in the previous studies, members of 
Amnesty International who did not give money were excluded from the analyses (n = 2).
Procedure
Session 1. In session 1, upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were led to 
individual cubicles. The experimenter explained that all instructions would be given by 
means of a computer program and left. Experiments were run individually. Participants 
performed three tasks in succession, which were announced as ‘a study of aesthetic 
judgements’, ‘the development of a new questionnaire’, and ‘a study on social attitudes’, 
respectively. Participants were told that the studies were combined because each took 
relatively little time to accomplish. Different fonts and layouts were used for each task.
First, participants were introduced to a task that was described as a study of 
aesthetic judgements of simple stimuli, i.e. letters of the alphabet (Nuttin, 1985; Koole et 
al., 2001). Actually, this task was used to measure the name letter effect, our indicator of 
implicit self-esteem. The participants were asked to evaluate the 26 letters of the alphabet, 
which were presented in randomized order (1 = not at all beautiful, 5 = extremely 
beautiful). The participants were encouraged to respond intuitively towards the letters. 
The name letter effect was calculated for initials, following a procedure that was put 
forward by Kitayama and Karawasa (1997). First, for each letter norm scores were 
calculated by the mean of the scores of those participants who did not have the letter in 
their name. Then, for each participant we calculated the difference between the mean own 
ratings for the initials of the participant and the mean norm scores for these letters. The 
difference score was used as our implicit measure for self-esteem, with more positive 
scores indicating a positive name letter effect and positive implicit self-evaluation.
After the letter task participants responded to a filler questionnaire, and then 
completed a computerized questionnaire on attitudes, which included items for centrality 
and commitment concerning Amnesty International. These items were identical to those 
in Study 4.2. Attitude strength with respect to Amnesty International was measured 
concealed in a series of similar measures for several other attitudinal objects. This was 
done to disguise that Amnesty International was the actual target of the study. At the end 
of the first session, participants made an appointment for the second session and left the 
laboratory.
Session 2. Approximately one week later, participants returned to the laboratory 
and started with a test that was introduced as a measure of abstract thinking and
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intelligence. Moreover, it was stated that the test was a good predictor for success in later 
career. Actually, the purpose of this task was to induce failure feedback. The procedure 
was taken from Koole et al. (1999). Participants were asked to solve analogies. They 
firstly received an example: “... a is to France, as Brussels is to ....b”. Each question had 
five different possible answers. The answer of the example was given (Paris and Belgium, 
respectively). Then the real test began. Participants responded to 6 unsolvable analogies. 
For each analogy they were given 1 minute of time. After an (incorrect) response or after
1 minute without a response they received feedback “This was not the correct answer”, 
after which the next analogy was presented. After 6 analogies, participants were informed 
that their total score was zero.
In the next part, participants were provided with the possibility to donate money 
to Amnesty International. Participants read a brief introduction about the organization of 
Amnesty International. As we were now interested in the consequences rather than the 
prediction of behavior, a few changes were made compared to the procedures used in 
Studies 4.1 to 4.3. First, the amount of money that they could donate was fixed at 2 
guilders. Thus, participants could choose between either donating 2 guilders to Amnesty 
International and donating nothing. They indicated their choice by clicking one of two 
buttons on the computer screen, labeled “Yes, I donate” or “No, I do not donate”. We 
deliberately used 2 guilders, which is somewhat higher than the mean of the amount of 
money that was donated in Studies 4.1 to 4.3 (M = 1.20 gulden), so that the choice to 
donate would not be a matter of simple compliance. Second, in order to lower the 
threshold to donate money, participants were told on the arrival at the second session that 
they were paid an additional ƒ 2.50, because “the tasks of the first session took for most 
participants somewhat longer than we had expected”..
Self-esteem was then measured again by the name letter-effect. Participants rated 
the beauty of the letters of the alphabet using the same method and instructions as in the 
first session. By measuring self-esteem twice, we could analyze whether donation 
behavior would cause a shift in implicit self-esteem scores. Finally, participants were 
extensively debriefed, paid and thanked. All participants were fully explained that the IQ- 
test was not a real test and that it was impossible to give the right answer.
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Results
Factor analyses.
Principal component analyses replicated the structure of attitude strength that was 
obtained in Studies 4.1 to 4.3. Again, a commitment and centrality factor emerged (total 
explained variance = 77%). Factor scores after rotation were calculated for both factors 
and used in subsequent analyses.
Preliminary analyses on name letter effect.
First, we conducted some preliminary analyses to examine whether we were able to 
replicate the name letter effect. Therefore the scores of the name letter effect for both the 
preliminary session (M = 0.77, SD = 0.97), and the experimental session (M = 0.54, SD = 
1.01) were tested against 0. These analyses revealed strong significant effects, ¿(50) = 
5.68, p  < .001, and ¿(50) = 3.63, p  < .01 respectively, replicating previous findings that 
people are more favorable towards their own name letters than other letters. 
Subsequently, the scores for the name letter effect in the preliminary session and the 
second session were subjected to a single factor 2  (time: session 1 versus session 2 ) 
MANOVA. This analyses revealed a marginal significant effect of time, F  (1, 50) = 3.84, 
p  < .06. The name letter effect appeared to be higher on session 1 than on session 2. The 
latter finding is consistent with the idea that failure feedback decreases implicit self­
esteem (e.g. Koole et al., 1999)9.
Effects of money donation on name letter effect.
Although the preliminary analyses revealed that self-esteem was generally lower in 
session 2  than in session 1 , we did not predict such a decline for central attitude 
participants who had chosen to donate money. Therefore, the effects of centrality and 
behavior on implicit self-esteem were analyzed. First, we controlled for the level of 
implicit self-esteem on the session 1 in order to obtain a measure that shows a shift in 
self-esteem. Therefore, the scores on the name letter effect at the target session were 
regressed on the name letter effect scores of the preliminary session, r(52) = .76, p  < .001. 
We also calculated the simple difference score between the name letter scores of session 1 
and 2 .
9 Although, we did not have a no-threat control group within the present study, we conducted another 
study with a similar time-interval in which participants did not receive failure feedback. The data of 
this study showed no change over time of the name letter effect (M time 1 = .75 versus M  time 2 = .78). 
These data corroborates the idea that the present effects were caused by the failure feedback.
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Subsequently, we regressed the unstandardized residuals of name letter effect on 
(1) the factor scores of centrality, (2) a dummy variable indicating behavior (1 versus -1 
for donating versus not donating money), and (3) the interaction term of centrality and 
behavior. This analyses revealed a marginal significant effect of behavior, p = .24, t (48) 
= 1.76, p  < .11, and no main effect for centrality, p = -.01, ns. Importantly, the interaction 
term was significant, p = .30, t (48) = 2.20, p  < .04.
Decomposing the interaction term, we separately analyzed the regression lines for 
participants with central and peripheral attitudes, (Aiken & West, 1992). These analyses 
showed a significant positive relation between behavior and name letter scores among 
central attitude participants, b = .54, t (48) = 2.75, p  < .01, but not among peripheral 
attitude participants, b = -.07, ns.
central attitudes peripheral attitudes
Behavior
Figure 4.3. Regression lines depicting the relationship between implicit self-esteem 
and behavior for participants with low and high centrality attitudes.
A similar pattern of results was obtained when a difference score, as calculated by 
the difference between the name letter effect on the preliminary session and the 
experimental session was used10. The results of these analyses are depicted in Figure 4.3.
10 The main effect of behavior was significant, p = .29, t (48) = 2.18, p < .04, and the centrality X 
behavior interaction was marginal significant, p = .24, t (48) = 1.75, p = .08. Simple regression slopes
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In line with the predictions, Figure 4.3 shows a decrease in the name letter effect for 
participants with low centrality attitudes towards Amnesty International. As these 
attitudes are not related to the self-concept, expressing these attitudes through behavior 
could not affirm the self-concept. The drop in self-esteem is caused by the failure 
feedback. On the other hand central attitude participants who decided to donate money to 
Amnesty International seemed successful in affirming their self-concept. No decrease in 
the name letter effect was obtained, supporting the idea that these participants restored 
their self-evaluations through the donation of money to Amnesty International. Finally, 
Figure 4.3 shows that high centrality attitude participants who decided n o t  to donate 
money showed a strong drop in self-esteem. After having been threatened by our failure 
feedback manipulation, their self-esteem was even further threatened by their failure to 
act on an attitude that is closely linked to personal values and their self-concept11.
We also conducted regression analyses on residual- and difference scores of the 
name letter effect for commitment, behavior and the commitment x behavior interaction 
term. These analyses showed no reliable main effects or interaction effects of 
commitment, all p  > .30.
Discussion
The results of Study 4.4 further provide evidence for the motivational properties of 
attitude centrality. As high centrality attitudes are closely linked with personal values and 
other aspects of the self-concept, a functional relation with self-esteem was expected. It 
was shown that the expression of central attitudes through behavior can neutralize threats 
to the self. Prior research has shown that value-expression may neutralize the effects of a 
threat to the self (Steele & Liu, 1983; Tesser & Cornell, 1991). Study 4.4 shows that if an 
attitude is related to core values, the behavioral expression of such an attitude may affirm 
the self in quite similar ways as the expression of a core value. Among those participants 
whose attitudes were not strongly linked to personal values and the self-concept, no 
effects of behavior were found. As a result of the absence of a link with the self-concept, 
the expression of such attitudes is less consequential for self-evaluation.
Finally, in line with Studies 4.1-4.3, Study 4.4 again provided evidence for the 
validity of a multi-dimensional view of attitude strength in terms of factor analytic
showed a significant relation between behavior and differences in name letter scores for high centrality 
participants, p = .54, t (50) = 2.72, p < .05, but not for low centrality participants, p = .051, ns.
11 Further analyses showed that analyzing the scores of the evaluations for letters that do not make part 
of a person’s own name, revealed no significant effects all p ’s > .15, suggesting that the obtained 
effects are due to self-evaluation rather than general mood effects.
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structure and differential consequences. Whereas the centrality factor showed effects on 
self-esteem, no effects of the commitment factor were found.
General Discussion
In four studies, the present research demonstrated several consequences of attitude 
centrality. The results of Studies 4.1 and 4.2 revealed that centrality was a significant 
predictor of value-expressive behavior. Moreover, centrality was found to mediate the 
value-behavior relationship. The results of Study 4.3 illustrated that central attitudes have 
a wide bandwidth of predictions, such that centrality towards one specific attitude object 
was found to predict behavior towards a different attitudinal object in the same value 
domain. Finally, the findings in Study 4.4 provide support for the idea that the expression 
of central attitudes may have important consequences for an individual’s self-esteem. 
Central attitude individuals whose self-esteem was threatened reaffirmed their selves by 
attitude-congruent behavior.
Some of these consequences are influenced by motivational properties of 
centrality. First, the present findings suggest that central attitudes are more proximal 
causes of behavior in the chain of values to behavior. Through its link with values and the 
self-concept, central attitudes may be furnished with motivational strength. This 
motivation is crucial in the decision whether and how much money a person wants to 
donate. Results showing that centrality, but not commitment or attitude, mediated the 
value-behavior relationship further underlines the role of motivation in the elicitation of 
value-expressive behavior.
Other findings were related to cognitive features that of centrality. Centrality can 
be considered as a dimension of attitude strength that captures features of the inter- 
attitudinal structure. The inter-attitudinal structure is defined as the linkages between an 
attitude and values, other attitudes and aspects of the self-concept. The relation between 
centrality and inter-attitudinal structure became evident in the results showing that 
centrality was associated with values. However, the cognitive properties became even 
clearer in the results of Study 4.3. In that study it was shown that centrality with respect 
to one specific attitude object (buying organically grown potatoes), predicted behavior 
concerning another attitude object (Greenpeace). These latter results may only be 
obtained if the attitude towards organically grown potatoes is embedded in the same 
values as the attitude towards Greenpeace. Furthermore, Study 4.4 yielded evidence that
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central attitudes are even related to general evaluations towards the self, by demonstrating 
that expressing central attitudes influences self-esteem.
Values versus Attitudes
Several researchers have argued that attitudes should be distinguished from values 
(e.g. Maio & Olson, 1994; Oskamp, 1991; Rohan, 2000; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992, 
1996; Verplanken & Holland, 2002). The two constructs differ in that values transcend 
specific situations or objects, are hierarchically ordered in terms of importance, and form 
an integrated system (e.g., Schwartz, 1992, 1996; Devos, Spini, & Schwartz, in press). 
The way values and attitudes are measured also points at an important difference: 
whereas the core characteristic of an attitude is its variation on an evaluative dimension 
(favorable-unfavorable), the distinctive aspect of a value is its variation in importance 
(e.g., Maio & Olson, 1994; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992).
However, attitude centrality also reflects differences in importance or self­
relevance. Then, what is the difference between a value and a central attitude? The 
answer may be found in the level of abstraction. Whereas values refer to general abstract 
goals, central attitudes are specified in relation to a specific object. In other words, values 
can be considered as general transsituational goals, whereas central attitudes are derived 
from these goals. The differences between central attitudes and values may be clearly 
illustrated by the formation of new attitudes. For example, when a supermarket sells a 
new product like organically grown peanut butter, your attitude towards this new product 
may be influenced by your general values on preserving the environment and may 
become central. However, your central attitude towards peanut butter is not a value. In 
light of this we do think it is warranted to view attitudes and values as different concepts, 
even in the case of central attitudes that are closely related to our personal values and self­
image.
Multi-dimensional View of Attitude Strength: 
Centrality versus Commitment
The present research also contributes to a better understanding of the nature of 
attitude strength. In the present study we adopted a multi-dimensional approach of 
attitude strength. In line with prior research we were able to replicate the previously 
obtained factor structure consisting of a centrality and a commitment dimension (e.g. 
Pomerantz et al., 1995). Although both dimensions seem related to strength, only
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centrality was found to be related to the onset and consequences of value-expressive 
behavior, whereas no effects of commitment were found. Therefore, the general statement 
that strong attitudes are more predictive of behavior than weak attitudes should be 
qualified by specifying the nature of the strength dimension and the nature of the behavior 
under focus. Instead of asking ourselves the question “Does attitude strength influence 
behavior?”, we should ask the question “Which strength dimension does influence what 
kind of behaviors?” The present findings may add to some preliminary evidence that 
commitment and centrality are associated with different outcomes (e.g. Holland et al., 
2003; Pomerantz et al., 1995; Visser, Krosnick, & Simmons, 2002).
Centrality and the Value-Expressive Function in Attitudes
In addition to a number of functions, including, the utilitarian function, the ego-defensive 
function and the knowledge function, several researchers have argued that attitudes may 
also serve the expression of values and the self-concept (Katz, 1968; Smith et al., 1956; 
see for a recent review of these functions Maio & Olson, 2000). The latter is called the 
value-expressive function of attitudes. Although all these functions have been identified 
some time ago, it seemed difficult to demonstrate these functions empirically. Some 
researchers focused on personality measures as indirect indicators of the value-expressive 
function. A well-known example of this kind of research is the use of the personality 
scales such as the self-monitoring scale (Snyder, 1974).
Other researchers have used a situational approach (e.g. Maio & Olson, 1995; 
Murray, Haddock & Zanna, 1996). For example, Maio and Olson made either altruistic or 
utilitarian beliefs salient with respect to donating money for cancer research. They found 
altruistic values to be associated with the intention to donate money, but only in the 
altruistic-salience condition, and not in the utilitarian salience condition.
Still others have used an object-based approach (Shavitt, 1990). Shavitt argued 
that some objects contain specific primary functions. For example, for most people coffee 
and air-conditioners have a utilitarian function, while a wedding ring or the Republican 
Party contain a self-expressive function.
Research has provided empirical evidence for all these perspectives, suggesting 
that these views on attitudinal function have their merits. Still, in these approaches the 
functional qualities of the attitudes are established in an indirect way, i.e. the value- 
expressive function is derived from variations due to individual differences, situational 
cues, or characteristics of the attitude object. However, these studies do not directly 
address the core features that make an attitude value-expressive or not.
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The present research suggests that the value-expressive function may reside in 
aspects of the inter-attitudinal structure. The centrality of an attitude, i.e. the degree to 
which an attitude is linked to personal values and the self-concept may reflect the value- 
expressive function of an attitude. This idea is supported by several findings of the 
present research. First, the fact that centrality mediates the value-behavior relationship 
suggests that central attitudes may serve personal values. Moreover, Studies 4.3 and 4.4 
have shown parallel effects of values and central attitudes. Both values and central 
attitudes have a wide bandwidth of predictions. Both the expression of values and central 
attitudes may boost a person’s self-esteem. These similarities further underline the 
possible relation between centrality and the value-expressive function. Accordingly, 
expressing central attitudes may serve our most important personal goals.
Directions for Future Research
The present studies were all correlational in nature. Hence, the causality of the 
obtained relations should be viewed with some caution. Therefore, it would be interesting 
to use experimental manipulations of centrality. As an example of such a manipulation 
one could think of experimentally strengthening the link between attitudes and values 
(e.g. Ostrom & Brock, 1968) and then study the subsequent effects on value-expressive 
behavior.
Moreover, future research might address the relation between attitude centrality and 
attitude function more directly. It would be interesting to further study centrality as a 
indicator of the value-expressive function by linking centrality to previous approaches to 
the value-expressive function. For example, it is often proposed that attitudes may have a 
value-expressive function among low self-monitors but not among high self-monitors 
(Snyder, 1974). If centrality is a more direct indicator of the value-expressive function, 
centrality should be associated with self-monitoring. Similarly, Shavitt (1990), argued 
that some attitude objects may be value-expressive (e.g. a wedding ring or a political 
party), whereas others are not. We would argue that attitudes towards these value- 
expressive objects are more central than attitudes towards objects that lack these qualities. 
By relating attitude centrality to these earlier approaches in future investigations, we 
might be able to further enhance our understanding of the essential role of centrality in 
translating values to behavior.
Chapter 5
Perceiving or Retrieving: 
Processes Underlying the Moderation of 
Attitude Strength on Self-Perception Effects*
Suppose that you just donated some money to charity. Prompted by a person 
rattling a collecting box, you gave a couple of dollars to Amnesty International. Let’s 
further assume that, prior to this event, you haven't given Amnesty International much 
thought. In fact you were somewhat uncertain whether or not you felt positive about it, 
and you were surely not committed to support it. Nevertheless, after your benevolent act, 
you may feel that you have a positive attitude towards Amnesty International, at least 
more so than you would have had without it.
This example illustrates the idea that people may infer their attitude from their 
own behavior. This is the central tenet of self-perception theory (Bem, 1967; 1972). From 
the perception of our own behavior we may infer our attitudes in much the same way as 
we may infer the attitudes of others from their behavior. The idea that attitudes may result 
from inferential processes has received a vast amount of empirical support. For example 
self-perception effects have been obtained in the domain of religious behavior (Salincik & 
Conway, 1975), humor (Olson, 1992), environmental attitudes (Chaiken & Baldwin, 
1981), interpersonal attraction (Dutton en Aron, 1974), overjustification effects (Lepper, 
Green & Nisbett, 1973), and foot-in-the-door effects (Snyder & Cunningham, 1975).
Do we always infer our attitudes from behavior? Bem (1972) speculated that self­
perception effects are limited to occasions in which people have weak, ambiguous, or 
uninterpretable internal cues. In line with Bem, the present paper aims to demonstrate that 
self-perception processes are limited to relatively weak attitudes. However, the present
* This chapter is based on Holland, Verplanken, van Knippenberg & Karremans (2003)
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research went beyond the question whether or n o t  attitude strength moderates self­
perception effects. The goal of the present research was to show how  attitude strength 
moderates self-perception effects. As we will discuss, recent developments in research on 
attitude strength suggest that attitude strength is best understood as a multi-dimensional 
construct (e.g. Bizer & Krosnick, 2001). That is, in our goal to reveal the process 
underlying the moderation of attitude strength on self-perception effects we have to 
explicate which aspect of attitude strength is crucial in this moderation.
Attitude Construal versus Attitude Retrieval
The self-perception account fits in with a more general perspective in which 
attitudes may be said to result from reconstructive processes (Tourangeau & Rasinski, 
1988; Wilson & Hodges, 1992). That is, perceivers may use various sorts of contextual 
cues, including their own behavior, to infer their attitude. In other words, according to this 
perspective, attitudes are construed “on-the-spot”, fluctuate over time and are primarily 
context-dependent (Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz, 2000; Sudman, Bradburn, & Schwarz, 
1996; Tourangeau, Rasinski, Bradburn & D’ Andrade, 1989). In line with this view of 
attitudes as temporary constructions, it has been shown that attitudes may be affected by 
relatively small changes in the context (see, e.g. Haddock, Rothman, Reber & Schwarz, 
1999; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Schwarz, Strack, Kommer, & Wagner, 1987; Tourangeau 
et al., 1989).
Despite the empirical support for the occurrence of self-perception effects, and for 
the context dependency of attitudes, however, it seems implausible that attitudes are 
always the result of reconstruction processes. For instance, there is ample empirical 
evidence that attitudes may show considerable stability over time (e.g. Marwell, Aiken & 
Demerath, 1987; Prislin, 1997), bias information processing (e.g. Fazio & Williams, 
1986; Sweeney & Gruber, 1984) and guide instead of follow behavior (e.g. Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 1980; Fazio & Williams, 1986; Millar & Tesser, 1986; see for reviews: Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993; Kraus, 1995). These findings suggest that attitudes may be relatively 
stable cognitive structures that persist over time, and have an independent causal 
influence on cognition and behavior (Allport, 1935; Eagly & Chaiken. 1993) Thus, to put 
it briefly, it seems that attitudes are sometimes stable dispositions and on other occasions 
act like temporary constructions. The question is, then, what makes the difference?
The answer to this question may be found in the concept of attitude strength. We 
suggest that attitude strength may be considered as a construct bridging the gap between 
these two general models of evaluative responses (see also Hodges & Wilson, 1994;
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Holland, Verplanken & van Knippenberg, 2002; Lavine, Huff, Wagner & Sweeney, 
1998). The view of attitudes as temporary constructions may more likely apply to weak 
attitudes, whereas the view of attitudes as stable dispositions may be more in line with 
strong attitudes. When attitudes are relatively weak, the evaluation of the object may be 
created “on-the-spot”. Accordingly, context information is likely to be assimilated in the 
evaluative response. A lack of strong internal cues may result in a greater reliance on 
external information to form an attitude. Conversely, strong attitudes may be simply 
retrieved from memory. Consequently, in these cases, context information is less likely to 
affect the evaluative response.
In line with this reasoning, it has been demonstrated that strong attitudes are less 
susceptible to context effects in the domain of decision-making (Fazio, Powell & 
Williams, 1989), survey research (Lavine et al., 1998), and listing reasons for ones 
attitude (Hodges & Wilson, 1994). Moreover, judgements of persons appear to be 
influenced by context information when the description of the target person is relatively 
ambiguous (see e.g. Higgins, Rholes & Jones, 1977), but not when the target is well 
known to the participant (Stapel, Koomen & van der Pligt, 1997). The results of these 
studies suggest that if judgments are readily available in memory, context information has 
little impact on the judgment.
Self-perception effects may be considered a special case of a context effect. In this 
specific case, salient behavioral cues constitute the context in which the attitude is 
constructed (e.g. “I have donated money, so I must be in favor of Amnesty 
International”). In line with the general idea that attitude strength moderates context- 
effects, it may be expected that self-perception effects are more likely to occur in the case 
of weak attitudes than for strong attitudes. Indeed, results of prior research suggest that 
self-perception effects may be moderated by attributes of attitude strength such as 
affective-cognitive consistency (Chaiken & Baldwin, 1981) or amount of knowledge 
(Wood, 1982). Although these studies suggest that the weak versus strong attitude 
distinction may be important with regard to the impact of self-perception processes, it 
remains unclear exactly what mechanism is responsible for this moderating role of 
attitude strength.
Recent developments in research on strength related attributes have yielded 
evidence for a multidimensional structure of attitude strength (Bizer & Krosnick, 2001; 
Krosnick, Boninger, Chuang, Berent, & Carnot, 1993; Pomerantz, Chaiken & Tordesillas, 
1995). Moreover, it has been shown that different strength dimensions may result in 
different consequences (Pomerantz et al., 1995; Holland, Verplanken, Smeets & van 
Knippenberg, 2003; see also Bassili & Krosnick, 2000). These findings suggest that the
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issue of how attitude strength moderates self-perception effects may be best addressed by 
asking which dimension o f  attitude strength is specifically responsible fo r  the moderation 
o f  attitude strength on self-perception effects?  By answering this question, we may 
provide a better insight in the process that underlies the moderating role of attitude 
strength with regard to self-perception effects. Before we expand further on this 
underlying mechanism, we will discuss the multi-dimensional structure of attitude 
strength in some detail.
Dimensions of Attitude Strength
The construct of attitude strength is usually defined in terms of attitudinal consequences. 
Strong attitudes are expected to be more stable over time, more resistant to change and to 
have greater impact on behavior and information processing than weak attitudes 
(Krosnick & Petty, 1995). In studying these consequences, researchers have focused on 
strength related attributes, such as certainty, importance, likelihood of change, amount of 
knowledge, lack of ambivalence, centrality, and accessibility (see for an overview 
Krosnick et al., 1993; Petty & Krosnick, 1995). Indeed, a vast amount of research has 
provided evidence that these attributes are correlates of one or more attitudinal 
consequences such as behavior or information processing (Petty & Krosnick, 1995). 
Given the great variety of these strength related attributes it may be overly simplistic to 
treat attitude strength as a uni-dimensional construct. Indeed, although strength indicators 
are usually moderately correlated, most researchers agree that attitude strength can best 
be considered as a multi-dimensional construct (e.g. Abelson, 1988; Krosnick et al., 1993; 
Pomerantz et al., 1995). However, the discussion on the exact nature of this multi­
dimensional structure still continues with regard to the amount of strength dimensions 
(Abelson, 1988; Bassili, 1996; Lastovica & Gardner, 1979; Pomerantz et al., 1995), and 
the interpretation of these strength dimensions (Bassili, 1996). Therefore, we will focus 
on two relatively independent dimensions of attitude strength that have received support 
in several studies.
One dimension relates to the motivational strength of an attitude and is referred to 
as centrality. Centrality is formed by strength related attributes like importance, centrality 
to the self-concept, and centrality to personal values. Centrality is closely related to the 
concept of value-relevant involvement (Eagly & Johnson, 1989). A second dimension 
relates to the ability to retrieve a clear and decided attitude and is referred to as 
commitment. This strength dimension is formed by strength attributes like certainty, 
decidedness, accessibility and perceived likelihood change.
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From a theoretical perspective a distinction between centrality and commitment 
seems valid. Confident or accessible attitudes do not necessarily go together with high 
levels of personal involvement. Providing a clear example of this, Tourangeau, Rasinski, 
Bradburn and D’ Andrade (1989) showed that feelings of ambivalence are amplified as 
the importance of the issue increases. Individuals, who are strongly involved in the issue, 
may hesitate to favor or disfavor on the issue because of both positive and negative 
elements. Such undecidedness indicates low commitment, despite high levels of 
centrality. Likewise, an individual may hold an attitude with great confidence and 
accessibility without being personally involved in the issue (e.g. “Ice-cream is great” or “I 
dislike cockroaches”). Such a case represents an attitude with high commitment but low 
centrality.
The centrality-commitment distinction has received a vast amount of empirical 
evidence. First, the two dimensions have received support from several factor-analytic 
studies on attitudes (Holland, et al., 2003; Lastovica and Gardner, 1979; Pomerantz et al., 
1995). Additionally, outside the attitude domain, a similar distinction between importance 
and certainty has been suggested in research on self-views (Pelham, 1991). Second, 
Pomerantz et al. (1995) showed that both dimensions have unique correlates in 
information processing. For example, their embeddedness factor (which was determined 
by centrality to self, values and importance and to some extent by knowledge) was found 
to be associated with increase in information seeking, whereas commitment was 
associated with selectivity in judgment of attitude-relevant information. Third, some 
researchers have used experimental designs to explore the underlying structure of attitude 
strength (Bizer & Krosnick, 2001; Holland, Verplanken & van Knippenberg, in press). 
Holland et al. (in press) showed that repeatedly expressing one’s attitude increased 
commitment to an attitude as indicated by attitude accessibility, certainty and subjective 
likelihood change. Importantly, they found no effects on centrality related attributes of 
strength (see also Bizer and Krosnick for related findings).
Considering these two dimensions of attitude strength, we argue that 
commitment, but not centrality, is the crucial moderating factor with regard to self­
perception processes. If commitment is high, i.e. if an individual is able to retrieve a clear 
and decided attitude, there is no need to reconstruct this attitude on the spot. Highly 
committed attitudes are simply retrieved from memory (e.g. “My favorite ice-cream 
flavor? Banana!”). In such cases our recent behavior may not influence our attitudes. 
Conversely, low commitment to an attitude may render this attitude susceptible for cues 
from our recent, favorable or unfavorable, behavior (e.g. “Let’s see, when it comes to ice­
cream I always choose banana flavor, so I guess that’s my favorite flavor”). Centrality on
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the other hand, pertains to the self-relevance of attitudes, and does differentiate between 
attitudes that are easily retrieved from memory and those that are not. Hence, we expect 
that centrality does not moderate self-perception processes.
Fazio (1987) noted that having an accessible attitude "lessens any need to 
construct an attitude “on the spot” by inference from current or salient behavior” (p. 139). 
In our view, and in line with Fazio’s argument, attitude accessibility constitutes an 
important attribute of strength with respect to the moderation of attitude strength on self­
perception effects, because high accessibility may serve as a signal that one possesses a 
clear and decided evaluation. Other attributes of commitment are the degree of attitudinal 
certainty, degree of attitudinal conviction and the perceived likelihood that the attitude 
will change in the future. All these strength attributes serve to indicate whether or not a 
person is able to retrieve a clear and decided attitude and may therefore moderate self­
perception effects.
The Present Investigation
In the present research, we seek to clarify the process through which attitude 
strength moderates self-perception effects. More specifically, we aim to show that 
commitment to an attitude is crucial in this moderation. Two experiments were 
conducted. In Study 5.1, we tested self-perception effects as a function of individual 
differences in commitment and centrality. Based on the idea that commitment relates to 
the ability to retrieve a clear and decided attitude, whereas centrality does not, it was 
predicted that commitment moderates self-perception effects.
In Study 5.2, we experimentally manipulated commitment to an attitude, by 
having participants express their attitudes repeatedly or only once. It was hypothesized 
that repeated expression lessens the need to construct the attitude on the spot. Therefore 
self-perception effects were only expected if attitudes were expressed only once. 
Experiment 2 contains the first experimental test of the moderation of attitude strength on 
self-perception effects.
Perceiving or Retrieving 93
Study 5.1
Method
Overview
Self-perception effects were studied after participants were provided with the possibility 
to sign a petition for Amnesty International (a human rights organization). Attitudes and 
several attributes of attitude strength towards Amnesty International were assessed in a 
preliminary session. Behavior was manipulated by either providing or not providing the 
participants with the opportunity to sign the petition. We assumed that anyone given the 
opportunity would indeed sign the petition. Signing the petition can be considered as a 
positive act towards Amnesty International. From a self-perception perspective, it was 
predicted that participants would become more positive towards Amnesty International 
after signing the petition. However, we predicted that such self-perception effects would 
only be obtained for low commitment participants. No self-perception effects were 
expected for high commitment participants.
Participants and design
Seventy-six undergraduate students from the University of Nijmegen participated in the 
study. Half of the participants were randomly assigned to a condition in which they were 
given the possibility to sign a petition for Amnesty International. The other half of the 
participants was not given such a possibility. Furthermore, the measured attributes of 
attitude strength were subjected to factor analysis. For each of the obtained factors, a 
median split divided the group of participants into a high and low group. Then, for each 
of these strength dimensions a separate ANOVA was carried out. Thus, each analysis 
used a 2 (Attitude Strength: weak vs. strong) X 2 (Condition: signature vs. control) 
between-participants design. Participants received DFL. 15,- (about 6.5 US Dollar) for 
participation. Thirty-one of the initial 76 participants had already signed the petition 
outside the laboratory before returning to session 2 of the experiment. Of course, our 
manipulation of behavior would have no effect on participants who have already signed 
the petition. Therefore, these 31 participants were excluded from the analysis. However, 
including these participants in the analysis resulted in a pattern of results that was clearly 
in line with our predictions (see results section footnote 2).
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Procedure
The experiment consisted of two sessions with a one-week interval in order to minimize 
consistency effects and to disguise our focus on the topic of Amnesty International.
The first session included attitude and attitude strength measures towards 
Amnesty International. First, attitude accessibility was measured. Second, a set of self­
reported strength measures was assessed within a computerized questionnaire. All items 
were presented after each other within a series of such measures towards three other 
topics. These other topics were included to further disguise Amnesty International as the 
target of the study. The order of these topics was randomly determined.
One week later, participants returned to the laboratory for an unrelated study. At 
the time this experiment was conducted, a large-scale petition for Amnesty International 
was held. By signing this petition, people could support Amnesty International. 
Participants were told that the Department of Social Psychology collaborated with 
Amnesty International in conducting research. One of two procedures was followed, 
depending on the experimental condition. In the signature condition, participants were 
given the opportunity to sign the petition for Amnesty International before expressing 
their attitude towards Amnesty International. The Amnesty International petition was 
explained to the participants while a small petition-card was placed in front of them. 
Then, the experimenter asked if the participant was willing to sign and left the cubicle. 
After signing the petition, the participants completed a small questionnaire about 
Amnesty International, including the dependent attitude measure. The questionnaire was 
placed underneath the petition-card. Control participants first responded to the small 
questionnaire in a cubicle. After completion, they returned to the waiting room where 
they were informed about the petition and asked to sign. So, the petition could not have 
influenced the attitude scores of participants in the control condition. Finally, all 
participants were paid, debriefed and thanked.
As expected, participants who were asked to sign the petition did so, except for 
one person in the control condition. This one person said to dislike the initiator of the 
campaign. This person was included in the analyses. However, excluding this person 
from the analyses did not affect the pattern of results.
Measures
A ttitudes. On the first session participants reported their attitudes towards 
Amnesty International on two 11-point semantic differentials (positive - negative, good - 
bad; alpha = .96). This attitude measure was used as a covariate. In the second session,
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attitudes were measured by asking participants to evaluate the work of Amnesty 
International on a scale from 1 to 10. This measure was the main dependent variable.
Attitude strength. Com mitm ent was measured by the following five attributes: 
certainty: “How certain are you about your attitude towards Amnesty International?”; 
conviction: “How convinced are you about your attitude towards Amnesty 
International?”; likelihood change: “How likely is it that your attitude towards Amnesty 
International will change in the future?”; decidedness: “I do not know at all what to think 
about Amnesty International”; and accessibility. Accessibility was measured in a separate 
task before all other measures. Participants were seated behind a computer and a button 
box with two buttons. The left button was labeled negative and the right button positive. 
Participants were instructed to evaluate words on the screen as quickly and accurately as 
possible. After receiving three practice trials, the task consisted of 20 trials, which were 
randomly presented and included the target object Amnesty International. The response 
latency of this target served as an indicator of attitude accessibility (see Fazio et al.,
1986).
Centrality was measured by the following 3 attributes: centrality to the self­
concept “My attitude towards Amnesty International provides a good description of the 
way I am”; centrality to values: “My attitude towards Amnesty International represents 
personally important values”; and importance: “How personally important is Amnesty 
International to you?”. These items were taken from Pomerantz et al. (1995).
Results
Factor-analysis
Principal component analysis12, using the eigenvalue > 1 criterion, on the set of strength 
related attributes revealed a two factor solution (total explained variance = 70%). In line 
with previous studies, a commitment factor and a centrality factor were obtained from the 
data. C om m itm ent was determined by the strength attributes certainty, conviction, 
decidedness, subjective likelihood change, and accessibility. Centrality was determined 
by strength attributes pertaining to the relation between attitudes and self and/or values, 
such as centrality to self-image, centrality to core values, importance. The factor loadings 
for each strength attribute are shown in Table 5.1. Individual factor scores were 
calculated for both factors. By means of a median-split on these factor scores, participants 
were categorized as either high or low on Commitment and Centrality.
Factor analyses using maximum likelihood procedures revealed a similar factor structure.12
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Table 5.1. Factor Loadings o f Strength Attributes on Commitment and Centrality
Strength measures
Strength Factors 
Commitment Centrality
Certainty .89 .28
Conviction .89 .34
Decidedness . 8 8 . 2 2
Likelihood change . 6 6 .38
Accessibility .59 .15
Represents values .32 . 8 6
Centrality to self .14 . 8 6
Importance .35 .60
Explained percent variance 57 13
Note. Higher scores represent higher strength
Self-perception analysis
To test the hypothesis that Commitment influences the effects of behavior on attitudes, 
session 2 attitudes were subjected to a 2 X 2 (Commitment X Behavior) analysis of 
variance, using session 1 attitudes as a covariate to control for individual differences on 
the pre-measure. A test for homogeneity for the covariate regression coefficients 
indicated that these coefficients did not differ for the various groups. The analysis 
revealed a significant effect for the covariate, F(1, 40) = 36.02, p  < .01, and a marginal 
significant main effect for condition, F(1, 40) = 3.23, p  < .08. The main effect for 
commitment was not significant, F(1, 40) = 1.75, p  < .20. Importantly, the predicted 
Commitment X Condition two-way interaction was significant, F(1, 40) = 10.32, p  < .01.
More specific analyses revealed that the effect of condition was highly significant 
for low committed participants, F(1, 40) = 13.68, p  < .002, but not for high committed 
participants F(1, 40) = 1.68, ns. The adjusted means of attitude ratings towards Amnesty 
International in session 2 are depicted in Table 5.2. The table indicates that low 
commitment participants in the signature condition had more positive attitudes towards
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Table 5.2 Means o f  Attitudes in Session 2 fo r  Participants with Low and High 
Commitment in both Behavior Conditions: Study 5.1
Experimental condition
Attitude strength Control Signature
Low commitment 7.8a 8.9b
High commitment 8.0a 7.7a
Note. Attitude-scores range from 1 to 10, with higher scores indicating more positive attitudes. 
Means were corrected for attitude ratings in session 1. Cell means in rows not sharing the 
same subscripts significantly from each other (p < .001).
Amnesty International than control group participants. No differences were found among 
high committed participants13.
Likewise, a 2 X 2 (Centrality X Behavior) analysis of variance was conducted. 
This analysis revealed no reliable main effects or interaction effects were found for 
centrality, all p ’s > .33, indicating that centrality did not moderate self-perception effects.
Discussion
Results of Study 5.1 were in line with the predictions. First, in correspondence with 
previous studies (Holland, Verplanken, Smeets, et al., 2003; Lastovica & Gardner, 1979; 
Pomerantz et al., 1995), the commitment and centrality dimensions were obtained from 
factor analysis. Second, linking these two strength dimensions to self-perception revealed 
that commitment moderated processes of self-perception, while no effects were found for 
the centrality dimension. More specifically, the attitudes of high committed participants 
were less influenced by their recent behavior than low committed individuals. High
13 We conducted some additional analysis with the 31 participants who already signed the petition 
when they returned to the laboratory for the second session. The dependent attitude measure was 
subjected to a 2 (Commitment: low versus high) X 2 (Condition: signature versus control) X 2 (Prior 
behavior: signed versus not signed) using the attitude score in session 1 as a covariate. This analysis 
resulted in a reliable three-way interaction, F(1, 67) = 4.51, p  < .04. Decomposing this interaction, it 
was found that the two-way interaction Prior behavior X Condition was highly significant for low 
committed participants, F(1, 67) = 7.95, p  < .01, but not for high committed participants, F(1, 67) = 
.45, ns. The effect for condition was only significant within the low commitment group of participants 
who had not signed yet when they returned for the second session, F(1, 67) = 9.03, p  < .01, but not 
when they already had signed the petition, F(1, 67) = .70, ns. Cell means indicated that weakly 
committed participants became more positive when they signed the petition irrespective as to whether 
this happened in or outside the laboratory. The attitudes of highly committed participants were not 
affected by their behavior in or outside the laboratory. Thus, the present data set provides correlational 
as well as experimental evidence for the notion that participants with weak attitudes infer their attitudes 
from their behavior, while participants with strong attitudes do not.
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commitment is characterized as attitudes that are easily retrieved from memory and are 
held with great confidence. The fact that commitment, and not centrality, moderated self­
perception effects supports the idea that the ability to retrieve a clear and decided attitude 
is crucial in the moderating role of attitude strength on self-perception effects. High 
committed participants had no need to infer their attitude from signing a petition for 
Amnesty International, because they could easily retrieve a clear attitude from memory. 
Lacking this ability, low commitment participants needed to construe their attitudes on 
the spot. Therefore information about their behavior is more likely included in the 
evaluation.
Study 5.2
Although the results of Study 5.1 supported the notion that high commitment to an 
attitude attenuates self-perception effects, these data were correlational in nature. That is 
commitment was measured rather than manipulated. To provide further evidence of the 
role of commitment in the moderation of attitude strength on self-perception effects, we 
conducted a second experiment in which we manipulated commitment by a repeated 
expression procedure (Fazio, 1995).
It is a well-established finding that attitudes become more accessible after 
repeatedly expressing them (e.g. Powell & Fazio, 1984). Repeatedly expressing ones 
global evaluation may result in clear and easily retrievable attitudes, i.e. repeated 
expression may strengthen the commitment of an attitude. Indeed, Holland et al. (in press) 
showed that repeatedly expressing an attitude increases accessibility as well as other 
attributes of commitment, i.e. certainty and subjective likelihood. These results suggest 
that the repeated expression paradigm may be a useful and valid method for 
experimentally manipulating commitment. If commitment were crucial in the moderating 
role of attitude strength on self-perception, one would expect participants who repeatedly 
expressed their attitudes not to infer their attitudes from behavior. This idea was tested in 
our second experiment.
Method
Overview
In a preliminary stage of our second experiment, we had participants express their attitude 
towards Amnesty International either a single time or 6 times as a manipulation of
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commitment. In a later stage, participants were randomly assigned to a behavior-first 
condition, in which participants were given the opportunity to donate money to Amnesty 
International before they rated their attitude, or to an attitude-first condition, in which 
participants first rated their attitudes and subsequently provided with the opportunity to 
donate money. Donating money can be considered as a supportive act, while deciding not 
to donate is a negative act. Following self-perception principles, attitudes may become 
more positive after donating money and more negative after not donating money. We 
expected, however, that these effects would depend on the level of commitment to an 
attitude. More specifically, it was hypothesized that participants in the single expression 
condition would more likely infer their attitude towards Amnesty International from their 
decision than participants in the repeated expression condition. Participants within the 
attitude-first condition served as control participants. As the attitude inquiry preceded 
behavior within this condition, it is not possible that participants inferred their attitudes 
from their donation behavior.
Participants and design
Participants were 176 undergraduate students from the University of Nijmegen, who did 
not participate in earlier studies on self-perception effects. Experiment 2 consisted of a 2 
(attitude expression: single expression vs. repeated expression) X 2 (order: behavior-first 
vs. attitude-first) X 2 (behavior: money donated vs. no money donated) between-subjects 
design. Participants were randomly allocated to conditions within the first two factors, 
while the level of the latter factor was measured. Participants received FL. 7,50 (about 3 
US $) for participation.
Procedure
Participants came to the laboratory and were seated behind computers. In a first task on 
‘attitudes’, we manipulated commitment by a repeated expression procedure adapted 
from Fazio et al. (1982). Participants reported their attitudes on 4-point semantic 
differentials towards a number of objects (e.g., soccer, studying, bull fighting, and 
chocolate), including Amnesty International. Participants allocated to the single 
expression condition reported their attitude towards Amnesty International 1 time 
(positive-negative). Participants in the repeated expression condition completed six 
semantic differentials on their attitude towards Amnesty International six times (positive­
negative, good-bad, favorable-unfavorable, desirable-undesirable, important-unimportant, 
and necessary-unnecessary). In order to end with the same number of attitude items for 
both experimental conditions, participants in the single expression condition reported
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their attitude towards studying on six different semantic differentials. Participants in the 
repeated expression condition reported their attitude towards studying only once. 
Altogether, participants responded to 21 attitude items.
Within the task on social attitudes, all participants responded to the attitude item 
positive-negative towards Amnesty International on a four-point scale. This measure was 
used as a pre-measure of the attitude14.
After the repeated expression manipulation, participants completed a 5-minute 
filler task. Subsequently they went to the room adjacent to the waiting room. There they 
received one coin of Fl. 2,50 and 5 separate guilders for participation. Directly after 
paying, the experimenter told the participant that he was also conducting a study for 
Amnesty International. For participants in the behavior-first condition he continued to 
explain that they could donate some money to Amnesty International in the collecting box 
if they wanted. When the experimenter was sure that the participant noticed the collecting 
box, he asked if he or she would anyhow fill in a small questionnaire about Amnesty 
International. This questionnaire contained a question asking for the amount of money 
that was donated. Additionally it contained the dependent attitude measure. Subsequently, 
the experimenter went back to the waiting room, leaving behind the participant with the 
questionnaire the money and the collecting box.
Participants in the attitude-first condition followed a reversed procedure. First, the 
small questionnaire was completed and subsequently the participant was explained that it 
was possible to donate money to Amnesty International. Thus, in the attitude-first 
condition the behavior followed the completion of the questionnaire15. Logically, the 
behavior could have no influence on the attitude measure. Finally all participants were 
paid, debriefed, thanked and dismissed.
The questionnaire handed out by the experimenter consisted of four items. The 
first item was an open question asking how much money they had put in the collecting 
box. By means of this question we forced participants to make a decision to donate 
money before they indicated their attitude. Of course, this item was left out in the 
attitude-first condition4. The questionnaire consisted of a participants were asked to 
report their attitudes towards Amnesty International by giving a grade from 1 to 10 for the 
work of Amnesty International. Finally, participants were thanked and debriefed.
14 No differences were found on the attitude pre-measure as a function of repeated expression, F (1, 
177) = .90, ns.
15 To determine the amount of money that was donated in the attitude-first condition the money in the 
box was simply counted after the participant left.
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Results
The attitude-measure was subjected to a 2 X 2 X 2 (Attitude expression X Order X 
Behavior) ANOVA. In order to control for differences in attitudes beforehand, we used 
the pre-measure of the attitude as a covariate. A test for parallelism of the covariate 
regression coefficients indicated no significant interactions with any of the factors in the 
design, suggesting that the slope of the regression lines were equal for all conditions. The 
analysis of variance revealed main effects for order, F(1, 167) = 11.13, p  < .01, and 
behavior, F(1, 167) = 4.33, p  < .05. The covariate was also significantly related to the 
attitude, F(1, 167) = 11.36, p  < .01.
Moreover, the Attitude expression X Order interaction was also significant, F(1, 
167) = 7.53, p  < .05, whereas the Attitude expression X Behavior and Order X Behavior 
interactions approached statistical significance, F(1, 167) = 2.92, p  < .09, and F(1, 167) = 
2.52, p  < .12, respectively. However, these two-way interactions were qualified by a 
significant Attitude expression X Order X Behavior three-way interaction, F(1, 167) = 
3.80, p  = .05. We conducted further analyses within experimental conditions, in order to 
reveal the nature of this three-way interaction. Within the single expression condition, the 
Behavior X Order interaction was significant, F(1, 167) = 6.03, p  < .02, while this 
interaction was absent within the repeated expression condition, F(1, 167) = .00, ns. 
Additionally, the Attitude expression X Behavior interaction appeared to be significant 
within the behavior-first condition, F(1, 167) = 6.21, p  < .02, but not within the attitude- 
first condition, F(1, 167) = .03, ns. The latter finding supports the idea that expression and 
behavior had no effect within the attitude-first control condition.
Subsequently, we continued to do some further analyses within the behavior-first 
condition, i.e. in the condition self-perception may be expected. According to the 
hypothesis within this behavior-first condition, behavior should have a stronger effect on 
attitudes of participants in the single condition compared to those in the repeated 
expression condition. In line with this hypothesis it was found that the participant’s 
decision to donate or not had a significant effect on attitudes of the participants in the 
single expression condition, F(1, 167) = 10.99, p  < .01, but not on the attitudes of 
participants in the repeated expression condition, F(1, 167) = .90, ns.
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Table 5.3 Adjusted means o f  attitude ratings as a function o f  behavior, attitude 
expression, and order o f attitude and behavior: Study 5.2
Behavior
Money donated No money donated
Order M (n) M (n)
Expression 1 time
Behavior-first 8 .1b (31) 6 .8a (10)
Attitude-first 8.5b (30) 8.5b (11)
Expression 6 times
Behavior-first 8 .1b (42) 7.9b (10)
Attitude-first 8 .2b (26) 8 .1b (16)
Note. Attitude-scores could range from 1 to 10, with higher scores indicating more positive 
attitudes. Means are adjusted for the attitude-score beforehand. Cell means in rows and 
columns not sharing the same subscripts significantly from each other (p < .05).
The cell means of the attitude are shown in Table 5.3. As can be seen in the table 
it appeared that the cell-mean of the non-donating participants in the behavior-first 
condition who expressed their attitude only once was different from all other cells in the 
design. Importantly, these participants reported more negative attitudes compared to the 
same participants in the attitude-first control condition, F(1, 167) = 11.13, p  < .01, and 
also compared to non-donating participants in the behavior-first condition in the repeated 
expression condition, F(1, 167) = 5.60, p  < .02.
Discussion
The results of Study 5.2 provide direct evidence for our idea that attitude strength 
moderates self-perception effects through the ability to retrieve a clear evaluation. If an 
attitude can be retrieved, there is no need to construct an attitude on the spot by inferring 
the attitude from behavior. Consequently, behavior will have less impact on people with a 
clear and decided attitude. Participants who repeatedly expressed their attitudes and 
therefore held highly accessible attitudes were less influenced by their behavior, than 
participant who expressed their attitudes only once and therefore held relatively low 
accessible attitudes. These results support the more general idea that low commitment
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participants are more likely to infer their attitudes from behavior, following self­
perception principles, while high commitment participants are more likely to retrieve their 
attitudes from memory.
In general, behavior had stronger effects on the attitudes of participants in the 
single than in the repeated expression condition. However, a closer look on the data 
revealed that this effect of behavior was more specific. It was only obtained for 
participants who did not donate money to Amnesty International, but not for participants 
who donated money. Why did the attitudes of participants in the single expression 
condition not become more positive after donating money? A post-hoc explanation may 
be the following. If people are asked for a donation, donating some money is the norm, 
especially when the charity is a well-liked organization such as Amnesty International. 
Donating money to such an organization may not be diagnostic for your attitude, because 
it can also indicate that your act resulted from an ‘external’ norm instead of your ‘inner’ 
attitude. Then, such a norm may serve as an external attribution for the cause of donating 
money. Conversely, the decision n o t to donate money may be diagnostic about your 
attitude, because it violates the norm.
Some past studies have reported that repeated expression or thinking about 
attitudes may result in changes of extremity (e.g. Downing, Judd & Brauer, 1992; Tesser, 
1978). One might argue then, that differences in attitude between the single and repeated 
expression condition were due to a mere polarization effect. When polarization and 
behavior caused the difference in attitudes between participants in the single and repeated 
expression condition, this difference may also be expected within the attitude-first control 
condition. However, the present data showed no effects of attitude expression on attitudes 
in these control conditions. If anything, participants in the single time expression 
condition seemed to express somewhat more positive attitudes than participants in the 
repeated expression condition. Therefore, mere attitude polarization as induced by 
repeated expression cannot account for the differences in attitudes we found in Study 5.2.
General Discussion
In two studies, it was consistently shown that evaluative responses of participants with 
weak attitudes are more influenced by their behavior than evaluative responses of 
participants with strong attitudes. In other words, following behavior, weak attitudes may 
reflect more behavioral cues, while strong attitudes may still reflect inner feelings. 
However, the present research went beyond the question “Does attitude strength
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moderates self-perception effects?”, by focusing on the question how  attitude strength 
moderates self-perception effects. We aimed to show that the ability to retrieve a clear 
and decided attitude, i.e. the degree of commitment is crucial in this moderation.
The present study elucidated the process underlying the moderation of attitude 
strength on self-perception effects in two important ways. First, in Study 5.1 it was shown 
that individual differences in commitment, but not centrality, were associated with the 
absence or presence of self-perception effects. Further corroborating the role of 
commitment in the moderation of attitude strength on self-perception-effects, the results 
of Study 5.2 indicated that an experimental manipulation of commitment renders an 
attitude less susceptible to self-perception effects. Furthermore, Experiment 2 is important 
because it constitutes the first demonstration of reduced context effects after an 
experimental manipulation of strength. Together, these results provide compelling 
evidence that commitment to an attitude is crucial in the moderation on self-perception 
effects.
Results of Study 5.1 render an alternative process less plausible. It has been 
suggested that strong attitude individuals base their attitudes on more careful and 
deliberate information processing than weak attitude individuals, because they are 
motivated to deliberate on the issue (Van der Pligt, De Vries, Manstead & Van Harreveld, 
2001). If an attitude is based on such careful information processing, beliefs about ones 
own behavior may only be a one piece of information in the total amount of beliefs on 
which people base their attitude. Consequently, beliefs about one’s own behavior may 
have less effect on the attitude (Taylor, 1975). However, such careful information 
processing may be primarily expected in the case of important, self-relevant attitudes, i.e. 
highly central attitudes (e.g. Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Pomerantz et al., 1995; van der 
Pligt et al., 2001). Thus, if dilution through deliberation, and not attitude retrieval, 
underlies the moderation of attitude strength on self-perception effects, the results of 
Study 5.1 should have obtained a moderating role of centrality, and not commitment. The 
fact that centrality did not affect self-perception effects, seems to rule out this alternative 
explanation. In general, the idea that commitment and centrality may be related to 
different processes further underlines the importance of testing both dimensions in 
relation to self-perception effects.
Overall, both studies suggest that different processes underlie evaluative 
responses for participants with different degrees of commitment. Persons with highly 
committed attitudes are more likely to retrieve their attitudes from memory upon an 
attitude inquiry, while persons with relatively low committed attitudes are more likely to 
infer their attitudes from cues available in the immediate context. Our theoretical
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framework converges with Fazio’s (1987) suggestions concerning the underlying 
mechanism through which weak attitudes are influenced by behavior while strong attitude 
are not. He suggested that a person with a strong attitude is more likely to retrieve his or 
her attitude from memory, while a person with a weak attitude does not have this option 
and therefore has to construct his or her attitude “on-the-spot”, e.g. by inferring it from 
his or her behavior.
The present research also extended prior research in another way. Previous 
findings with regard to the relation between attitude strength and self-perception effects 
were based on studies in which participants inferred their attitudes from behavioral 
information (which was made salient by the researchers) rather than actual behavior 
(Chaiken & Baldwin, 1981; Wood, 1982). Several studies have shown that actual 
experience has a stronger impact on attitudes compared to mere contemplation (e.g. 
Regan & Fazio, 1977; Wu & Shaffer, 1987). This suggests that inducing self-perception 
effects by actual experience may be more potent than by merely priming behavioral 
information. Indeed, Chaiken and Baldwin (1981) suggested that if their saliency 
manipulation in their study had “been more potent” (p. 9) strong attitudes might also 
begin to show effects of behavioral cues. In contrast to their suggestions, however, the 
present data showed no self-perception effects among strong attitude individuals, despite 
the use of strong behavioral manipulations, i.e. actual behavior. Thus, it seems that the 
moderation of attitude strength on self-perception effects is more general than suggested 
in earlier research.
Attitude Strength and Context Effects
The present findings may also have implications for the extensive field of research on 
context effects. The moderation of attitude strength on self-perception can be considered 
as a special case of the moderation of attitude strength on context effects in general. In the 
case of self-perception, context is provided by a person’s behavior. People who cannot 
retrieve a previously stored attitude must construct their evaluative response via currently 
available information. In our studies, behavioral information was available as a salient 
cue. However, other cues may serve this role too. For example, attitudes can be 
influenced by information from mood (e.g. Schwarz et al., 1987), ease of retrieval 
experiences (Haddock et al., 1999; Wanke, Bless & Biller, 1996), and minor changes in 
wording or question order (e.g. Lavine et al., 1998; see for reviews Tourangeau & 
Rasinski, 1988; Strack & Martin, 1987).
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Empirical research on the moderation of attitude strength on context effects is 
relatively scarce. Krosnick and Schuman (1988) investigated response effects in surveys. 
In contrast to what they predicted, they concluded that attitude strength, indicated by 
attitude importance, intensity and certainty does not moderate context effects. In addition, 
Bishop (1990) also failed to find consistent moderating effects of importance, interest and 
frequency of thought in context effects on survey data. Several possible explanations for 
the absence of influence of attitude strength in these studies have been put forward, such 
as unreliability of the strength measures they used (Lavine et al., 1998). Krosnick and 
Schumann (1988) dismissed the unreliability argument because of observed inconsistency 
in the direction of response effects. Interestingly, whereas for importance and intensity 
such inconsistencies were indeed observed, inconsistencies with respect to certainty were 
not reported. Either, an increase in certainty was associated with less context effects or no 
effect of certainty was found.
The findings of the present investigation suggest a different explanation. Not all 
indicators of attitude strength may be successful moderators of context effects. For 
example, if a person is strongly involved in the issue of abortion, she may find the issue 
very important, but she may not be sure to favor or disfavor on the issue. What’s more, 
personal importance may even result in greater ambivalence. Therefore, importance, 
centrality, interest or intensity may not be appropriate indicators of the strength with 
which a position on the issue is taken. Consequently, strength indicators referring to 
personal involvement may be less successful moderators of response effects. In line with 
Krosnick and Schumann’s (1988) and Bishop's (1990) null findings, results of 
Experiment 1 revealed that centrality was not associated with less self-perception effects. 
We suggest that strength measures related to the commitment dimension of attitude 
strength may be crucial in the moderation of context effects. Interestingly, two recent 
studies provide evidence for this. First, Lavine et al. (1998) replicated the Krosnick and 
Schuman (1988) study, and included strength measures that were related to the ease of 
attitude retrieval, like certainty, ambivalence and extremity. Using an aggregate measure 
with these strength measures, they found that response effects were less pronounced for 
participants with strong attitudes than for participants with weak attitudes. Second, Bassili 
and Krosnick (2000) found that certainty and extremity, but not importance and intensity, 
successfully moderated response effects in surveys. Together with the present results, 
these data suggest that it may be worthwhile to further study context effects as a function 
of commitment.
Some researchers favor the view of attitudes as temporary constructions and argue 
that all attitudes are construed “on-the-spot” (Wilson & Hodges, 1992; Tourangeau &
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Rasinski, 1988; Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz, 2000; Sudman, Bradburn, & Schwarz, 1996; 
Tourangeau, Rasinski, Bradburn & D’ Andrade, 1989). For example Schwarz (2000) 
suggested that attitudes are only stable over time if the context in which these attitudes 
are measured is stable. Although we fully agree that some attitudes are mainly context- 
dependent, we propose that the view of attitudes as temporary constructions is 
incomplete. In the present research, the context was manipulated in which attitudes were 
measured. However, in contrast with the view that all attitudes are construed “on-the- 
spot”, it was found that only attitudes low in commitment seemed to be influenced by the 
context, but not high commitment attitudes. Thus, the present findings suggest that the 
view of attitudes-as-contemporary-constructions seems most appropriate for attitudes low 
in commitment. On the other hand, the classic approach of attitudes (Allport, 1935; Eagly 
& Chaiken, 1993), in which attitudes are considered as relatively stable over time and 
mentally represented seems most applicable for attitudes high in commitment.
Different Processes and Functions Related to Dimensions of Attitude 
Strength
Most previous studies on attitude strength focused on the effects of only one strength 
related attribute (e.g. certainty, importance) on attitudinal consequences such as stability, 
information processing, resistance, or behavior (see for reviews: Petty & Krosnick, 1995; 
Krosnick et al., 1993). However, in order to understand how  attitude strength is related to 
these consequences, such a ‘one-attribute’ approach is often inadequate. One way to 
attain a more profound understanding of underlying processes is to link various 
components of attitude strength to these consequences. Providing such a case, results of 
the present Experiment 1 showed that commitment moderated self-perception effects, 
whereas centrality did not. Other recent studies have also provided evidence that different 
aspects of attitude strength may be related to different processes in the causal chain to a 
consequence of attitudes (Biek, Wood & Chaiken, 1996; Pomerantz et al., 1995; see also 
Bassili & Krosnick, 2000; Eagly & Chaiken, 1998). That is, one specific aspect of attitude 
strength may be the unique moderator of a specific consequence. Additionally, one might 
think of a case in which two aspects of attitude strength may be associated with the same 
effects, however with different underlying processes. For example, although commitment 
and centrality both moderate the attitude-behavior relation (e.g. Pomerantz et al., 1995), 
commitment might be more predictive of a spontaneous attitude-behavior relation (Fazio, 
1995; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999), whereas centrality may be of crucial importance in 
the prediction of value-expressive behavior (Holland et al., 2003). A second way to
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enhance our understanding of how attitude strength relates to attitudinal consequences is 
the use experimental manipulations of strength. In the present Study 5.2 we used an 
experimental manipulation of commitment in relation to processes of self-perception. In 
relation to other consequences, such as behavior or resistance, one may think of other 
manipulations such as importance (Bizer and Krosnick, 2001), centrality (Ostrom & 
Brock, 1968) or elaboration (Petty, Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995). Employing different 
dimensions or experimental manipulations of attitude strength, future research could 
investigate more thoroughly potential different processes by which attitude strength is 
related to attitudinal consequences.
If commitment and centrality are related to different consequences, it may be 
possible to specify, one a more general level, the functions of these strength dimensions. 
Why do we need commitment or centrality in the first place? Although several authors 
have analyzed the functions of attitudes (Katz, 1968; Maio & Olson, 2000; Smith, Bruner 
& White, 1956), the relation between dimensions of attitude strength and function has 
been largely neglected (see for an exception, Fazio, 2000). Through its relation with the 
ability to retrieve a clear and decided attitude, commitment may be related to the object 
appraisal (Fazio, 2000; Smith et al., 1956) or knowledge function (Katz, 1968). High 
commitment to an attitude enables people to act on that attitude without deliberation, 
lessens any need to construct an attitude on the spot. Thus, high commitment to an 
attitude frees us from have to think about the issue thoroughly. On the other hand, 
through its relation with values and other aspects of the self-concept, centrality may 
pertain to the value- or self-expressive function of attitudes. Through stating or acting on 
central attitudes, we can express who we are, and show our personal values. That is, 
central attitudes may add to our sense of identity. By focusing on the functions and 
related processes of strength dimensions we may be better able to understand the 
theoretical underpinnings of the structure and consequences of attitude strength.
Summary and Conclusion
When a person is asked to indicate an attitude or preference (e.g. “Do you like banana ice 
cream?”), commitment to his/her attitude may determine how such a question is 
answered. The present findings tell us that if we possess a clear and decided attitude, we 
simply retrieve it from memory and tell the world about it. If we lack the capacity to 
retrieve a stored summary evaluation, we need to infer our preferences from whatever 
information that is present in the context. Instead of retrieving an attitude from memory, 
we perceive  it from cues in the situation. Our overt behavior (e.g. “This is my second
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banana ice-cream today”) can be a very useful source of information to tell us about our 
attitude when we are not sure what to think about it.

Chapter 6
General Discussion
In this dissertation I set out to validate the strength dimensions centrality and 
commitment. In order to reach this goal, we examined structural attitudinal features, 
mental processes, psychological experiences and the consequences associated with these 
dimensions of attitude strength. In this final chapter, I will review the empirical findings 
that were described in the chapters 2 to 5 and discuss how the findings shed light on the 
validity of a centrality-commitment distinction. After having summarized and discussed 
the main findings of the empirical chapters, some implications of the present work will be 
sketched. In particular, I will argue that the two strength dimensions may pertain to 
different functions of attitudes.
Two Dimensions of Attitude Strength
Several studies have provided preliminary evidence that centrality and commitment are 
two distinct dimensions of strength (Lastovica & Gardner, 1979; Pomerantz, Chaiken, & 
Tordesillas, 1995). One of the conclusions of the present research may be that we have 
also found support for this two-dimensional structure of attitude strength. In Studies 4.1 
to 4.3 and in Study 5.1. we replicated this two-dimensional structure using factor 
analyses. Strength measures pertaining to certainty, conviction, decidedness and 
subjective likelihood of change loaded consistently on the commitment factor, whereas 
importance, centrality to the self and value-relevance loaded consistently on the centrality 
factor. These findings further heighten our confidence that these two dimensions reflect 
distinct elements of attitude strength. Many researchers in the attitude strength literature 
have found that factor-analytic approaches yielded inconsistent results (e.g. Krosnick, 
Boninger, Chuang, Berent, & Carnot, 1993). Although this may be the case for some 
aspects of attitude strength, the centrality and the commitment dimension seem to
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replicate very well, across laboratories, objects and individuals (for more evidence see 
Smeets, 2000).
However, our goal was not just to replicate the factor-analytic structure of attitude 
strength. Instead, we started of with the finding that centrality and commitment are two 
strength dimensions that are found in the literature, and we aimed to examine the 
structural attitudinal features and consequences that are associated with centrality and 
commitment. What does it mean to have an attitude high or low in centrality or high or 
low in commitment? We address this question first by reviewing the findings of the 
present research that pertain to structural attitudinal features that may underlie differences 
in centrality and commitment.
Attitude structure and Attitude Strength
Structural attitudinal features related to centrality
Centrality was predicted to be a property of the inter-attitudinal structure, that is the 
strength of the link between an attitude and core aspects of the self. The structural 
features of attitudes that are associated with centrality were most directly addressed in 
Chapter 2. In the experiments, it was argued that if central attitudes are linked to the self­
concept, these attitudes should become activated when the self becomes activated. 
Therefore, in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 we used a priming procedure in which we activated 
the self by presenting words like “I’ or “me” before we measured the latency of 
evaluative responses to attitude objects. In support of our ideas about the structural 
features of attitude centrality, these studies consistently showed that high centrality 
attitudes were found to be more accessible when the self was activated, compared to 
situations in which we used control primes. Furthermore, self-activation did not seem to 
affect the accessibility of low centrality attitudes.
Additionally, the results of Study 2.3 provided further support for the link 
between high centrality attitudes and the self-concept. Instead of priming with the self and 
measure the accessibility of attitudes, in this study attitude objects were primed and we 
measured activation of the self. Results showed that thinking about high centrality 
attitudes increased activation of the self-concept compared to thinking about low 
centrality attitudes. This study suggests that the link between central attitudes and the 
self-concept is bi-directional: priming the self-concept activates central attitudes and 
priming central attitudes activates the self-concept.
While Studies 2.1 to 2.3 were directly aimed at revealing the structural features 
related to attitude centrality, other results in the present dissertation have further
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corroborated these notions. For example, in Study 4.4, it was shown that the behavioral 
expression of an attitude affected self-esteem as a function of attitude centrality. 
Consistent with the idea that low centrality attitudes have no strong connection to the self, 
the expression of low centrality attitudes did not affect self-esteem. In contrast, attitude 
expression of high centrality attitudes was found to influence a person's self-esteem. Once 
more, these results underline the link between central attitudes and the self.
In Studies 4.1 to 4.3 we focused on the relation between attitudes and more 
specific aspects of the self: personal values. Psychologists have often studied values as 
core constituents of the self-concept (Steele, 1988; Schwartz, 1992; Verplanken & 
Holland, 2002). Further corroborating the relation between centrality and the self­
concept, results of Studies 4.1. and 4.2 revealed that when values were considered to be 
more important to the self, the centrality of attitudes was found to increase as well (see 
also Boninger et a., 1995). Also, the results of Study 4.3 further illustrated the structural 
features of attitude centrality. The study suggested that a central attitude may be linked 
with other (central) attitudes by their links with abstract personal values. Consistent with 
these notions, central attitudes towards one attitudinal object was found to predict 
behavior towards a different object, within the same value-domain.
Together, across several studies and research paradigms, we consistently showed 
that high centrality attitudes are linked to core constituents of the self, whereas low 
centrality attitudes do not have such a strong link. These data underline our ideas that 
attitude centrality should be conceptualized as an aspect of the external or inter-attitudinal 
structure of an attitude.
Structural properties related to Commitment
We have argued that the strength dimension commitment (Pomerantz et al., 1995) largely 
depends on the intra-attitudinal structure of attitude strength. People may feel certain 
about their attitude when its internal structure is coherent and accessible. These ideas 
were confirmed in Experiment 3.1. In this experiment, we strengthened the link between 
an attitude object and its global evaluation by having individuals repeatedly express their 
attitudes (e.g. Fazio, 1995). Thereby, attitudes became more easily retrieved from 
memory. Results showed that repeatedly expressing an attitude increased attitude 
accessibility as well as meta-attitudinal indicators of commitment such as attitude 
certainty and perceived likelihood of change. What is more, the effects of repeated 
expression on certainty were found to be mediated by attitude accessibility. This latter 
finding suggests that psychological experience of commitment may be derived from the 
ease with which an attitude was retrieved. By and large, Experiment 3.1 provides
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evidence that the strength of the association of an object and its summary evaluation is a 
structural feature of commitment.
Contrasting the structural attitudinal features of centrality and commitment
Our data seem consistent with the notion that commitment relates to intra-attitudinal 
properties whereas centrality relates to inter-attitudinal properties. In several studies we 
could compare the structural features related to centrality and commitment. For example, 
Study 3.1 showed that strengthening the link between an object an its summary evaluation 
increased commitment, it did not influence centrality. Moreover, Studies 4.1 and 4.2 
showed that whereas centrality was associated with the links to personal values and self­
esteem, commitment was found to be unrelated to values and the self. These findings 
provide additional evidence for the divergence between commitment and centrality such 
that commitment relates to the intra-attitudinal structure and centrality to the inter- 
attitudinal structure.
Consequences of centrality and commitment
Having examined the structural attitudinal properties of commitment and centrality, we 
may further advance our understanding of how and why these two dimensions are related 
to attitudinal consequences. Moreover, in itself showing disparate consequences of 
centrality and commitment further validates the need for differentiation between the two 
strength dimensions. The present dissertation investigated differential consequences of 
centrality and commitment in the domain of value-expressive behavior and self­
perception effects.
Value-expressive behavior
Chapter 4 was centered on the effects of attitude strength in the domain of value- 
expressive behavior. Through their link with personal values, highly central attitudes 
were expected to be imbued with considerable motivational strength and to be part of a 
larger cognitive system. In contrast, commitment refers to intra-attitudinal properties 
rather than the external links of an attitude with the self and personal values. The 
motivational and cognitive properties of high centrality attitudes compared to low 
centrality attitudes were expected to affect a number of consequences.
First, Studies 4.1 and 4.2 showed that centrality was a principal predictor of 
value-expressive behavior. What is more, these studies consistently showed that centrality 
mediates the value-behavior relationship. These findings suggest that centrality is a more
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proximal determinant of behavior in the relation between values and behavior. Motivation 
plays a key role in this process, we assume that central attitudes may derive motivation 
from abstract personal values. Indeed, a person may think "this is important to me" if an 
attitude relates to personal values (Boninger et al., 1995). This level of motivation, may 
explain why high centrality attitudes were more predictive of behavior than low centrality 
attitudes. Especially when this behavior costs money, as was the case in our studies on 
money donation, such motivational strength seems of crucial importance. The results of 
these studies suggest that highly central attitudes may help to attain our most important 
values and goals in life.
Second, Study 4.3 showed effects of centrality that relate to the cognitive 
properties of attitude centrality: centrality was found to affect the bandwidth of 
predictions of attitudes. Because central attitudes have great external links, these attitudes 
may predict other attitudes and behaviors. Specifically, by their cognitive links with 
values, highly central attitudes may be linked with each other. Indeed, Study 4.3 showed 
that central attitudes towards organically grown potatoes reliably predicted behavior 
towards Greenpeace.
Third, we focused on the relation between attitude expression and self-esteem. 
Previous studies have shown that the expression of important values may affirm the self 
(Steele, 1988). The results of Study 4.4 illustrated that the expression of high centrality 
attitudes may also affect self-esteem. Behaving consistently with a central attitude 
affirmed the self, which was shown by an increase in implicit self-evaluations. In 
contrast, behaving inconsistently with a central attitude seemed to decrease a person's 
self-evaluation. Thus, expressive actions that are relevant to high centrality attitudes 
influence our self-esteem, in a positive or negative way, depending on whether the action 
was consistent with the attitude or not. Study 4.4 also showed that no such effects were 
found for low centrality attitudes. As, we showed in Studies 2.1 to 2.3, low centrality 
attitudes are not closely associated with the self. The absence of effects on attitude 
expression on self-esteem for low centrality attitudes is consistent with these findings.
Studies 4.1 to 4.4 also included measures for commitment. In line with our 
hypotheses, no significant relations were found between commitment and value- 
importance, value-expressive behavior, the bandwidth of predictions and self-esteem. 
Then, what consequences are related to commitment? In Chapter 5 we focused on one of 
the possible consequences of commitment by investigating self-perception effects.
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Self-perception effects
Previous studies have shown that self-perception effects are limited to cases in which 
individuals have relatively weak attitudes (Chaiken & Baldwin, 1981; Holland, 
Verplanken & van Knippenberg, 2002; Wood, 1982). However, on the basis of these 
studies it is not possible to identify which strength dimension is actually responsible for 
this moderation of self-perception effects. Fazio (1987) suggested that people only infer 
their attitudes from their behavior if they cannot quickly retrieve an attitude from 
memory. In line this suggestion, we proposed that commitment is the pivotal factor in the 
moderation of attitude strength on self-perception processes.
Chapter 5 provided empirical support for the idea that commitment is the crucial 
strength factor in the moderation of self-perception effects. Study 5.1 compared the 
possible influence of commitment and centrality on self-perception effects. The study 
showed that observed differences in commitment moderated self-perception effects, 
whereas no effects were found for centrality. These results were in line with our 
theoretical assumptions: people only inferred their attitudes from their behavior if they are 
unable to retrieve a prior attitude that is held with great confidence, i.e. when 
commitment is low. Study 5.2 further corroborated these findings by employing the same 
experimental manipulation of commitment as we used in Study 3.1, that is, by having 
individuals repeatedly express their attitudes. This experimental manipulation also 
moderated self-perception effects; while self-perception effects were found among 
individuals who expressed their attitudes only a single time, no self-perception effects 
were found among individuals who expressed their attitudes repeatedly.
Together, these studies provide evidence that commitment is crucial in the 
moderation of self-perception effects. People who have access to a highly committed 
attitude ‘know’ their attitude and are able to retrieve the attitude from memory. On the 
other hand low commitment attitudes need to be constructed “on the spot”. Hence, in the 
latter case, behavioral information is more likely to be included in the process of attitude 
construal.
However, in addition to self-perception effects, it is likely that commitment 
moderates all kinds of context-effects on attitudes, including effects of mood (Schwarz & 
Clore, 1983), or response effects within attitude inquiries (Krosnick & Schuman, 1988) 
and attitude-based decision-making. Some support has been provided for these ideas by a 
study on consumer choices of Fazio, Powell & Williams (1989). They showed that the 
placement of a product on the front row or in the back row influenced choice behavior, 
but only if attitudes towards these products had low accessibility and not when attitudes
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were highly accessible. These findings suggest that commitment affects a broad range of 
context effects.
A note on the attitude-behavior relationship
Previous studies have provided evidence that strength related properties moderate the 
attitude^ behavior relationship (Fazio, 1995; Kraus, 1995) and also the 
behavior^attitude relationship (Chaiken & Baldwin, 1981; Wood, 1982). In particular, 
within one study Holland, et al. (2002) showed that strong attitudes were more likely to 
affect behavior than weak ones, whereas weak attitudes were more likely to be affected 
by behavior than strong ones.
The present results suggest that centrality affects the attitude-behavior 
relationship, whereas commitment influences the behavior^ attitude relationship. These 
differential findings might create the false impression that commitment is unimportant 
with respect to the impact of attitudes on behavior. We certainly do not think so. 
Although commitment is not associated with value-expressive behavior, as we have 
repeatedly shown, commitment may very well affect other kinds of behavior that were not 
studied in the present dissertation. Specifically, commitment seems to be important in 
non-motivational spontaneous attitude-behavior relationships. Consistent with these 
notions are a series of studies by Fazio and colleagues (Blascovich, Ernst, Tomaka, 
Kelsey, Salomon & Fazio, 1993; Fazio et al., 1989; Sanbonmatsu & Fazio, 1990) showed 
that highly accessible attitudes may more likely guide decision-making processes 
compared to attitudes that are difficult to retrieve.
In general, high commitment attitudes are more likely used as heuristics in 
behavior and decision-making (is it good or is it bad, should I approach or avoid this 
person). On the other hand, centrality is more likely to affect behavior that requires strong 
motivation. Therefore, commitment may more likely g u id e  behavior, e.g. simple 
approach or avoidance decisions, selective perceptions of the attitude object, whereas 
centrality may more likely energize behavior (cf. Fazio, 1995), like searching information 
about the issue, persistence, and spending money and time on the issue.
Attitude strength and Attitudinal Functions
People have attitudes because they are functional. The type of function that is served by 
an attitude varies across attitudes, attitude objects, persons and situations. Several 
functions have been proposed in the attitude literature (Katz, 1960; Maio & Olson, 2000; 
Smith et al., 1956). First, the knowledge (Katz, 1960) or object-appraisal function  (Smith
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et al., 1956) refers to the idea that attitudes help people to simplify interaction with their 
environment by classifying objects in positive or negative manner. Second, the utilitarian 
fu n c tio n  pertains to the idea that attitudes help to maximize rewards and minimize 
punishments obtained from their environment. Third, the social adaptive function  relates 
to the idea that attitudes may help to interact with others and make impressions on others. 
And fourth, the value-expressive function  of attitudes pertains to the proposition that 
attitudes may express personally important values and add to a person's sense of identity.
By and large one could argue that if people are served by attitudes, strong attitude 
should do a better job than weak ones. However, the functions that are served by "strong" 
attitudes may depend on specific characteristics of strength. Based on the findings 
described in the present dissertation, it seems that centrality and commitment pertain to 
different attitudinal functions. Revealing specific functions of both strength dimensions 
may further enhance our understanding of centrality and commitment. We argue that 
commitment relates to the object-appraisal function of attitudes, whereas centrality relates 
to the value- or self-expressive function of attitudes.
Commitment and the object-appraisal function
The object appraisal fu n c tio n  implies that attitudes may help us to understand and 
respond to our environment (Fazio, 2000; Katz, 1960; Smith et al., 1956). For instance, in 
his classic work on attitudes, Allport (1935) wrote, “...[attitudes] draw lines about and 
segregate an otherwise chaotic environment; they are our methods for finding our way 
about in an ambiguous universe” (p.806). Although we are bombarded with an immense 
amount of information everyday, most of us seem to handle this situation quite easily. 
Pre-stored attitudes can help reduce this information overload. If we would have to weigh 
the pros and the cons of every single piece of information, our functioning would be 
severely paralyzed. In contrast, if we can rely on our global evaluations, this would free 
us from deliberately considering every action and we may have time to do other things 
like playing with our children, drinking beer or writing a dissertation.
The commitment dimension of attitude strength distinguishes attitudes that are 
easily retrieved from memory and held with great confidence from those that are not 
accessible and held with uncertainty. Therefore, we propose that the strength dimension 
commitment relates to the object-appraisal function. If we are confident about our 
attitudes we do not have to create an attitude “on the spot”, but we can simply retrieve it 
from memory. Our proposition concerning the relation between the object-appraisal 
function and commitment seems to be supported in our studies on self-perception effects 
(Studies 5.1 and 5.2). Self-perception was only obtained for low commitment attitudes,
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but not for high commitment attitudes. Thus, whereas low commitment attitudes may be 
inferred from behavior, high commitment attitudes are simply retrieved from memory. 
Work by Fazio and colleagues have more directly shown that accessible attitudes are 
functional because they enhance the quality and ease of decision-making (Blascovich et 
al., 1993; see Fazio, 2000). For example, Blascovich et al. (1993) showed that decision­
making processes resulted in an increase in blood pressure among individuals who did not 
have accessible attitudes, but not among those who had accessible attitudes. Also Fazio & 
Powell (1997) showed in a field-study that students, who had a highly accessible attitude 
toward college-relevant issues, were less likely to experience stress during college life 
compared to those who had low accessibility attitudes. In general, these findings suggest 
that it is useful to know your likes and your dislikes. As commitment increases, an 
attitude can more easily guide your perceptions and your actions.
Centrality and the value-expressive function of attitudes
Still, people are not only served by quick and confident evaluations. Attitudes may also 
be held in the service of higher order goals. Such attitudes may have a more symbolic, 
self-related function; attitudes may provide a sense of identity and help to maintain self­
worth (Katz, 1960; Pratkanis & Turner, 1994; Prentice, 1989). These ideas are probably 
best captured by the self- (Prentice, 1996) or value-expressive function of attitudes (Katz, 
1960). By expressing an attitude we may express a part of ourselves and affirm ourselves.
Interestingly, the value-expressive function has been mainly studied as dependent 
on personality factors, the nature of the attitude object and situational influences, but not 
in terms of structural attitudinal properties. We would like to argue that the attitude 
strength dimension centrality pertains to the value-expressive function. In other words, 
when the centrality of an attitude increases, the attitude is more prone to serve the value- 
expressive function. Several of the findings in the present dissertation are consistent with 
this argument. First, centrality was found the mediate the value-expressive behavior, 
suggesting that that central attitudes may serve the expression of personal values. 
Moreover, Katz (1960) noted "the individual derives satisfactions from expressing 
attitudes appropriate to his personal values" (p. 170). Indeed, as described above we 
showed that the expression of a central attitude may positively influence a person's self­
esteem.
Strength in relation to other functions
How does strength relate to other functions of attitudes? In particular, it seems interesting 
to contemplate on the relation between attitude strength and the social adjustive function
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of attitudes. Attitudes may foster bonding between people when they perceive similarities 
of their opinions (e.g. Byrne, 1970). Thus, in order to smoothen social interaction, we 
may try to match another person’s attitudes. Generally speaking, for an attitude to serve 
this goal, this attitude should be weak and flexible, because then it is possible to adjust an 
attitude to specific social situations (cf. Tetlock & Kim, 1987). These notions suggest that 
attitudes should be both low in commitment and centrality in order to serve the social 
adjustive function. In fact, one could argue that high commitment and high centrality 
attitudes may constitute a potential source of interpersonal conflict.
However, as all fans of a sports team probably know, social attitudes can also be 
very strong. Therefore, social adjustive attitudes should not be conceptualized per se as 
weak and flexible attitudes. If an attitude is largely shared by significant others or 
members of a social group, this might result in strong opinions. In fact, Boninger et al. 
(1995) showed that social identification can enhance the perceived importance of an 
attitude. That is, if an attitude is important to a person's close others or his or her social 
reference groups, this person may attach great significance to the issue. Such attitudes 
may thus be closely related to the social or collective self (Baumeister, 1998; Brewer, 
1991; Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Gardner, Gabriel & Lee, 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 
1991; Holland, Roeder, van Baaren, Brandt, & Hannover, in press). Although the present 
dissertation was not aimed at investigating the difference between the personal and the 
social self, it should be noted that our studies on centrality were more related to personal 
values and the personal self rather than the social self. It may be worthwhile the social 
functions of attitudes in future research by studying the link between attitudes and the 
social self (e.g. social groups, significant others).
Determinants of attitude accessibility
The present findings have implications for understanding attitude accessibility. Attitude 
accessibility is often measured as the speed with which an attitude comes to mind. It is 
said to reflect the strength of the association between an object and its evaluation (e.g. 
Fazio, 1995). Indeed, replicating previous findings (e.g. Powell & Fazio, 1984), the 
present dissertation showed that strengthening the link between an object and its 
evaluation resulted in an increase in attitude accessibility.
However, the present dissertation suggests that accessibility may also indicate 
inter-attitudinal properties. Thus, attitudes may become accessible through multiple ways. 
An attitude can also become accessible when other cognitive structures are activated that 
are closely linked with the attitudes in memory. This idea was supported in Studies 2.1
General Discussion 121
and 2.2. In these experiments, an attitude’s accessibility depended on the strength of its 
link with the self-concept. Activating the self resulted in increased accessibility of central 
attitudes. Similarly, attitudes may become accessible when relevant values or related 
attitudes are activated (see Judd, Drake, Downing & Krosnick, 1991). Such spreading of 
activation is largely dependent on inter-attitudinal properties rather than intra-attitudinal 
properties such as object-evaluation associations.
Therefore, Fazio’s view on attitude accessibility as determined by the strength of 
the object-evaluation association is best considered as one structural attitudinal feature 
that determines accessibility. When the self is not activated, the speed with which an 
attitude is indicated can be considered as an operative measure of the strength of the 
object-evaluation association. However, when the self has been activated, the speed with 
which an attitude is indicated reflects the strength of the link between an attitude and the 
self-concept rather than object-evaluation associations.
Directions for future research
Although the present studies advanced our knowledge concerning two key dimensions of 
attitude strength, as always, many questions remain to be answered. I will now sketch 
some of these issues that requires more attention in further investigations.
First, more research should be carried out to study the determinants of attitude 
centrality. How do attitudes become linked to the self? Although results of the present 
dissertation suggested that personal values may play an important role, more 
(experimental) evidence is needed to understand the relation between values and 
centrality. Moreover, research should also focus on other factors that may determine the 
link between an attitude and the self such as self-interest (Sivacek & Crano, 1982) and 
reference persons or groups (e.g. Boninger et al., 1995).
Second, in the present studies we investigated the influence of attitudes on value- 
expressive behavior. To a certain extent, this behavior can be characterized as deliberative 
in nature. It would be interesting to investigate the influence of the strength dimensions in 
terms of more spontaneous automatic behavior. Broadly speaking, more evidence is 
needed to advance our knowledge concerning the guidance role of the commitment 
dimension of attitude strength.
Third, the effects of commitment and centrality were contrasted in all Chapters, 
except for Chapter 2. We have maintained throughout this dissertation that commitment 
relates to intra-attitudinal properties. Indeed, no relationship was found between 
commitment and value-importance in Studies 4.1 and 4.2. Also, commitment did not
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affect the width of predictions of an attitude, nor the relation between attitude expression 
and self-esteem. Still, although these studies indeed suggest that commitment does not 
pertain to the strength of the link between an attitude and the self, future studies, 
investigating commitment as a predictor of accessibility as a function of self-activation 
following a similar paradigm as we did in Chapter 2 could shed further light on this issue.
Fourth, we have maintained that commitment and centrality are two key 
dimensions of attitude strength. Although we have studied the structural attitudinal 
features underlying commitment and centrality, we have not addressed the issue of the 
dimensionality of the full set if attitude strength measures as such. We have shown that 
commitment and centrality may explain a variety of strength-related outcomes, we do not 
exclude the possibility that other strength dimensions may be identified. Also, this is up to 
future research.
Closing time
To some extent, considering the number of strength-related variables that have been 
proposed in the literature, the current field of research on attitude strength looks a bit like 
a jungle. Although some of the variables studied are based on elaborate theories, others 
lack theoretical underpinnings. Also, because many strength related attributes were 
studied in isolation, general theoretical frameworks on attitude strength are scarce. The 
present dissertation aimed to provide a more comprehensive view on attitude strength by 
systematically and jointly examining two strength dimensions, commitment and 
centrality, in terms of structural attitudinal features, psychological experiences and 
consequences. We successfully explained differences in centrality and commitment by 
internal and external structural features of the attitudes. Moreover, the findings suggest 
that centrality and commitment dimensions may have a wide range of consequences that 
differ between these two dimensions. Several of these specialized consequences were 
illustrated in the present dissertation and further stress the need to distinguish them. 
Furthermore, and further corroborating the theoretical validity of the centrality- 
commitment distinction, the findings suggest that centrality and commitment may have 
different attitudinal functions. By elucidating the nature of centrality and commitment, we 
hope to have contributed to our understanding of when and by what mechanisms strong 
attitudes influence our behavior and information processing.
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Summary
Attitudes are evaluations of objects (e.g. persons, organizations, abstract ideas, 
things). For example, a person may like the new clothes of his girlfriend; dislike Danish 
blue on pizza’s; is favorable towards protecting the environment etc. The key element of 
every attitude is the psychological tendency to evaluate a particular entity with some 
degree of favor or disfavor.
Despite the fact that all attitudes share an evaluative component, attitudes can be 
different in several aspects. One way in which attitudes may differ is in their strength. 
Some attitudes are stable over time and have a big impact on behavior and the way people 
perceive and interpret their environment. Other attitudes fluctuate easily and have no or 
only minor impact on behavior and information processing. The degree to which attitudes 
are related to these consequences is referred to as the strength of an attitude. Strong 
attitudes are like strong muscles, they are not easily moved and they have a great potential 
impact.
Although for practical purposes it may be useful to classify the strength of an 
attitude on the basis of their consequences, such an approach does not clarify why and 
how some attitudes have impact on behavior and are stable over time whereas others are 
not. The present dissertation aimed to advance our understanding of attitude strength by 
the systematic investigation of two important strength dimensions. One dimension refers 
to the importance of an attitude, and its perceived centrality to the self and personal 
values. This dimension is referred to as centrality. A second dimension is formed by 
strength-related attributes such as certainty, perceived likelihood of change and 
decidedness. In the literature this dimension is often referred to as commitment. 
Beforehand, it seems to make sense to distinguish these two dimensions of strength, 
because a person may find an attitude highly important, but may be unsure about his or 
attitude, for example as a result of conflicting cognitions or feelings (e.g. ambivalent
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attitudes towards abortion, or starting a war for peace). Moreover, people can be highly 
confident about their attitudes without any importance or reference to the self (e.g. 
attitudes towards cockroaches or icecream).
Although several factor-analytic studies have revealed evidence for a distinction 
between centrality and commitment, little is known about the nature of these strength 
dimensions. The goal of the present dissertation can be divided in two steps. First, we 
aimed to reveal evidence for the structural attitudinal properties and mental processes that 
are associated with centrality and commitment. Second, we aimed to link the two strength 
dimensions to differential attitudinal outcomes.
We hypothesized that centrality pertains to the strength of the link between an 
attitude and the self-concept. That is, attitudes are central, if they are strongly associated 
with core elements of a person’s identity. In this respect, we have framed centrality as an 
aspect of the inter-attitudinal or external structure of attitudes. In Chapter 2, we 
investigated these structural attitudinal properties of centrality. We argued that if high 
centrality attitudes are closely linked to the self, these attitudes should become more 
accessible after activation of the self. In contrast, low centrality attitudes were not 
expected to become accessible after the self was primed. Thus, if we would obtain 
different levels of attitude accessibility as a function of attitude centrality and self­
activation, it would support our notions on the nature of centrality.
In Studies 2.1 and 2.2, attitude centrality was measured in the same way as in 
previous factor analytic studies on attitude strength. One week later, participants returned 
to the lab and were asked to indicate as quickly as possible their evaluations (positive­
negative) of a series of objects. For participants in the self-activation condition, the self 
was primed just before an object was presented on the screen with words like "I" or "me". 
For participants in the control condition, no prime was presented (Study 2.1) or a control 
prime was presented (Study 2.2). The reaction times served as a measure of attitude 
accessibility. In line with our hypotheses, the results of Study 2.1 showed that the relation 
between centrality and accessibility was more pronounced in the self-activation condition 
than in the control condition. More specifically, the results of Study 2.2 showed that the 
accessibility of high centrality attitudes was increased in the self-prime condition 
compared to the control condition, whereas the accessibility of low centrality attitudes 
was not affected by the self-prime. Furthermore, Study 2.2 suggests that the link between 
the self and high centrality attitudes is automatic and effortless, as we employed 
subliminal priming techniques to activate the self. Finally, in Study 2.3, we used a reverse 
procedure. Instead of activating the self and measure the accessibility of attitudes, we 
now primed participants with either a low or a high centrality attitude object and
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measured self-activation. Self-activation was measured by the use of first person 
pronouns in a language translation task. In line with the idea that centrality refers to the 
strength of the link between the self and an attitude, results of Study 2.3 showed self­
activation was stronger after thinking about a high centrality attitude than after thinking 
about a low centrality attitude. Together, the results of Chapter 2 provide validity for our 
views on the structural features of centrality.
In Chapter 3, we focused on the structural features that are associated with 
commitment. We argued that commitment, in contrast to centrality, relates to intra- 
attitudinal properties. That is, we believe that commitment depends on structural features 
of the attitude itself. More specifically, it was hypothesized that the strength of the link 
between an object and its summary evaluation may underlie differences in commitment. 
We hypothesized that as the strength of the link between an attitude and its summary 
evaluation increases, attitudes are more easily retrieved from memory, which may signal 
a high commitment to the attitude. In other words meta-cognitive indicators of 
commitment such as certainty and perceived likelihood of change may be inferred from 
the ease of attitude retrieval.
These ideas were tested in Study 3.1. In that study, the strength of the link 
between an object and its summary evaluation was manipulated by having participants 
either repeatedly express their global evaluation towards one attitude object or only a 
single time. In line with previous findings, results indicated that rehearsed attitudes were 
more accessible than non-rehearsed attitudes. Second, meta-attitudinal strength measures 
of commitment, i.e. certainty and perceived likelihood of change, were also affected by 
repeated expression. Certainty was greater and the perceived likelihood of change was 
smaller in the repeated expression condition than in the single expression condition. 
Moreover, mediation analyses supported our hypothesis that attitude rehearsal affects 
commitment by its effect on attitude accessibility. These findings suggest that meta- 
attitudinal measures of commitment may be inferred from the speed with which an 
attitude comes to mind. The study also included a group of participants answering 
questions concerning attitude centrality after repeated or single attitude expression. In 
support of the distinction between the two strength dimensions and the structural features 
related to these dimensions, centrality was not affected by the manipulation of attitude 
accessibility. In sum, results of Chapter 2 suggests that commitment, but not centrality, is 
at least partly based on the strength of the link between an attitude and its summary 
evaluation.
The second part of the dissertation addressed the consequences of centrality and 
commitment. Having studied the structural features related to commitment and centrality,
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we may be better able to understand the potential consequences of the two strength 
dimensions. In Chapter 4 we specifically focused on the possible consequences of attitude 
centrality. We hypothesized that, because these attitudes are closely linked to key 
elements of the self, high centrality attitudes should more likely affect the impact of 
attitudes on value-expressive behavior, the width of the range of predictions of an attitude 
and the consequences of attitude expression for self-esteem.
By connections with the self, high centrality attitudes are assumed to be imbued 
with motivational strength. This motivation is important with regard to the influence of 
attitudes on behavior, especially when the behavior is costly (e.g. costs money). In Study 
4.1 (4.2) we measured attitude centrality and attitudes towards Greenpeace (Amnesty 
International), and the importance of environmental (equality) values. In a later stage, 
participants were asked to donate money to Greenpeace (Amnesty International). In line 
with our ideas, centrality was the best predictor of the amount of money donated to 
Greenpeace (Amnesty). Furthermore, it was found that value-importance influenced 
behavior through its effect on attitude centrality. In other words, the value-behavior 
relationship is mediated by attitude centrality. Study 4.3 revealed effects of the cognitive 
properties of high centrality attitudes. Values are assumed to be linked to several 
attitudes. High centrality attitudes are linked to values and therefore also linked to each 
other. These interconnections with other attitudes extend the range of predictions of an 
attitude. In line with these notions, results indicated that centrality with regard to buying 
organically grown potatoes predicted money donation to Greenpeace. In Study 4.4 we 
showed other motivational properties of centrality. This study provided evidence that high 
centrality attitudes may influence a person’s self-esteem. Results showed that acts 
congruent with a high centrality attitude may boost a person’s implicit self-esteem. In 
contrast acting inconsistently with a high centrality attitude may lower implicit self­
esteem. Conversely, attitude expression of low centrality attitudes was not found to affect 
implicit self-esteem at all. The latter findings further corroborate our ideas that high 
centrality attitudes are closely linked to the self, whereas low centrality attitudes are not. 
In Studies 4.1 to 4.4 we also included measures for commitment. However, no effects of 
commitment were found whatsoever. Together, these studies provide additional evidence 
for the validity of centrality as a dimension of attitude strength and the distinction 
between centrality and commitment.
In Chapter 5, we addressed consequences related to commitment, when we 
examined the moderation of attitude strength on self-perception effects. Although 
previous studies obtained evidence that strong attitudes are less likely influenced by self­
perception processes compared to weak attitudes, the present studies aimed to extend
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these studies by more exactly examining which dimension of attitude strength is crucial 
in the moderation of self-perception effects.
In Study 5.1, we showed that individual differences in commitment, but not 
individual differences in centrality, moderated self-perception effects. High commitment 
attitudes were less likely inferred from behavior than low commitment attitudes. 
Furthermore, Study 5.2 provided experimental evidence for the role of commitment in the 
moderation of self-perception effects. As in Study 3.1, commitment was manipulated by 
having participants either express their attitudes repeatedly or a single time. Although 
self-perception effects were obtained in the single expression condition, no self­
perception effect was obtained in the repeated expression condition. Once again, these 
findings stress that self-perception effects are limited to low commitment attitudes. In 
general these findings suggest that whereas low commitment attitudes are inferred from 
behavior, high commitment attitudes are simply retrieved from memory. High 
commitment lessens the need to think about the pros and the cons of the attitude object, 
therefore contextual influences, including information about our own behavior, may have 
less impact on these attitudes.
Together, the present dissertation offers a systematic analysis of two important 
dimensions of attitude strength and therefore elevates our understanding of the nature of 
the concept of attitude strength. As is shown in the present dissertation, attitude strength 
is better understood when it is related to structural attitudinal features of attitudes. 
Previous factor-analytic studies put forward the distinction between a centrality and 
commitment dimension of attitude strength. In the present dissertation these results were 
replicated repeatedly. However, the structural attitudinal features, specific consequences 
and functions remained inclear in these previous studies. By systematically analyzing the 
structural properties, mental processes and specific consequences of centrality and 
commitment, we aimed to increase our understanding of the nature of these important 
strength dimensions. Results suggested that centrality can be framed as a feature of the 
inter-attitudinal structure, the strength of the link between an attitude and core elements of 
the self. Central attitudes make up part of a greater cognitive structure, whereas peripheral 
attitudes are relatively isolated mental constructions. On the other hand, results suggest 
that commitment can be framed as a feature of the intra-attitudinal structure, at least 
partly based by the strength of the link between an attitude object and its summary 
evaluation. The mental representation of central attitudes suggests that these attitudes are 
self-relevant and therefore may be imbued with great motivational strength. This 
motivation was found to be crucial with regard to the influence of attitudes on value- 
expressive behavior. Commitment refers to the ability to retrieve a clear and decided
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attitude. As a result of high commitment, context effects, including one’s own recent 
behavior, are less likely to affect attitude judgments. On a more general level, our 
findings suggest that the two dimensions may reflect differential attitudinal functions. 
Through its links with the self and personal values, attitude centrality may pertain to the 
self- or value-expressive function of attitudes. Highly central attitudes may help us to 
attain our most important goals in life and regulation of self-esteem. On the other hand, 
commitment seems to be associated with the object-appraisal or knowledge function of 
attitudes. This function entails that attitudes help us to understand and respond to our 
environment. This function seems primarily reflected in high commitment attitudes, 
because these attitudes are easily retrieved from memory and held with certainty. As a 
consequence of high commitment, we may be able to decidedly take a decision without 
(much) deliberation. To sum up, the research in this dissertation suggests that the two 
most important dimensions of attitude strength, commitment and centrality, are related to 
different structural features and mental processes, have unique consequences, and may 
reflect distinct attitude functions. In providing this analysis, we hope to have contributed 
to a better understanding of why and when attitudes influence our behavior and 
information processing and thus by getting more insight in the nature of strong and weak 
attitudes.
Nederlandse Samenvatting
Attitudes zijn evaluaties van objecten. Iemand kan bijvoorbeeld de nieuwe kleren van zijn 
vriendin leuk vinden, een hekel hebben aan Danish blue op pizza’s; milieubescherming 
een warm hart toedragen enz. Het cruciale element van elke attitude is de geneigdheid om 
een entiteit (een object, een persoon, organisatie, abstract idee, etc.) te evalueren met een 
bepaalde mate van positiviteit of negativiteit.
Het feit dat alle attitudes worden gekenmerkt door een evaluatieve component 
neemt niet weg dat er veel verschillen zijn tussen attitudes. Eén manier waarop attitudes 
duidelijk kunnen verschillen is de sterkte van een attitude. Sommige attitudes zijn relatief 
stabiel over tijd en hebben invloed op gedrag en de manier waarop we onze omgeving 
interpreteren. Andere attitudes zijn juist sterk onderhevig aan verandering, en hebben 
weinig invloed op gedrag en informatieverwerking. De mate waarin attitudes gerelateerd 
zijn aan deze consequenties wordt de sterkte van een attitude genoemd. Sterke attitudes 
lijken op sterke mensen, ze zijn moeilijk omver te krijgen en hebben potentieel een grote 
invloed op hun omgeving.
Alhoewel het maken van een indeling in sterke of zwakke attitudes op basis van 
consequenties nuttig kan zijn voor praktische toepassingen, geeft een dergelijke indeling 
geen inzicht in waarom en hoe sommige attitudes invloed hebben op gedrag en stabiel 
zijn over tijd terwijl andere attitudes weinig invloed hebben en veranderlijk zijn. Dit 
proefschrift heeft tot doel om meer inzicht te verschaffen in de aard van sterke en zwakke 
attitudes door twee belangrijke dimensies van attitudesterkte systematisch te 
onderzoeken. Een dimensie heeft betrekking op het belang van een attitude voor een 
persoon en de relatie tot het zelf en/of persoonlijke waarden. In dit proefschrift (en in 
andere onderzoeken) wordt deze dimensie centraliteit genoemd. Een tweede dimensie 
wordt gevormd door attributen zoals zekerheid en overtuiging. Deze dimensie wordt in 
navolging van eerdere onderzoeken ‘commitment’ genoemd. Op voorhand lijkt het zinnig
140 Summary in Dutch
om deze twee dimensies te onderscheiden, omdat sommige attitudes wellicht erg 
belangrijk voor iemand kunnen zijn zonder dat deze persoon zeker is over zijn attitude 
door bijvoorbeeld tegenstrijdige ideeën of gevoelens (denk aan ambivalente attitudes over 
abortus, of oorlog om vrede te bereiken). Anderzijds kunnen mensen zeer overtuigd zijn 
van attitudes zonder dat deze attitude belangrijk of zelfrelevant is (denk aan attitudes ten 
opzichte van kakkerlakken of ijs).
Alhoewel verschillende voorgaande onderzoeken, waarbij veelal gebruik is 
gemaakt van factor-analyse, steun bieden voor dit onderscheid is er tot op heden weinig 
bekend over de aard van deze sterkte dimensies. Het doel van de huidige dissertatie bevat 
twee componenten: Enerzijds wordt gepoogd om meer inzicht te krijgen in de 
onderliggende mentale processen en structurele kenmerken van attitudes die ten 
grondslag liggen aan centraliteit en commitment. Anderzijds wordt gepoogd om deze 
sterktedimensies te onderzoeken in relatie tot verschillende consequenties, zoals waarde- 
expressief gedrag, zelfwaardering, en het wel of niet optreden van processen van 
zelfperceptie. Juist door zowel de structurele aspecten als de consequenties van 
attitudesterkte in samenhang te onderzoeken kan meer inzicht verkregen worden in de 
aard van attitudesterkte.
In hoofdstuk 2 hebben we de structurele kenmerken onderzocht die ten grondslag 
liggen aan verschillen in centraliteit. Centraliteit verwijst naar de sterkte van de 
associatie tussen een attitude en het zelfconcept. Een attitude is voor iemand centraal 
wanneer deze attitude sterk verbonden is met kernaspecten van zijn of haar identiteit. 
Vanuit dit perspectief wordt centraliteit dus beschouwd als een deelaspect van de inter- 
attitudinale structuur (associaties van attitudes met andere elementen in een breder 
cognitief netwerk). Als centrale attitudes sterk zijn verbonden met het zelf dan zouden 
deze attitudes meer toegankelijk moeten worden wanneer het zelf is geactiveerd in het 
geheugen. Daarentegen wordt verwacht dat de toegankelijkheid van niet-centrale (of 
perifere) attitudes, niet beïnvloed wordt door de activatie van het zelfconcept. Kortom, 
het onderzoeken van toegankelijkheid van attitudes als functie van centraliteit en 
zelfactivatie kan empirische steun bieden voor onze ideeën over de structurele kenmerken 
van centraliteit.
In Studies 2.1 en 2.2 werd, in een eerste onderzoeksessie, centraliteit gemeten op 
gebruikelijke manier (dat wil zeggen, door middel van zelfrapportage). Een week later 
kwamen dezelfde proefpersonen weer terug naar het laboratorium en werd hen gevraagd 
om zo snel mogelijk aan te geven of ze een positieve of negatieve houding hadden ten 
opzichte van een serie van onderwerpen. Proefpersonen in de zelfactivatie conditie kregen 
vlak voordat een onderwerp op het computerscherm werd aangeboden woordjes geflitst
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die betrekking hebben op het zelfbeeld zoals ‘ik’ en ‘mij’. Proefpersonen in de controle 
conditie kregen dezelfde taak, maar dan zonder prime (Studie 2.1) of met een controle 
prime (Studie 2.2). De responstijden waarmee de evaluaties werden gegeven dienden als 
maat voor de attitude-toegankelijkheid. De resultaten waren in overeenstemming met 
onze hypotheses. De resultaten van Studie 2.1 lieten zien dat de correlatie tussen 
centraliteit en toegankelijkheid sterker was in de zelfactivatie conditie dan in de controle 
conditie. De resultaten van Studie 2.2 lieten duidelijk zien dat centrale attitudes meer 
toegankelijk werden na een prime met het zelf, terwijl deze zelf-prime geen invloed had 
op de toegankelijkheid van meer perifere attitudes. In Studie 2.2. werd gebruik gemaakt 
van subliminale (en daardoor onbewuste) zelfactivatie. Dit suggereert dat activatie van 
centrale attitudes door een zelf-prime volledig automatisch en moeiteloos is. Tot slot 
werd in Studie 2.3 het omgekeerde verband onderzocht. Proefpersonen werd gevraagd na 
te denken over een attitude die ofwel centraal of perifeer was. Daarna werd zelfactivatie 
gemeten door het aantal keren dat proefpersonen gebruik maakten van eerste persoon 
persoonlijke voornaamwoorden in een vertaaltaak. Consistent met het idee dat centraliteit 
is gebaseerd op de sterkte van de associatie tussen een attitude en het zelf lieten de 
resultaten van Studie 2.3 zien dat zelfactivatie sterker was na het denken over een centrale 
attitude dan over een perifere attitude. De drie studies samen bieden steun voor onze 
ideeën over de structurele kenmerken die ten grondslag liggen aan centraliteit.
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt onderzoek belicht naar de structurele kenmerken die zijn 
gerelateerd aan de sterktedimensie commitment. Verwacht werd dat, in tegenstelling tot 
centraliteit, commitment verband houdt met de intra-attitudinale structuur van attitudes. 
Dat wil zeggen dat commitment samenhangt met structurele kenmerken van de attitude 
zelf. In het hoofdstuk wordt een aspect van de intra-attitudinale structuur in het bijzonder 
belicht. Er werd verwacht dat commitment gedeeltelijk afhankelijk is van de sterkte van 
de associatie tussen een attitude en haar globale evaluatie. Wanneer de sterkte tussen een 
object en haar associatie sterk is, dan wordt die attitude gemakkelijker opgehaald uit het 
geheugen. Dit gemak kan een sterke commitment met de attitude signaleren. Met andere 
woorden, meta-cognitieve oordelen van commitment zoals zekerheid kunnen worden 
afgeleid vanuit het gemak waarmee attitudes worden opgehaald.
Deze ideeën zijn getoetst in Studie 3.1. In dit experiment werd de sterkte van de 
associatie tussen een attitude object en haar globale evaluatie gemanipuleerd door 
proefpersonen herhaaldelijk of slechts één keer een attitude te laten uiten. In 
overeenkomst met voorgaande onderzoeken bleek dat herhaaldelijk uitgedrukte attitudes 
meer toegankelijk waren dan attitudes die slechts één keer waren uitgedrukt. Echter, naast 
de toegankelijkheid van attitudes bleken ook meta-cognitieve oordelen van commitment
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beïnvloed door herhaalde uiting. Wanneer attitudes herhaaldelijk waren uitgedrukt waren 
proefpersonen meer zeker van hun attitude en schatten ze de kans kleiner in dat hun 
attitude verandert in de toekomst in vergelijking met de conditie waarin attitudes slechts 
een keer werden geuit. Bovendien bleek in verdere analyses dat de invloed van herhaalde 
expressie op meta-cognitieve oordelen van commitment werd gemedieerd door de 
toegankelijkheid. Deze bevindingen suggereren dat meta-cognitieve oordelen van 
commitment worden afgeleid uit de snelheid waarin attitudes in onze gedachten komen. 
In de studie was ook een conditie opgenomen waarin meta-cognitieve oordelen van 
centraliteit (belang, waargenomen relatie tot zelfbeeld) werden gemeten na de herhaalde 
expressie manipulatie. In lijn met onze verwachtingen werden in deze conditie geen 
effecten gevonden. Deze bevindingen ondersteunen de centrale stelling van het 
proefschrift dat de structurele kenmerken die ten grondslag liggen aan commitment en 
centraliteit van elkaar verschillen. Hoofdstuk 3 biedt steun voor het idee dat 
commitment, maar niet centraliteit, afhankelijk is van de sterkte van de associatie tussen 
een attitude object en een globale evaluatie.
Het tweede deel van het proefschrift bouwt voort op de bevindingen van het 
eerste deel. Doordat we in hoofdstukken 2 en 3 meer inzicht hebben gekregen in de 
psychologische processen en structurele kenmerken die ten grondslag liggen aan 
centraliteit en commitment is het makkelijker te begrijpen waarom ze zijn gerelateerd aan 
verschillende consequenties. In hoofdstuk 4 worden de mogelijke gevolgen belicht van 
verschillen in centraliteit. Verwacht werd dat attitudes die sterk verbonden zijn met de 
kern van iemands zelfbeeld meer invloed zouden moeten hebben op waarde-expressief 
gedrag, en de gevolgen van attitude expressie op zelfwaardering.
Doordat centrale attitudes zijn verbonden met belangrijke onderdelen van het 
zelfbeeld zoals persoonlijke waarden, zijn deze attitudes uitgerust met een sterke 
motivationele kracht. Verschillen in motivationele kracht zijn belangrijk met betrekking 
tot de invloed van attitudes op gedrag, zeker wanneer het gedrag moeite of geld kost. In 
Studies 4.1 en 4.2 werden deze ideeën getoetst. In Studie 4.1 werd in een eerste fase het 
belang van de waarde bescherming van het milieu gemeten en ook attitudes ten opzichte 
van Greenpeace. In een latere fase werd aan proefpersonen gevraagd om geld te geven 
aan Greenpeace nadat ze net waren uitbetaald in losse guldens voor het meedoen aan het 
onderzoek. In lijn met de verwachting bleek dat centraliteit de beste voorspeller was van 
de hoeveelheid geld die werd gedoneerd aan Greenpeace. Bovendien bleek dat 
milieuwaarden invloed heeft op donatie aan Greenpeace doordat deze waarden de 
centraliteit van attitudes ten opzichte van Greenpeace versterken. Anders gezegd, de 
waarde-gedragsrelatie werd gemedieerd door centraliteit. In Studie 4.2 werden deze
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bevindingen gerepliceerd met een ander attitude object (Amnesty International) en met 
een week tijdsverschil tussen de meting van waarden (gelijkheid) en attitudes en het 
gedrag (donatie aan Amnesty). Opnieuw bleek dat de waarde-gedragsrelatie werd 
gemedieerd door centraliteit. Terwijl Studies 4.1 en 4.2 voornamelijk waren gericht op de 
motivationele eigenschappen van centrale attitudes als gevolg van relaties met 
persoonlijke waarden, werd in Studie 4.3 de gevolgen die direct betrekking hebben op de 
cognitieve aspecten van centraliteit nader belicht. Waarden worden gezien als brede 
algemene mentale constructen die onderdeel uitmaken van iemands zelfbeeld. Aan 
waarden kunnen een heleboel meer specifieke attitudes verbonden zijn. Centrale attitudes 
zijn daardoor indirect verbonden met vele andere (centrale) attitudes. Door deze 
verbindingen met andere attitudes kan een centrale attitude vele andere attitudes en 
wellicht zelfs gedragingen ten opzichte van andere attitudes voorspellen. Consistent met 
dit idee liet Studie 4.3 zien dat de centraliteit van attitudes ten opzichte van het kopen van 
ecologische aardappelen de hoeveel geld die werd gegeven aan Greenpeace voorspelde. 
Studie 4.4 gaat in op de gevolgen van het uiten van attitudes op zelfwaardering. Doordat 
sterk centrale attitudes verbonden zijn aan belangrijke onderdelen van het zelfbeeld, 
kunnen gedragsuitingen van centrale attitudes invloed hebben op zelfwaardering. In een 
voorafgaande sessie werd centraliteit gemeten ten opzichte van de attitude ten opzichte 
van Amnesty International. Een week later kregen proefpersonen de kans om geld te 
geven aan Amnesty. De resultaten van Studie 4.4 lieten zoals verwacht zien dat attitude- 
consistent gedrag een positieve invloed heeft op de zelfwaardering van proefpersonen met 
een centrale attitude ten opzichte van Amnesty International, terwijl attitude-inconsistent 
gedrag ju ist een negatieve invloed hebben op zelfwaardering binnen deze groep. 
Daarentegen, hadden consistente of inconsistente handelingen van proefpersonen met een 
meer perifere attitude ten opzichte van Amnesty International geen invloed op 
zelfwaardering. Dit laatste ondersteunt de bevindingen uit Hoofdstuk 2 dat centrale 
attitudes verbonden zijn aan het zelfbeeld en perifere attitudes niet. In Studies 4.1 tot 4.4 
zijn ook steeds maten opgenomen voor commitment. Echter, er werden geen enkele 
effecten gevonden op de gevolgen die zijn onderzocht in Hoofdstuk 4. Dit verschil geeft 
opnieuw steun voor het onderscheid tussen centraliteit en commitment als twee 
grotendeels onafhankelijke sterktedimensies.
In Hoofdstuk 5 werden consequenties onderzocht die betrekking hebben op 
verschillen in commitment. In dit hoofdstuk werd de invloed van attitudesterkte op 
processen van zelfperceptie onderzocht. Zelfperceptie betreft het afleiden van attitudes uit 
eigen gedrag (‘je bent wat je  doet’). Hoewel in voorgaand onderzoek al naar voren is 
gekomen dat sterke attitudes minder beïnvloed worden door zelfperceptie effecten dan
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zwakke attitudes, poogt het onderzoek dat is beschreven in hoofdstuk 5 meer nauwkeurig 
te analyseren welke dimensie van attitudesterkte cruciaal is in de modererende rol van 
attitudesterkte op zelfperceptie effecten.
In Studie 5.1 werd centraliteit en commitment van de attitude ten opzichte van 
Amnesty International gemeten in een eerste fase van het onderzoek. Een week later werd 
de helft van de proefpersonen gevraagd of ze een petitie wilden tekenen voor Amnesty 
International. Zoals verwacht bleek het zetten van de handtekening effect te hebben op 
attitudes voor proefpersonen met een zwakke commitment, maar niet voor proefpersonen 
met een sterke commitment. Ook in overeenstemming met de hypotheses bleek 
centraliteit geen modererende rol te spelen met betrekking tot zelfperceptie effecten. In 
Studie 5.2 werd commitment gemanipuleerd op dezelfde manier als in Studie 3.1. 
Proefpersonen werden gevraagd om hun attitudes herhaaldelijk uit te drukken of maar één 
keer. Vervolgens bleek dat zelfperceptie effecten alleen werden gevonden in de conditie 
waarin proefpersonen hun attitude slechts een keer hadden geuit, maar niet wanneer ze de 
attitude herhaaldelijk hadden geuit. Deze resultaten suggereren dat zwakke commitment 
attitudes worden afgeleid uit gedrag, terwijl sterke commitment attitudes simpelweg 
worden opgehaald uit het geheugen. Doordat mensen met een sterke commitment de 
betreffende attitude gemakkelijk ondubbelzinnig kunnen ophalen uit hun geheugen is er 
geen reden meer om verder na te denken over de attitude, waardoor allerlei invloeden 
vanuit de context, waaronder eigen gedrag, minder invloed hebben op de attitude.
Samenvattend biedt dit proefschrift een systematische analyse van twee 
belangrijke dimensies van attitudesterkte en levert daardoor een bijdrage aan ons inzicht 
in de aard van attitudesterkte. Zoals we in het proefschrift laten zien, is attitudesterkte 
beter te begrijpen wanneer sterkte wordt gerelateerd aan structurele kenmerken van 
attitudes. Eerdere factor-analytische studies suggereerden dat centraliteit en commitment 
te onderscheiden dimensies zijn van attitudesterkte. Dit werd herhaaldelijk gerepliceerd in 
het huidige onderzoek. Echter de structurele en functionele kenmerken van deze 
dimensies bleven tot dusver onduidelijk. Door systematisch de structurele kenmerken, 
psychologische processen en de gevolgen van centraliteit en commitment te analyseren, 
hebben wij getracht ons inzicht in de aard van deze twee sterktedimensies te vergroten. 
De resultaten suggereren dat centraliteit beschouwd kan worden als een deelaspect van de 
inter-attitudinale structuur, namelijk de sterkte van de associatie tussen een attitude en 
kernaspecten van het zelf. Centrale attitudes maken dus deel uit van een groter cognitief 
netwerk, terwijl perifere attitudes relatief geïsoleerd zijn gerepresenteerd in het geheugen. 
Ondanks sterke associaties van een attitude met kernaspecten van het zelf, kan de interne 
structuur van een attitude relatief zwak zijn. De huidige resultaten suggereren dat
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commitment juist wordt bepaald door aspecten van deze intra-attitudinale structuur, 
waaronder de sterkte van de associatie tussen een attitude-object en een globale evaluatie. 
De mentale representatie van centrale attitudes alszijnde verbonden met het zelf 
suggereert dat centrale attitudes een belangrijke motivationele kracht hebben. Hierdoor 
hebben centrale attitudes meer invloed op waarde-expressief gedrag. Commitment 
verwijst naar de mate waarin mensen in staat zijn om een heldere en overtuigde attitude 
op te halen uit het geheugen. Hierdoor hebben context-effecten, waaronder invloeden van 
iemands eigen gedrag, minder invloed op attitude expressies. Deze resultaten met 
betrekking tot de consequenties suggereren dat centraliteit en commitment verschillende 
attitude functies dienen. Centraliteit lijkt te verwijzen naar de mate waarin attitudes een 
zelf- of waarde-expressieve functie van attitudes dienen. Centrale attitudes kunnen helpen 
bij het nastreven van belangrijke doelen in ons leven en de regulatie van onze 
zelfwaardering, terwijl perifere attitudes deze functies niet dienen, omdat ze niet 
verbonden zijn met kernaspecten van het zelf. Commitment lijkt gerelateerd aan de 
kennisfunctie van attitudes. Deze kennisfunctie houdt in dat attitudes orde kunnen 
scheppen in onze omgeving door te kunnen vertrouwen op heldere attitudes die makkelijk 
zijn op te halen uit het geheugen. Sterk gecommitteerde attitudes stellen ons in staat om 
overtuigd beslissingen te nemen, zonder dat we er (lang) over hoeven na te denken. 
Kortom, het proefschrift suggereert dat de twee belangrijkste sterktedimensies, 
commitment en centraliteit, verschillende onderliggende structurele attitudekenmerken 
hebben, leiden tot verschillende consequenties en verschillende functies van attitudes 
reflecteren. Hiermee hopen we een bijdrage te hebben geleverd aan een beter begrip over 
de manier waarop attitudes invloed hebben op onze waarneming en ons gedrag, kortom, 
meer inzicht in de aard van sterke en zwakke attitudes.
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